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on the actions of soldiers and employees of the Military Intelligence Services (WSI) and 

military organizational entities performing military intelligence and counter-intelligence 

activity before coming into the force of the Act July 9, 2006 on Military Intelligence 

Services to the extent determined in Art. 67 subpar. 1 p. 1 through 10 of the Act of June 9, 

2006 "Regulations Implementing the Military Counter-intelligence Service and the Military 

Intelligence Service Act and the Duties of the Military Counter-intelligence Service and 
Military Intelligence Service Officers Act" and other actions going beyond the issues of the 

State defense and safety of the Polish Army. 

Table of contents: 


1. Power of the Services - the Map of Research Problems 12 

2. WSI Finances 25 

3. Russian Penetration: the Threats for Internal and External Safety of the State 28 

4. WSI Use of Security Service Apparatus - Case Study 65 

5. Surveillance of Political Environment by the WSI 71 

6. Impact of the WSI on the Forming of the Public Opinion 92 

7. Illegal Arms Trade 106 

8. Irregularities Related to the Protection of the Tender for Wheeled APC 119 

9. Interference of the WSI on the Fuel and Energy Market 128 

10. Activities of the WSI Officers in the Military Technical Academy 136 

11. Other Irregularities in the WSI Operations 144 

12. Operation ZEN 153 

Conclusion 162 


Legal basis 

The Act of amending the Act - the Regulations Implementing the Military Counter- 
intelligence Service and the Military Information Service Act and the Duties of the Military 
Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Officers Act (the Journal of 
Laws of 2007, No. 7, item 49), passed on December 14, 2006, imposed on the President of the 
Republic of Poland a duty of announcing to the public the Report on the actions of soldiers and 
employees of the Military Intelligence Service (the WSI) and military organizational entities 
performing military intelligence and counter-intelligence duties, going beyond the area of such 
activities and services, as determined by the law, issued by the President of Verification 

The scope of information included in the Report 

According to Art. 70a of the Act of December 14, 2006, the Report comprises information about 
the activity of soldiers and employees of special services (and the persons co-operating with 
them) concerning: 

o disclosure or use of the information making the State secret or; 

o omission to notify the prosecution agencies of criminal acts; 

o obstruction and disconcerting penal proceedings; 

o use of violence and illegal threats; 

o exerting illegal affect on decisions made by the public authorities; 

o keeping secret cooperation with entrepreneurs and persons acting in public media; 

o falsifying information in order to exercise or extend penal proceedings against specific 

o taking financial or personal benefits from the above mentioned actions; 

o and any other actions going beyond the matters of State defense and safety of the Polish 

As set forth in the Act, the Report also includes information about the persons co-operating 
with soldiers and employees of special military services, who performed the above mentioned 
actions, and the persons, who induced them to perform such actions or facilitated their 

It was also the Parliament's will to disclose the information about the persons occupying leading 
state positions, who knowing about the activities of the military special services going beyond the 
prevailing regulations of the law, did not undertake any actions aiming at discontinuation of such 
actions in the Report. 

Legal basis of the actions of Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) and their predecessors 
after 1989. 

Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) and their legal predecessors - military 
organizational entities executing the military intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks 
constituted and integral part of the Polish Army. The tasks of the Armed Forces were determined 
in the constitutional regulation prevailing from December 31, 1989 and in the Act of November 
21, 1967 on General Duty of Defense of Polish People's Republic, according to which the Armed 
Forces safeguarded the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation, its safety and peace. 
As part of the Polish Army, the military special services could act exclusively within the scope of 
State defense and safety. Amendment to the Constitution of December 29, 1989 imposed on the 
governmental agencies the order to act exclusively on the grounds of the regulations of the law, 
and made the observance of the law of the Republic of Poland their fundamental duty. 

Statutory legal bases for intelligence and counter-intelligence activity were introduced by 
the Act of October 25, 1991 on amendment of the Act on General Duty of Defense of the Polish 
People's Republic and certain other acts. This Act has strictly determined the obligations of 
Military Intelligence Services (the WSI), indicating that they include only the tasks relating to 
identification and counteracting the threats being detrimental to State defense and breach of the 
State secret relating to defense. This Act used for the first time the name of Military Information 
Services (the WSI) in relation to military special services. Up to 2003 there was no 

comprehensive regulations relating to the WSI. The Act of July 9, 2003 on Military Intelligence 
Service (the WSI) set forth the details of the tasks assigned to these services, restricting them 
explicitly to counteracting the threats being detrimental to the Armed Forces safety and to 
interdependence of the State, to its territory and boundaries. The Act on Military Intelligence 
Services (the WSI) of July 9, 2003 determined allowable forms of operating activity, binding 
them in each case with realization of statutory tasks of these services. 

It is beyond any doubt, that according to the law prevailing after 1989, the intelligence 
and counter-intelligence services, and then, from December 1992 the Military Information 
Services, could interfere - in the forms permissible by law - in social and economic life only in 
such situations, in which it was directly linked with State defense or safety. In the remaining 
scope such interference was possible in the event in which the law permitted it - only through the 
actions of special civil services of the State Security Office ('Urzaxl Ochrony Panstwa' - UOP), 
and then Agencja Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetanego ('Internal Security Agency'). 

Every action of military special services going beyond the above mentioned areas, 
independent from the period in which it took place, made a breach of prevailing regulations of the 
law and violation of an oath binding the soldiers of Military Information Services (the WSI), 
which imposed on them a duty to protect the Constitution. 
The object of examination and the legal ground of Commission work 

The object of the examinations making the basis for this Report, issued by the 
Verification Commission, were the actions and acts of soldiers and other persons to the extent 
indicated in Art. 70 a subpar. 1 through 3 of the Act "Regulations Implementing the Military 
Counter-intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service Act and the Duties of the 
Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Officers Act". They have 
been established by the Verification Commission appointed by the President of Republic of 
Poland and the Prime Minister according to Art. 63 subpar. 1 of the Act and the Prime Minister's 
Decree of July 26, 2006 on the course of action of the Verification Commission appointed in 
connection with liquidation of the Military Information Services (the WSI) (the Journal of Laws 
No. 135, item 953). The Commission, working based on the Act and Decree of the Prime 
Minister was collecting and analyzing materials originating from the hearings of the soldiers of 
the WSI and third persons, and from the archive files and files of pending matters, being at the 
disposal of the WSI (Military Information Services, SKW (Military Counter-intelligence 

Service), SWW (Military Intelligence Service), IPN (The Institute of National Remembrance), 
CAW (Central Military Archives). 

Legal regulations relating to hearings 

The Verification Commission started its works on August 2, 2006. By September 30, 
2006 the needs of the Commissions were fulfilled by the proxy responsible for Military Counter- 
intelligence Service organization, at present they are fulfilled by the Chief of this organization. 
As regards access to the WSI source materials, until September 30 the Commission took 
advantage of the access authorized thanks to the WSI management vested in Deputy Minister of 
Defense. From September 30 th , the access to archive materials is realized through the Minister of 
National Defense within the scope of the access to the qualified collection of the Institute of 
National Remembrance (IPN) and Central Military Archive (CAW), the Chief of Military 
Intelligence to Services (as regards the access to the files of the 2 n Directorate of the General 
Staff of Polish People's Army and the 2 nd Directorate WSI) and Chief of Military Counter- 
intelligence Services (as regards access to the files of Internal Military Services (WSW) and the 
3 Directorate of Military Information Services (the WSI). Full description of the issues 
associated with Commission activity shall be provided in the final report from the works of the 
Commission, in compliance with Art. 70 subpar. 1 and 2 of the Act. 

Legal considerations and the value of the hearings of the WSI soldiers 

In addition to materials originating from the archived files (operating files, personal files 
("teczka"), files of verification proceedings), the Commission has also used the files of clearance 
proceedings, established on the grounds of oral and written statements of the WSI soldiers and 
third persons, and from materials produced in result of their hearings before the Commission 
pursuant to regulations of Art. 67, 68, 69, 76 subpar. 2 and 6 and Art. 79 of the Act. It should be 
underlined in this point that while the written statements were submitted in compliance with Art. 
79 - "One, who (...) stated untruth shall be subject to a penalty of i No. 31/Sztab imprisonment 
from 6 months to 8 years" - the relations given during the hearings did not fall within such rigor. 
On the contrary, the legislator released the person heard before the Commission from 
responsibility, if he/she conceded to the untruth contained in his/her statement. The party 
submitting the statement did not have an obligation to respond to the questions, either. Third 

persons (including e.g. the former solders of Military Intelligence Service and the 2 nd Directorate 
of General Staff, and in general all the soldiers who did not apply for employment in new 
services) did not have an obligation to appear before the commission, and to testify in the matters 
related to State secret, they had to obtain the consent of Minister of National Defense. These 
regulations were changed under the amendment to the Act of January 17, 2007, which came into 
force on February 1, 2007. 

The role and importance of hearings is considerable. In many events the information received this 
way makes a first important signal enabling seeking further sources as regards a given problem. 
It was so e.g. in the event of the system of training in the Soviet Union and in other the socialistic 
camp countries, and particularly in the "GWIAZDA" case, managed by the WSI 
The same situation is in the event of the case relating to organized group known under the Polish 
name "Rolowisko" [rather untranslatable, in English would be: a field of fools, from Polish slang: 
'rolowac' meaning approximately 'cheating'. Translator's notes are in [brackets]], binding 
politicians of SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) and higher-rank military men. Though first 
information on this subject obtained by Commission referred to "Zwalowisko" [a heap or so], but 
they precisely described the same group of people, mechanisms and subject of activity, which is 
called "Rolowisko" in the WSI files, discovered at a later date. 

This matter would most probably not have been detected for a long period, if it had not 
been for the information received during the hearings before the Commission. It could not be 
found in the archives or in the unit competent ratione loci for the case, it was not shown on the 
list of wildcat ventures, to which the Minister of National Defense obliged the then Chief of the 
WSI Jan Zukowski. The soldiers notifying of this had only fragmentary knowledge, as they were 
bound by the prohibition to carry this case. But it was just this knowledge, which enabled the 
Commission finding the files kept by the unit located more than 300 km away. 

A similar situation took place in the matters relating to fuel, connected to the 'Orlen' 
affair ['Orlen' = state-controlled oil company in contemporary Poland]. The Verification 
Commission obtained information from operating officers that field WSI branches were dealing 
with this affair, but the information gathered by them was blocked at a central level. The WSI 
Command inhibited the actions at operating level, and it did not communicate the information on 
this subject to other governmental agencies. The same situation was in the event of politicians' 
so-called 'invigilation' (or surveillance) and "Pro Civili" Fund affairs, and in result with the affair 


relating to action of group of the WSI soldiers and international adventurers extracting money to 
the detriment of the WAT ('Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna' - Military University of 
Technology. Precise indication of the place of search of the files and persons would not be 
possible without information obtained from the soldiers making statements before the 

Also in the matter of illegal trade in arms, and particularly connection with this activity of 
some WSI officers, the information received during the hearings played very important role. But 
it is beyond any doubt that this type of sources was most important for reconstruction of the 
relations reigning inside the services, for establishing the personal relations and for common 
crime identification for investigation of phenomena, having material affect on the shape and 
quality of the WSI activity. 

The considerations and value of the sources originating from the WSI archives 
The basic sources for Commission examinations are the files of the Military Information, Internal 
Military Services (WSW), 2 nd Directorate of General Staff of Polish People's Army and Military 
Information Services (the WSI) - i.e. successive mutations of military organizational structures in 
the communist period and in the years 1991-2006, dealing formally with the defense of the 
Armed Forces and widely understood safety of defense-related areas. These files were many 
times destroyed and taken over, together with their ownership title, by successive teams 
managing the services. The action of destroying the WSI files, performed in the years 1988-1989 
under the leadership of the then chief of the WSI Edmund Bula is well known. The report of 
1991, discussing these actions, prepared by the Parliamentary sub commission presided by the 
representative Janusz Okrzesik, indicated several guilty persons and part of the events 
accompanying these events. The political restrictions existing at that time prevented the full 
analysis of this effect. First, the activity of Okrzesik's sub-commission was limited to the matters 
relating to the WSI actions, hence they did not relate to the 2 nd Directorate of the General Staff. 
In this way, Okrzesik's Report became one of the tools facilitating taking over the management 
of Military Information Services (the WSI), which were created at that time by the officers of the 
2 nd Directorate of the General Staff. 

As for the rest, this Report has never been published and it is not available in unclassified 
Parliament materials, and the only copy known to the Commission is kept in Parliamentary 
archives. It is characteristic that this Report does not contain any information, which would be 

key for the evaluation of archives' status - which was otherwise confirmed in numerous verbal 
communications, including this confirmed in the files of "GWIAZDA" case, stating namely that 
prior to the first scheduled destruction of files, the Chief of WSI General Bula instructed to have 
them screened and than transferred them to USSR services, i.e. GRU. 

Destruction of files and the system of hiding the files after 1989 

The specifics of transformations performed in the army after 1989, consisting in 
maintaining the basic structures and the old cadre of the special forces and in subordinating them 
to the management of the officers originating from the 2 nd Directorate of the Staff General, 
confirmed that no conclusions were drawn from the image of the situation outlined in Okrzesik's 
Report, and particularly the possibility of manipulating the files in the future was not prevented. 

As it can be seen from data delivered by the Liquidation Commission to the Deputy 
Minister of Defense and from the statements made before Verification Commission, the files of 
former military services or files produced by individual WSI units on an on-going basis, were 
systematically destroyed and hidden. This is also proved by the report of Parliamentary 
Commission for Special Services of September 2003, containing among others reports of the to 
public prosecutor's office of the crime of falsifying the files ("teczka") of the operational case 
"BELFER" [beak understood as a teacher]. Identical practices were stated by the Verification 
Commission during the analysis of files of among others the 4 th Directorate of the WSI, i.e. the 
later Internal Security Office. It relates particularly to the files of the investigation of right wing 
politicians and investigations of the Russian human source networks, run by the 2 n and 3 r 

In turn, as it relates from the report prepared by Wojciech Sawicki from the Liquidation 
Commission, starting from 1992, the process of establishing of a new system, aimed at hiding 
material information before the lustration-related [vetting-related, screening-related] legislation 
coming into force, was initiated. Part of this system was establishment of two quasi-archival 
sections; section 26 in the Intelligence Directorate and Section 35 in the Counter-intelligence 
Directorate, named for hiding their actual functions - "non permanent stores of non-archival 
data" These sections gathered operational cases of special importance, relating to politicians, 
business activists and media representatives, updated but not managed on an on-ongoing basis. 
"Non permanent stores of non-archival data" were the place to which the files were referred prior 


to their possible transfer to the Institute of Remembrance. The advantage of this structure was the 
fact that in the case of a question about archives or archive files one could reply that it did not 
relate to the materials placed in the "stores", as from the organizational structure point of view 
"stores" were not the archives, and the files kept there were not archival - it provided the excuse 
for not revealing them to the organs of the Spokesman for Public Interest and the Institute of 
National Remembrance. At the same time, it was a place in which the basic aids for keeping the 
filing system were kept, enabling orientation in the files transferred to the Institute of National 

Also after the Act of the Institute of National Remembrance come into effect, the 
realization of the plan of the files' destruction and hiding was continued. It is proved, among 
others, by an attempt of destroying the personal data by deleting them with the use of a marker in 
"Book No. 12", containing the register of agents from 'Wybrzeze Gdanskie' [Three-Cities: 
Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia Region] from the 70'ies and 80'ies. Thanks to the work of the Verification 
Commission and the Liquidation Commission, over 1000 files hidden in WSI premises were 
found, which should have been transferred to the Institute of National Remembrance many years 
ago. In addition, the facts of carrying unregistered cooperation were stated, including storing the 
labor files and personal files of agents in a way suggesting an intention to hide them (this 
concerns among others the personal files "M" connected with the "ZEN" case, and stored in 
separate premises without the knowledge of the responsible officer). 

All this makes the examined files far incomplete (it relates first of all to files stored in the 
command, the resources kept in the agencies and 'inspectorates' (inspection /field/ offices) i.e. in 
field units, which are in much better condition). 

In conclusion it should be stated, what follows: the Commission started its works focusing 
on the identification of irregularities resulting from the actions of the soldiers of former WSI to 
the extent indicated in the Act of June 9, 2006. The Report presented below refers to the works of 
the Verification Commission, which are still not completed. The Act of December 14, 2006 on 
Amendment to the Act - Regulations Implementing Military Counter-intelligence Service and 
Military Intelligence Service Act, enable the presentation of further publications, together with 
the appearance of new materials. 

The Verification Commission provided the Public Prosecutor's Office information on 
committing crimes in the following cases: 


- in the case of the Russian penetration of Military Information Services (the WSI) and omission 
to undertake appropriate actions aiming at the neutralization of the threat; 

- in the case of abasement of powers and taking over State assets in order to illegally acquire 
funds for financing special services; 

- in the case of illegal trade in arms, and hiding documents; 

- in the case of acting to the detriment of the State Treasury and State safety through preferential 
treatment of the Company SILTEC in tenders organized for the Polish Armed Forces; 

- in the case of establishing a residency, whose agents undertook illegal actions with the 
participation of former, non verified employees of the [Communist] Security Service (Sluzba 
Bezpieczenstwa - SB); 

- in the case of irregularities relating to the management of operational funds in the Krakow 
WSI branch and alienation of operational premises; 

- in the case of misleading Polish State authorities by providing false information being of 
material importance for the Republic of Poland and failure in fulfillment of obligations; 

in the case of irregularities relating to tender for wheeled APC; 

- in the case of illegal surveillance of political parties; 

in the case of carrying investigative activity against the interest of defense of the Republic of 
Poland and its Armed Forces; 

- in the case of disclosing, for financial benefit - confidential information by the employees of 
the Polish ministries and non communication by the WSI the information about State energy 
threats to appropriate authorities; 

- in the case of disclosing the state secret and using illegal threats; 

The Report contains 24 documentary annexes, in which the problems referred to above are 
discussed in more detail. 


1. Power of the Services - the map of research problems 

In the eighties two structures composed the military services of the People's Republic of Poland. 
These were: the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish People's Army (Zarzqd II 
Sztabu Generalnego Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, established at least in this form in 1951 
foreign intelligence) and the Military Internal Services (Wojskowe Sluzby Wewnetrzne) 
established from the Military Information (Informacja Wojskowa), acting simultaneously as C.I. 
as well as 'gendarmerie' (military police), but in reality being merely a kind of military political 
police). In 1990 the gendarmerie was excluded from the WSW but the rest was included into the 
2nd Directorate of the General Staff. Newly established in the autumn of 1991, the structure was 
named the Military Intelligence Services [in Polish: Wojskowe Sluzby Informacyjne, thus the 
WSI]. In 1991 WSI as a separate 'Inspectorate' (Polish: Tnspektorat') was put under the 
command of the Minister of National Defense. In 1994 WSI returned under the subordination of 
the General Staff finally under the Ministry once again. In 2006 the Parliament's [the Sejm, 
Poland's Lower Chamber] Act dissolved the WSI and in its place established two separated 
services: the Military Counter Intelligence Service - MCIS and the Military Intelligence Service - 
MIS (SKW and SWW [in Polish: Sluzba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego and Sluzba Wywiadu 
Wojskowego]). They are both the State's central administration organs. 

Organizational changes made in the end of eighties and in the beginning of nineties did not have 
a crucial impact. [Military] Service(s) have played a function of political apparatus continuously. 
The present work of the Verification Commission helped to uncover the picture of the real 
structure of the military services: amongst almost 10 thousand collaborators of the military 
services acting inside the country as well as abroad in the year 1990, at least 2500 consisted of 
people being placed in central administrative and economic institutions of the country. Just the 
enumeration of this institution and then the people acting in their structures as WSI collaborators 
presented the real scope and size of the problem, facing Poland after re-gaining its independence 


after 1989. This problem is illustrated below presenting a list encompassing of as many as 2457 
WSI collaborators being placed in WSI 'assets' in civil institutions of the [so-called] People's 
Republic of Poland. 

Central State Offices (Urzedy centralne): 

Council of Ministers Office - 6 

Sejm's Chancellery - 1 

MFA - 108 

State Institute for International Relations [connected or in some years part of MFA] - 7 

Foreign Commerce Ministry (Ministerstwo Handlu Zagranicznego) - 32 

Ministry of Internal Commerce (Ministerstwo Handlu Wewnetanego) - 1 

Labor Ministry (Ministerstwo Pracy) - 1 

the other ministries - 1 3 

Office for Religious Denomination (Urzad ds. Wyznan) - 1 
Other of state administration offices: 

Central Statistical Office - 3 

District Mining Office - 1 

State Committee for Normalization - 2 

Air Traffic Board (Zarzaxl Ruchu Lotniczego) - 3 

Maritime Economy Office (Seared Gospodarki Morskiej) - 3 

Telecommunication Office - 2 

Customs Office - 1 

Social Security Office (Zaklad Ubezpieczen Spolecznych) - 1 

Courts and Prosecutor's Offices - 4 

Territorial 'self-government offices' (Samorzaxl terytorialny, rady narodowe, rady gmin, 

urzedy wojewodzkie) - 14 

Political and social organizations (central bodies): 

Central Committee of PZPR (Communist Party) (Komitet Centralny Polskiej Zjednoczonej 

Partii Robotniczej) - 2 

Communist Trade-unions (Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiajzkow Zawodowych) - 1 


Polish-Soviet Friendship Association (Towarzystwo Przyjazni Polsko-Radzieckiej) - 2 
'People's Party' (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe) [Communists' Ally] - 1 
Socialist Youth Union (Zwiajzek Mlodziezy Socjalistycznej) - 1 
Country Youth Union (Zwi^zek Mlodziezy Wiejskiej) - 1 
Socialist Polish Youth Union (Zwi^zek Socjalistycznej Mlodziezy Polskiej) - 1 
Polish Students Association (Zrzeszenie Studentow Polskich) - 4 

'Democratic Party Central Committee (Centralny Komitet Stronnictwa Demokratycznego) 
[Communists' Ally] - 1 

Trade Unions Central Council (Centralna Rada Zwiajzkow Zawodowych) - 1 
All-Poland Labor Battalions (Ogolnopolskie Hufce Pracy) - 5 
Association 'Polonia' (Towarzystwo Polonia) [for expatriates, Poles abroad] - 3 
Agriculture Circles Union (Zwi^zek Kolek Rolniczych) - 1 
Academies, Universities, etc.: 

Mining-Metallurgical Academy (Academia Gorniczo-Hutnicza) - 7 

Agriculture university-level schools - 17 

Medical university-level schools (akademie medyczne) - 10 

Technical University in Gdansk - 8 

Technical University in Krakow (Politechnika Krakowska) - 4 

Technical University in Szczecin (Politechnika Szczecinska) - 18 

Technical University in Katowice (Politechnika Slajska) - 5 

Technical University in Warsaw (Politechnika Warszawska) - 22 

Technical University in Wroclaw (Politechnika Wroclawska) - 20 

the other technical universities- 9 

'Main School for Planning and Statics' (Szkola Glowna Planowania i Statystyki) [so-called 

'Polish Harvard'] - 10 

University of Poznan (Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu) - 7 

University of Krakow (Uniwersytet Jagiellonski) - 6 

University of Lodz (Uniwersytet Lodzki) - 4 

University of Lublin (Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej w Lublinie) - 3 

University of Wroclaw (Uniwersytet Wroclawski) - 6 







University of Warsaw (Uniwersytet Warszawski) - 20 
Physical Education Academy (Academia Wychowania Fizycznego) - 3 
Pedagogical academies (wyzsze szkoly pedagogiczne) - 3 
Professional academies (wyzsze szkoly zawodowe) - 7 
Other universities in Poland (inne szkoly wyzsze) - 18 

• 342 students in the registry as collaborators of military services; the highest number (106) in 
the years 1987-1990 

Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Academia Nauk) - 38 

• Research Institute (Instytuty naukowe) - 41 

• high-schools, technical and professional high-schools (licea, technika i szkoly zawodowe) - 

• elementary schools - 4 

Journalists in TV, Radio and Press - editorial offices (Redakcje telewizyjne, radio we i 
prasowe) - 67, including: 

TV and radio - 28 

Polish Press Agency (Polska Agencja Prasowa) - 10 

"Rzeczpospolita" daily - 3 

"Trybuna Ludu" daily - 4 

"Sztandar Mlodych" daily - 3 

"ITD" students' weekly - 2 

as well as following titles: "Chlopska Droga", "Przeglaxl Techniczny", "Sportowiec", "Glos 


"Wieczor", "Tygodnik Polski", "Radar" and the other ( i inne redakcje) - 

Holding RSW "Prasa, Ksia^zka, Ruch" ['Press, Book & Movement' - state monopoly for 

press distribution] - 7 
Artistic and cultural institutions, publishers and printing offices (Instytucje artystyczne i 
kulturalno-oswiatowe, wydawnictwa i drukarnie) - 21 

• Hospitals and medical institutions (Szpitale i zaklady opieki zdrowotnej) - 34 



Bank Handlowy - 5 

Pekao SA - 4 

'Narodowy Bank Polski' [National Bank] - 3 

Other - 2 

Insurance companies - 3 

International Commerce Centrals (Centrale Handlu Zagranicznego: 

Agros - 9 

Animex - 9 

Baltona - 12 

Budimex - 6 

Chemitex - 3 

Ciech - 22 

Coopexim - 6 

DAL - 12 

Dromex - 2 

Elektrim - 24 

Hortex - 1 1 

Impexmetal - 35 

Kolmex - 3 

Megadex - 3 

Metalexport - 33 

Metronex - 14 

Minex - 15 

Paged - 6 

Pewex - 1 

Polcoop - 7 

Polimex (Polimex Cekop) - 25 

Polservice - 19 

Rolimpex - 5 


Skorimpex - 12 

Stalexport - 8 

Textilimpex - 7 

Universal - 19 

Varimex - 33 

the other - 23 
as well as: 

Polish Intl. Commerce Chamber (Polska Izba Handlu Zagranicznego) - 2 

companies established by expatriates ([called:] 'firmy polonijne') - 25 

'International Poznan Fairs' Miedzynarodowe Targi Poznanskie - 2 

Commercial establishments (Przedsiebiorstwa handlowe): 

Agromet - 17 

Centrozap - 19 

Centromor - 15 

the other - 7 
Military Production Companies (Przedsiebiorstwa branzy zbrojeniowej): 

Bumar - 12 

Cenzin - 1 

CZInz - 3 

Inter Vis - 1 

Steo - 1 

Vis- 1 
Fuel & Energy Companies (Przedsiebiorstwa sektora paliwowo-energetycznego): 


Gdanskie Zaklady Rafineryjne - 1 

Naftobudowa - 1 

the other of this kind - 32 
Metalurgical and mining establishments (Huty i kopalnie, sektor gorniczy): 

mines - 1 1 

foundry, ironworks - 9 


• commercial establishment 'W^glokoks - 14 

• another mining establishments (inne przedsiebiorstwa gornicze) - 3 

Industrial conglomerates, holdings (Zjednoczenia przemyslowe) - 7 

Transport companies (Przedsiebiorstwa transportowe i spedycyjne): 

• LOT Airlines - 143 

• PKP Railways - 5 

• PKS Bus Long-distance Company- 15 

• Hartwig Spedition- 15 

• Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, Ship Company - 36 

• Polska Zegluga Beraltycka Ship Company- 32 

• Polska Zegluga Morska Ship Company - 26 

Maritime sector Companies [besides above mentioned] (Przedsiebiorstwa zwia^zane z 
gospodarka^ morskaj: 

Dalmor, ocean fishery company - 9 

Nawimor - 3 

Polcargo - 10 

Polfracht - 8 

the other sea transport companies - 6 

shipyards - 41 

the other companies connected with the shipyards - 14 

port authorities - 10 
Electronic sector (Zaklady branzy elektronicznej) - 32 

TV- and Radiostations (Nadawcze Stacje Radiowo-Telewizyjne) - 3 

osrodki ZETO centers- 5 
Pharmaceutical branch companies, production and commerce (Zaklady branzy 
farmaceutycznej - produkcyjne i handlowe) - 4 
Aviation branch companies (Zaklady branzy lotniczej) - 8 

Automotive branch companies (Przedsiebiorstwa produkcyjne i handlowe branzy 
motoryzacyjnej) - 15 
Production companies - the others branches (Zaklady produkcyjne roznych branz) - 189 


Construction companies (Przedsiebiorstwa budowlane) - 60 

• Communal companies (Przedsiebiorstwa komunalne) - 23 

R&D centers for industry, project bureaus, etc. (Osrodki badawczo-rozwojowe zwiajzane z 
roznymi gal^ziami przemyslu, biura projektowe i konstrukcyjne) - 49 
Tourist sector (Biura turystyczne i biura podrozy): 

• Orbis - 22 

• Almatur - 3 

• Gromada - 3 

• Juwentur - 5 

• the other firms - 4, except 

• hotels - 2 

Building administrations and dwelling-cooperatives, cooperatives at large (Spoldzielczosc i 
spoldzielczosc mieszkaniowa oraz administracje mieszkaniowe) - 38 
Single collaborators were placed also in:: 

• Central arrest (areszt sledczy) 

• Work office (biuro zatrudnienia) - 1 

• Treasury Printinghouse (Drukarnia Skarbowa) - 1 

• taxi-cab firms (firmy taksowkarskie) - 5 

• Meteorology Institute (Instytut Meteorologii) - 1 

• sport clubs (kluby sportowe) - 3 

• 'Folk Riding Team' ('Ludowy Zespol Jezdziecki') - 1 

• State Mint (Mennica Panstwowa) - 1 

• astronomy observatory (obserwatorium astronomiczne) - 1 

• training centers (osrodki szkoleniowe) - 3 

• State Radio Inspectorate (Panstwowa Inspekcja Radiowa) - 1 

• State Agricultural Establishment (Panstwowe Gospodarstwo Rolne) - 1 

• State Pedagogical Establishment (Panstwowy Zaklad Wychowawczy) - 1 

• Private Foreign Language School (Prywatna Szkola J^zykow Obcych) - 1 

• Materiel Management Council (Rada Gospodarki Materialowej) - 1 

• Regional Technical Authority (Rejonowy Dozor Techniczny) - 1 


• restaurants - 3 

• Quarantinne and Plant Security Station (Stacja Kwarantanny i Ochrony Roslin) - 1 

• Fire-fighters (straz pozarna) - 1 

• Vacation Establishments for Military (Wojskowy Dom Wypoczynkowy) - 1 

• Communication Club in Wroclaw (Wroclawski Klub La^cznosci) - 1 

• Hunters' Union [of Poland] (Zwia^zek Lowiecki) - 1 

Origins of the WSI 

In 1980, Communist authorities being well-informed as far as to the scope and size of 
socioeconomic and political crisis in Poland amount, forecasted main deterioration of the 
situation of Communist countries. They expected the narrowing of chances for the possibility of 
influencing the external world. Communists expected the worsening of the military-political 
situation with the reality of war coming into effect. In connection with this, special aims were 
put for operational detachments of military intelligence as formulating a concept of secure 
communications between the Central and agency sources working in the West. The plan, which 
was ultimately chosen, set up establishing a network of companies on the territory of the neutral 
countries - from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean. The plan was based on already existing 
expatriate companies ('spolki polonijne') but also planned to establish new companies and to take 
over already existing purely foreign (not expatriates') companies. These firms, working legally as 
regular commercial establishments were supposed to be secret branch offices for communist 
military intelligence and had to concentrate their works on transferring information from 
'agentura' sources in the West to the Soviet Center. The system was expected to be made fully 
operational in 10 years. The plan took for granted that the whole system would require a huge 
amount of financial resources, since the firms had to be in healthy condition on western markets. 
It was expected that the whole scheme would utilize firms sending parcels consisting of western 
goods on commercial basis to Poland for populations as a part of liaison system. In addition for 
the same aim the international TIR connection was studied by military intelligence. The 
Verification Commission identified at least four sources of financing for networks of firms made 
by People's Republic of Poland (PRL) military intelligence during its work. These four sources 
were started already in the Eighties and then were in continuity by the WSI: 

1 . This was income from computer parts smuggled from the West, which were protected in 


the eighties by COCOM by an export embargo to communist countries and necessary for 
the Soviet's arms race. The commission has documented at least two cases in which the 
PRL army intelligence had been involved. The first concerned a network of intermediaries 
organized by Grzegorz Zemek and Piotr Kuczynski during 1983-1985, which was 
according to the prosecuting organs of that time, consisted of approximately 100 persons 
receiving packages containing computer parts from the West. These packages were then 
sold with much profit to the company IMPOL and the transactions were organized by 
Zemek and lead by an agent penetrating the trade union NSZZ "S" in that company. In 
turn IMPOL then sold the goods to army firms belonging to the Ministry of the Interior 
(MSW). This operation was possible due to the cooperation of [PRL - abbreviation in 
Polish: 'People's Republic of Poland'] army intelligence and the western companies 
connected with it. Zemek chose for these operations, along with the Swiss company 
Akerman Electronics, the company BATAx belonging to Wiktor Kubiak; he also 
cooperated with companies noted by the cofounder of IMPOL - Piotr Kuczynski's 
"Capitami" from Belgium and ICL from the United Kingdom and Jerzy Pilch- 
Kowalczyk's firm from the USA. 

2. Enormous profits from the illegal trade of computer parts were also attained by the 4th 
and 8th departments of the Central Board of Engineering (Centralny Zarza^d Inzynierii) which 
was managed in the late eighties by Jerzy Dembowski active as a secret collaborator 
"WIRAKOCZA". The computer parts sold to the USSR and to the Republic of South Korea 
brought profits of approximately 500 - 600 thousand US Dollars per single delivery. This 
was income from computer parts smuggled from the West, which were protected in the 
eighties by COCOM by an export embargo to communist countries and necessary for the 
Soviet's arms race. The commission has documented at least two cases in which the PRL 
army intelligence had been involved. The first concerned a network of intermediaries 
organized by Grzegorz Zemek and Piotr Kuczynski during 1983-1985, which was according 
to the prosecuting organs of that time, consisted of approximately 100 persons receiving 
packages containing computer parts from the West. These packages were then sold with 
much profit to the company IMPOL and the transactions were organized by Zemek and lead 
by an agent penetrating the trade union NSZZ "S" in that company. In turn EVIPOL then sold 


the goods to army firms belonging to the Ministry of the Interior (MSW). This operation was 
possible due to the cooperation of [PRL] army intelligence and the western companies 
connected with it. Zemek chose for these operations, along with the Swiss company Akerman 
Electronics, the company BATAx belonging to Wiktor Kubiak; he also cooperated with 
companies noted by the cofounder of IMPOL - Piotr Kuczynski's "Capitami" from Belgium 
and ICL from the United Kingdom and Jerzy Pilch-Kowalczyk's firm from the USA. 
Enormous profits from the illegal trade of computer parts were also attained by the 4th and 
8th departments of the Central Board of Engineering (Centralnego Zarzq.du Inzynierii) which 
was managed in the late eighties by Jerzy Dembowski active as "WIRAKOCZA" [cryptic 
name for secret collaborator]. The computer parts sold to the USSR and to the Republic of 
South Korea brought profits of approximately 500 - 600 thousand US Dollars per single 
Army intelligence was also involved in illegal financial operations consisting of: 

a. foreign bank transaction of the "PORTFOLIO" and "LETTERS OF CREDIT" yielded 
approximately 40% profit yearly. Sources of financing were among others the funds of the 
Foreign Trade Central (Central Handlu Zagranicznego); the course of some of these 
operations is known due to the human source-originated material concerning Grzegorz 

One of them (not fully explained to this day) was an operation consisting of granting credit 
amounting to 32 million US Dollars Wiktor Kubiak's company BATAX by Zemek acting in 
the name of BHI (a branch of the Bank Handlowy, [Warsaw]) in Luxembourg where he 
fulfilled the role of the director of the Credit Commission; in any case Zemek claimed that 
this loan was never carried out and only a promise of the loan was issued. BATAX, it seems, 
carried out an important strategic role in the PRL army intelligence; 

b. repurchase of Polish debt through Foreign Debt Administration Fund (FOZZ - 'Fundusz 
Obslugi Zadluzenia Zagraniczngo'), lead by a co-worker, secret collaborator of the 
Intelligence i.e. DIK [cryptic name for secret collaborator] (Mr. Grzegorz Zemek). Mr. 
Zemek included among others ABI in his activities; Zemek became the director general of 
FOZZ after consultations carried out by army and civil intelligence. In a report written after 
these consultations, he claimed that the "profits that could additionally be 'milked' from these 
operations amounted to the sum of 500 million US Dollars per year"; 


c. Taking over inheritances of deceased abroad former Polish citizens. Documented profits of 
such operations surpass millions of dollars; 

d. Arms trade with Arab terrorists. Plans and intentions for the year 1990 of Department 'Y' 
(more on its activity and origin follows) included written information that arms trade should 
be an important source of "financing outside the service". Janusz Onyszkiewicz as Minister of 
National Defense published a directive approving "outside financing" of the army. [Gen.] 
Boleslaw Izydorczyk issued approval for operations in the sale of arms to Sudan and Latvia, 
which was supposed to bring profits of around 200 000 - 400 000 USD to the service. 

3. Intelligence had been establishing on the territory of Poland, through theirs secret 
collaborators acting at Polish firms - common ventures ([called even in Polish: 'joint 
venture'), expected to bring in return really huge profits. The example of such business was 
among the others a scheme of a joint establishment made by [Polish national airline] LOT as 
well as started in Chicago a firm by the name of ABI'. Both partners made a casino for 
hazard games located in the Hotel Marriott in Warsaw. Middleman for this operation, in 
whose 'ABI' transferred a million dollars was a company 

BAT AX belonging to Mr. Wiktor Kubiak. 

4. The Foreign Intelligence tried also very hard to start with TV company. Original thinking 
for such activities was to make easy to place secret collaborators on the West. Mr. Grzegorz 
Zemek, who in behalf of Intelligence started his talks with firm called TIT and its 
representatives Mr. Jan Wejchert and Mr. Mariusz Walter, in such a way explained the 
beginning of those undertakings. The very important role was played by a source working in 
[the state-controlled movie-industry firm called] 'Film Polski', however matters were much 
more complicated since also important role in the FOZZ operations played certain Mr. 
Weinfeld, a German citizen of Polish ancestry living in California. Mr. Weinfeld was the 
owner of media industry company. Both Mr. Weinfeld and Mr. Zemek made strong 
involvement in a take-over of the Dutch media-industry company called SEPP and for this 
reason Mr. Zemek in behalf of FOZZ transferred his powers to the firm 'Biccarco' belonged 
to Mr. Andrzej Kuna. 'Biccarco' bought out shares of the SEPP company. In the nineties 
military services built-up around old [from the communist period] Intelligence, around the 
2nd Directorate of the General Staff (Zarza^d II SG), concentrated its efforts on building home 
apparatus as well as making firms acting under cover. The consequences of this practice were 


to gain by the Services extraordinary influence on national economy and many aspects of 
social situation of the country. Secret services put also attention on gaining extra-budget 
financial means. As early as 1983 the Intelligence started to transform itself thoroughly, in 
consequence of this central role gained in this process a special detachment established on the 
1st of November, 1983 so-called 'Y' Department. This unit, whose most personnel was trained 
in the Soviet Union, got very special aims for realization as a kind of re-orienteering 
intelligence activities and making network of firm being secret branch offices for communist 
secret services. 

2. WSI finances 

From November 1985 the cashier's of the Financial Section of the 2 nd Directorate 
received funds for so called operating deposit of Department 'Y', which was to finance the 
operating activity in the event of any threat and period of war. As it can be seen from the book of 
Department 'Y', in 1985 "An amount of 9,000.00 USD was gathered, of which over 6,000.00 
USD was paid to the cash desk of the Directorate". This money originated from off-budgetary 
income gathered on Department 'Y' operational activity. The income was acquired from 
"additional commissions, donations and extra remuneration earned by the under cover officers 
and co-workers acting in foreign companies and income from banking operations and illegal 
taking over of foreign legacies". Getting such funds was possible due to decision of the Chief of 
the General Staff No. POR/01643/74. 

The funds originating from Department 'Y' operational deposit were never transferred to 
banking accounts and they were the source of financing the operations, in which their strict 
documentation was undesirable. 

In the files relating to current currency deposit of Department 'Y' of the 2nd Directorate 
you may find many financial operations, which the Verification Commission can not explain up 
to now as regards their destination. However, there remained some documents, which indicated 
the placements of individual amounts. 

In 1988 Department 'Y' granted to its employee a.k.a. "MER" [cryptic name for secret 
collaborator] (Jan Zaluska) a loan amounting to USD 50,000.00 bearing 20% interest p. a. Zaluska 
was recruited in 1986 and was used for purchasing devices on which an embargo was imposed 
(which usually meant electronic parts with prohibition of export to communist countries, to 
which the USA and other Western states wanted to hinder their participation in the arms race. At 
the beginning of the 90-ies, he was the owner of two companies registered in Poland ("Carpatia" 
and "Agaricus") and an Austrian Company "Riedrich". Granting the loan, Department Y obliged 
Zaluska to employ the persons indicated to him and to transfer to them 5% of profits from 
domestic companies and 3% from Austrian Company. It may be supposed that the real purpose of 
the loan were illegal financial operations, though in the documentation the purpose of this loan 
was presented quite differently: "The objective of the loan was to establish a strict relation 
between "MERC" and command and securing the conditions to place our people in his company. 


"MERC" returned the loan together with interest to the command in January 1991. 

Pursuant to decision of the Chief of Intelligence, in January 1991 all financial obligations of the 

employee towards the Head Office were annulled". 

On October 9, 1990 the amount of 7,000.00 USD was delivered from the cashier's of 
Department 'Y' to Col. Konstanty Malejczyk, based on the letter of Col. Zdzislaw Zylowski. 
There is no evidence confirming return of this amount, nor any explanation of the purpose of its 

Another example of use of financial funds by Department Y was granting a loan 
amounting to 15 thousand US Dollars for undetermined investment purposes to consultant a.k.a. 
"YUGO" [cryptic name for secret collaborator, etc.] 

Available documentation does not allow in many cases to determine the purpose and the 
financial operation for which the WSI officers used the funds taken from current currency deposit 
of Department Y, which is exemplified by a memo dated January 25, 1991 in which confirmed 
the receipt of the amount of 30 thousand US Dollars from Col. Zylowski, constituting return of 
expenditure for investment realized in accordance with decision contained in the letter of 
Department Y No. 0213/PO-Y90. In addition, this document contains a handwritten annotation 
stating that "the benefits expected in a/m memo have not been achieved" 

The 3 Directorate also took advantage of Department 'Y' deposits. Among others Col. 
Eugeniusz Lendzion received, on April 14, 1992, with consent of B. Izydorczyk, an advance 
payment amounting to 100 thousand US Dollars. This amount was to be a security of "the 
objectives indicated in the plan of April 13, 1992 realized in the Military Counter-intelligence 
Services code name Contract No. 01 10/92". 

Financial documentation contains also acceptance for disbursement of the amount 100 
thousand US Dollars from Department 'Y' deposit in favor Marek Mackiewicz. B. Izydorczyk 
gave such consent on June 3, 1992 . 

The funds of Department Y deposit were also raised by the funds originating from various 
operational undertakings realized in the country (the payments amounting to 1 thousand US 
Dollars, 500 USD etc. are noted.) and abroad by e.g. 3 rd Department of WSI 3 rd Directorate (the 
receipt of amount of DM 1,500.00) was noted. 

The above financial operations, though noted in the "Current currency deposit of 
Department Y", have not been noted anywhere else. Particularly there is no mention of them in 


the files relating to WSI banking accounts, kept by the Chief of Financial Section. The 
Verification Commission did not establish what the further history of these funds was. Recent 
entry relates to the operation run out by Col. Malejczyk and Col. Dukaczewski, who on February 
5, 1993 delivered to deposit of Financial Section the amount of FFr (French francs) 552,160.00 
and PLN 43,700.00. Certain trace is also the record from 1991, which ordered to cease receiving 
additional off-budget funds under military intelligence operating activity until the moment in 
which the activity of military intelligence shall become legally sanctioned. At the same time a 
decision was made about opening a banking account in three independent Swiss banks, and 
depositing the amount of 500 thousand US Dollars in each of them. 

This amount - USD 1.5 million taken out from Poland by intelligence, made a minimum 
resource, with which this structure started its activity in the 3 Republic of Poland. This amount 
has never been accounted for. We do not know, how it was disbursed, what profits it brought, as 
it never has been balanced. 

In the light of the above-cited facts the performance of the following persons fulfils the 
instruction in Art. 70 a subpar. 1 and 2 of the Act of June 9, 2006 Regulations Implementing the 
Military Counter-intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service Act and the Duties of 
the Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Officers Act Brig 
General Marek Dukaczewski, Major - General Boleslaw Izydorczyk, Col. Zdzislaw Zylowski, 
Col. Konstanty Malejczyk, Col. Eugeniusz Lendzion. The activity of Jan Zaluska fulfils 
instruction of Art. 70 a subpar. 2 p. 1 of the above cited Act. 
In the described period the Chief of WIS was Rear Admiral Czeslaw Wawrzyniak. 


3. Russian penetration: the threats for internal and external safety of the State 

The Soviet special services (KGB and GRU) established and fully controlled military 
special forces of the Polish People's Republic. It was so in 40-ies and it did not fundamentally 
change before 1989. In 2 nd Directorate of General Staff and in Internal Military Services (the 
WSW), Soviet services had their permanent representations, in which GRU and KGB residents 
were placed. Also on the level of the field structures level of the WSW the contacts with GRU 
officers, who protected individual units of the Soviet army, were established. They had free 
access to military counter-intelligence and intelligence cadre of Polish People's Republic and to 
their operating base, in this to operational documents, computational premises, HUMINT sources 
and information about other collaborators. 

Military Information Services (the WSI) cadre 

The WSI were established in October 1991 as result of joining Internal Military Services 
(the WSW) with 2 nd Directorate of the General Staff. Notwithstanding the new name and new 
management, the WSI maintained the fundamental feature of special services of the countries 
subordinated to the USSR: their cadre was composed of selected and trusted people, who 
underwent special training guarantying their loyalty, whereby in the communist period the Soviet 
services had decisive impact on personnel policy in the 2 nd Directorate of the General Staff, in the 
WSW and in the entire Polish People's Army. Only the persons indicated by them were 
anticipated to exercise commanding functions in military special forces of the Polish People's 
Republic and in military diplomacy, particularly in the NATO states. It was so called 
"perspective cadre" i.e. the officers who were expected to take commanding functions in the 
future. The persons being qualified to this group were directed to GRU or KGB training in the 
Soviet Union or in any other countries of the communist block. 

The analysis of representations submitted before the Verification Commission and 
selected operational cases confirmed that training in the Soviet Union or in military schools of 
other countries of this camp had great weight for the services of the persons, who underwent such 
training. It can be seen from collected information that beginning of Seventies was the time of 
initiating the action of cyclical training of Polish officers in KGB and GRU schools. 


These were master degree studies (full-time or part-time), post-graduate studies (lasting 
six or nine months) or three-month courses, which were organized in special, closed facilities.. 
We still do not know the actual number of the graduates and the type of schools they had 

For example, only in one school year 1973/74 127 Polish students from special services 
were staying in the USSR and studying at its universities and academies. The dynamics of 
changes is confirmed by the fact that, as we may read in the report of the Deputy Military Attache 
at the Embassy of Polish People's Republic in Moscow 
"the number of students trained within one year increased over recent three years almost three 
times". According to other materials gathered so far by the Commission, from the beginning of 
70-es to 1989 at least 800 officers from Poland were studying in the USSR schools. 

Classification to training in the USSR was treated as the award for ideological attitude, 
effects of work and loyalty. The candidates to such training had to fulfill the following eligibility 

• unobjectionable ideological attitude; 

• loyalty to the system, confirmed and verified on regular basis; 

• predisposition to realize operating tasks; 

• unquestioning fulfillment of superiors' instructions. 

• training in the USSR was a precondition for occupying managerial positions in special 
service of the Polish People's Republic. Such cadre policy ensured the control and 
interference level of special services of the People's Polish Republic with Russian 
services, expected by the Russians. 

On the grounds of the relations between the courses participants it is known that during the 
courses the details and procedures of operating actions run by the Polish People's Republic 
services were revealed. The officers were under permanent surveillance of the Soviet special 
services. As It can be seen from their relations, the bugs were planted in their dormitories and in 
lecture halls, and each time the officers were leaving their facilities, they were always 
accompanied by a "tail" ("ogon" in Polish). It is also probable that the KGB recruited Polish 
soldiers. During the courses the officers were asked detailed questions relating to operational 
method used in Poland and the lecturers provided to their students only out of date, book 


The courses organized by the GRU and the KGB for soldiers from the Eastern block countries 
were oriented to gathering knowledge about their participants, their addictions and habits, to 
creation of their psychological profiles and to extension of knowledge about composition of the 
cadres employed by the services. 

"Perspective cadre" was directed from Poland also to the Soviet higher military and civil 
schools and to diplomatic academies kept under strict control of the Soviet special services. The 
training in the Soviet Union underwent among other WSI chiefs (Rear Admiral Kazimierz 
Glowacki and Gen. Marek Dukaczewski), successive chiefs of intelligence, in this Col. 
Waldemar Zak and recent of them, Col. Krzysztof Surdyk. The training in the Soviet Union 
underwent also the chiefs of the WSI Security Department of the WSI Col. Marek Witkowski 
(GRU course) and Col. Andrzej Zietkiewicz (KGB course). Also the officers under cover from 
Department Y underwent training (later Department 22 of the 2nd Directorate). The persons 
delegated to training were medium-aged, having command of foreign languages and achieving 
good results in operating activity. Recent training were carried by the KGB and GRU as late as 
on the turn of the Eighties and Nineties, when the dissolution of communist bloc was inevitable. 
According to data possessed by the Verification Commission, the officers sent to the Soviet 
courses were the officers expected to take managerial positions in the new service in the period 
following the political changes (together with the agency of the influence). 
For certain participants it was already the second such training. 

The events of the WSI officers' training in Russia were noted as late as in 1992 and 1993, 36. The 
fact that until 2006 several dozen graduates from the Russian training and courses served in the 
WSI structures confirms the situation that up to that time none fundamental changes were carried 
in special services of the Republic of Poland. 

This situation is illustrated by the specification of functions, which were fulfilled in individual 
organizational entities of the WSI by some of the officers trained in the Soviet Union. 

The Chiefs of Military Information Services (the WSI) 

1. Brig. Gen. Dukaczewski Marek [in this list the first are last names of the persons] (2001- 

2. Rear Adm. Glowacki Kazimierz (1996-1997) 

3. Gen. Izydorczyk Boleslaw (1992-1994) 


The Deputies of the WSI Chief 

1. Col. Januchta Roman (1996-1998) 

2. Col. Janus Stefan (1996-1997) 

3. Col. Puchta Janusz (1991-1992) 

Source Operating Intelligence (Agenturalny Wywiad Operacyjny - AWO) 

1. Col. Czyzyk Julian (1975-1988) 

2. Lt. Col. Glowicki Marek (1975) 

3. Col. Kruzel Andrzej (1979-1983) 

4. Col. Ludwichowski Stanislaw (1975-1977;1980-1982;1990) 

5. Col. Maka Dobroslaw (1976; 1977-1980; 1984-1987) 

6. Col. Pieniak Janusz (1975; 1976-1981; 1984-1986) 

7. Comd. RussjanJerzy (1987-1990) 

8. Lt. Col. Smaza Stefan (1975; 1976-1985; 1986-1990) 

9. Col. Staluszka Wladyslaw (1983-1989) 

10. Col. Worozbit Zbigniew (1977-1979) 

11. Col. Wysocki Marek (1976-1980; 1981-1983) 

Department Y (Department 22) 

1. Col. Bekier Maciej (no data) 

2. Col. Biernat Zygmunt (1983-1984) 

3. Lt. Col. Bobek Janusz (no data) 

4. Maj. Bolewski Ryszard (no data) 

5. Lt. Col. Cibulla Jan (no data) 

6. Col. Dunal Henryk (1983-1986) 

7. Rear Adm. Glowacki Kazimierz (1983-1986) 

8. Lt. Col. Glowicki Marek (1985-1986) 

9. Col. Lipert Cezary (1983-1989) 

10. Comdr. Lewicki Ryszard (1990) 

11. Col. Michalski Grzegorz (1987-1989, the Chief of 'Unit 'Y') 


12. Cpt. Romanski Kazimierz (no data) 

13. Lt. Col. Siwanowicz Ryszard (no data) 

14. Col. Sosnowski Ryszard (1983-1987) 

15. Col. Surdyk Krzysztof (no data) 

16. Lt. Col. Szuba Tadeusz (1983-1984) 

17. Col. Witkowski Marek (1985-1988) 

18. Col. Worozbit Zbigniew (1987) 

19. Col. Zylowski Zdzislaw (1984-1991 

Office/Directorate for Studies and Analyses 

1. Lt. Col. Adamczyk Krzysztof - specialist (1995-1999; ZSiA - 1999-2004) 

2. Col. Arczynski Janusz - senior specialist (1991-1994) 

3. Col. Bartkowiak Henryk - chief of section (1993-1996) 

4. Col. Bekier Maciej - chief of section (1998-1999, ZSiA 1999-2001) 

5. Col. Biernat Zygmunt - deputy chef of Office for Studies and Analyses (1997-1999) 

6. Col. Blaszczak Marian - chief of section (1996-1997) 

7. Col. Budzik Zdzislaw - chief of section (1998-1999, ZSiA 1999-2005) 

8. Maj. Doroz Marek - specialist (ZSiA 2002-2004) 

9. Comdr. Dziubinski Ryszard - chief specialist (1996-1997) 

10. Maj. Ferenz Arkadiusz - senior designer (1996-1999) 

11. Col. Gajewski Bonifacy - chief of the office for studies and analyses (1995-1997) 

12. Col. Kendziorek Zdzislaw - chief of section (1991-1992) 

13. Lt. Col. Kloczewski Marek - senior specialist (1995-1999) 

14. Col. Kosla Piotr - chief of section (1991-1994) 

15. Maj. Lis Jerzy - officer (1993-1995) 

16. Col. Lisiak Marek - chief of section (2002-2003) 

17. Col. Mazurkiewicz Artur- deputy chief of directorate (ZSiA 1999-2001) 

18. Col. Nowak Marek - senior specialist (1993-1996; ZSiA 2000-2003) 

19. Lt. Col. Obolewicz Zbigniew - senior specialist (1996-1999, ZSiA 1999) 

20. Lt. Col. Piars Stanislaw - specialist (1996-1998; ZSiA 2001-2003) 

21. Lt. Comdr. Rygiel Jacek - senior officer (1997) 


22. Col. Sabak Zbigniew - chief specialist (ZSiA 2004-2005) 

23. Lt. Col. Stocki Jerzy - senior officer (1991-1994) 

24. Col. Szubert Jerzy - chief of section (2000-2002) 

25. Col. Tratkiewicz Andrzej - deputy chief of section (ZSiA 2004-2005) 

26. Col. Twardowski Wieslaw - deputy chief of section (1993-1999) 

27. Col. Wolak Jan - senior specialist (ZSiA 2001-2002) 

28. Col. Wozniak Maciej - chief of section (1996-1999) 

29. Col. Wysocki Marek - deputy chief of section (1996-1999) 

30. Col. Zawilinski Kazimierz - chief specialist (1995-1996) 

2 nd Directorate 

1. Col. Bazylak Stanislaw - chief of section (1999-2003) 

2. Col. Boryszczyk Romuald- chief of section (1996-1998) 

3. Col. Broda Krzysztof - senior specialist (1997-1999) 

4. Col. Bury Wladyslaw - senior officer (1996-2000) 

5. Col. Czyzyk Julian - chief of branch (1998-2003) 

6. Brig. Gen. Dukaczewski Marek - chief specialist (1992-1997) 

7. Col. Gajewski Bonifacy - chief of directorate (1997) 

8. Col. Gapys Wladyslaw - deputy chief of directorate (2004-2005) 

9. Lt. Col. Glowicki Marek - senior officer (1991-1999) 

10. Lt. Col. Goszczycki Tomasz - chief of branch (1998-2000) 

11. Lt. Col. Gryss Wojciech - chief of branch (1994-1998) 

12. Brig Gen. Izydorczyk Boleslaw - chief of intelligence directorate (1991-1992) 

13. Lt. Col. Jesionowski Janusz - deputy chief of section - chief of department (1998-1999) 
14.. Col. Jurgielewicz Stanislaw - senior officer (1991-1995) 

15. Comdr. Karczewski Czeslaw - chief specialist (1997-1998) 

16. Col. Kastelik Marian - deputy chief of branch (1996-1999) 

17. Lt. Col. Kozlowski Andrzej - senior specialist (1991-1992; 1997) 

18. Col. Krajewski Zbigniew - chief of branch (1998-1999) 

19. Col. Lesniowski Tadeusz - chief of branch (1993-1997) 

20. Col. Lipert Cezary - chief of directorate (1996-1997) 


21. Col. Lisiak Marek - chief of section (2003) 

22. Col. Ludwichowski Stanislaw - chief of branch (1996-1999) 

23. Col. La^czynski Wit - chief of section (1992-1995) 

24. Col. Luczkiewicz Robert - chief of branch (1995-1999) 

25. Col. Marzeda Wlodzimierz - deputy chief of section (1996-1999) 

26. Maj. Moskala Jerzy - senior officer (1997) 

27. Col. Paciorek Wojciech - deputy chief of section (1995-1999) 

28. Col. Paraszczuk Jozef - senior officer (1991-1996) 

29. Col. Pater Jerzy - chief of branch (1996-1999) 

30. Col. Pieniak Janusz - chief specialist (2001-2004) 

31. Lt. Col. Przelaskowski Witold - chief of branch (2003-2004) 

32. Col. Puchala Zygmunt - chief of directorate (2001) 

33. Col. Rosowski Jan - chief of department (1993-1999) 

34. Lt. Col. Rudzinski Zbigniew - deputy chief of section (1999-2001) 

35. Comdr. Russjan Jerzy - chief of branch (1996-1999) 

36. Comdr. Rygiel Jacek - deputy chief of branch (1997-1999) 

37. Col. Sosnowski Ryszard - chief of section (1992-1995) 

38. Col. Staluszka Wladyslaw - chief of branch (1993-1996) 

39. Lt. Col. Staniszewski Andrzej - deputy chief of branch (1996-1999) 

40. Lt. Col. Stocki Jerzy - senior officer (1994-1995) 

41. Col. Surdyk Krzysztof - chief of command (2003-2006) 

42. Lt. Col. Szlakowski Wojciech - senior officer of section (1992) 

43. Col. Szolucha Michal - deputy chief of command (1998-2000) 

44. Col. Szubert Jerzy - senior officer (1996-1998) 

45. Col. Ubych Tadeusz - chief of section (1998-1999) 

46. Col. Witaszczyk Kazimierz - chief of branch (1997-2002) 

47. Col. Worozbit Zbigniew - chief of section (1991-1995) 

48. Col. Wozniak Ryszard - chief of branch (1996-1997) 

49. Lt. Col. Wysokowicz Marek - chief of branch (1992-1997; 1998-2001) 

50. Col. Zadora Jerzy - chief of section (1998-1999) 

51. Col. Zylowski Zdzislaw - chief specialist (1991-1992) 


3 rd Directorate 

1. Col. Bialek Adam - senior officer (1996-1999) 

2. Col. Bocianowski Ryszard - chief of section (1992-1995) 

3. Col. Boczek Waldemar - chief of section (2002) 

4. Col. Bortnowski Andrzej - senior officer (1991-1993) 

5. Col. Broda Krzysztof - deputy chief of the office (1999-2002) 

6. Col. Czaplinski Marek - chief of section (1996-1999) 

7. Col. Kalina Lech - deputy chief of directorate (1993-1995) 

8. Col. Koczkowski Mieczyslaw - senior specialist (1998-2000) 

9. Lt. Col. Kowalski Wieslaw - senior specialist (1998-2001) 

10. Lt. Col. Kuczynski Zygmunt - deputy chief of section (1999-2000) 

11. Col. Kulita Mieczyslaw - chief specialist (1995-1996) 

12. Col. Lendzion Eugeniusz - deputy chief of office (2002-2003) 

13. Col. Lipert Cezary - chief of section (1993-1994) 

14. Col. Lisak Krzysztof - deputy chief of section (1999-2001) 

15. Lt. Col. Listowski Jerzy - senior officer (1998-1999) 

16. Col. Mikolajczyk Czeslaw - chief of section (2001-2004) 

17. Lt. Col. Nabozny Stanislaw - senior specialist (1996-1999) 

18. Col. Nowakowski Marek - chief of section (1991-1998) 

19. Lt. Col. Packo Wieslaw - deputy chief of section (1992-1997) 

20. Col. Paraszczuk Jozef - senior specialist (1996-1998) 

21. Lt. Col. Piars Stanislaw - senior specialist (2004) 

22. Col. Przepiorka Marian - senior specialist (1997) 

23. Lt. Col. Radzewicz Edmund - senior specialist (1997-1998) 

24. Col. Rzepecki Jerzy - chief of directorate (1997-1999) 

25. Col. Sadowski Romuald - senior specialist (1996-1998) 

26. Lt. Col. Szalacinski Zbigniew - deputy chief of section (2005) 

27. Lt. Col. Szlakowski Wojciech - senior specialist (2000-2003) 

28. Col. Wilus Jerzy - senior specialist (1994-1995; chief of section 1995-1999) 

29. Col. Witkowski Marek - senior specialist (1991-1993) 


30. Col. Woloszyk Maciej - senior specialist (1993-1996) 

3 1 . Col. Zietkiewicz Andrzej - senior specialist (no data) 

32. Col. Zyrek Emil - senior officer of section (1981-1990) 

Military Information Services (WSI) Training Center 

1. Col. Dabros Lucjan - deputy commanding officer of the Center, chief of section (2001-2002) 

2. Comdr. Karczewski Czeslaw - head of cycle (1998-2002) 

3. Col. Kobacki Jerzy -head of cycle (1996-1998) 

4. Lt. Col. Kozlowski Andrzej - senior lecturer (1997-1998) 

5. Comdr. Lewicki Ryszard - deputy commanding officer of the center, commanding officer of 
the center (1992-1996) 

6. Lt. Col. Krajewski Tadeusz - lecturer (1990-1996) 

7. Col. Pierzak Zbigniew - deputy commanding officer (2000-2005) 

8. Col. Przepiorka Marian - head of cycle (1997-1998) 

9. Lt. Col. Szlakowski Wojciech - foreign languages lecturer at foreign languages course (1991- 

10. Col.Targinski Edward - senior lecturer (1995-1998) 

Technical Support Unit 

1. Col. Andrzejewski Michal - deputy chief of section (1995-1998) 

2. Col. Kozuchowski Andrzej - chief of section (1990-1997) 

3. Lt. Col. Kujawa Bogdan - senior officer responsible for organization and human resources 

4. Col. Lorek Kazimierz - chief of section (1995-1995) 

5. Col. Pieniak Janusz - head of the unit (1992-1995) 

6. Lt. Col. Rak Piotr - chief of section (1994-2000) 

7. Col. Winnicki Ryszard - deputy head of unit (1992-1996) 

8. Col. Zyrek Emil - chief of section (1996-1999 expert 
Center of Teleinformatics Security 

1. Col. Kasperek Jan - Director (1999) 

2. Col. Maka Dobroslaw - Chief of the Center (2001-2003) 


3. Col. Polkowski Krzysztof- Chief of the Center (2004-2006) 

4. Col. Rembacz Bogdan -Chief of Department (2000-2001) 

Counter-intelligence Section of Air Force 

1. Col. Bocianowski Ryszard - chief of section (1990-1997) 

2. Col. Bugajny Jacek - deputy chief of department (1992-1997) 

3. Lt. Col. Choptowy Kazimierz - deputy chief of department (1994-1997) 

4. Lt. Col. Dudys Henryk - specialist (2001-2004) 

5. Lt. Col. Karski Tadeusz - chief of department (1992-1997) 

6. Lt. Col. Walczak Lech - chief of department (1992-1996) 

Counter-intelligence Section of Pomeranian Military District 

1. Col. Bialek Adam - chief of department (1990-1996) 

2. Lt. Col. Cichocki Marek - deputy chief of section (1993-1996) 

3. Lt. Col. Domagalski Andrzej - senior officer (1990-1997) 

4. Lt Col Kiepas Bogdan - senior officer (1990) 

5. Lt Col Kowalik Ryszard - chief of department (1993-2001) 

6. Lt Col pplk Kowalski Wieslaw - chief of department (1990-1995) 

7. Lt Col Kuwik Stanislaw - chief of department (1995-1996) 

8. Lt Col Musialek Tadeusz - chief of section (1995-1997) 

9. Lt Col Pasternak Zenon - chief of department (1992-2001) 

Counter-intelligence Section of Navy 

1. Col. Baluch Adam - chief of section (1990-1997) 

2. Lt. Col. Domagalski Andrzej - chief of department (1997) 

3. Lt. Col. Haryszyn Jan - chief of department (1998-2001) 

4. Lt. Col. Jaroslawski Andrzej - chief of section (1990-1997) 

5. Lt. Col. Nawiesniak Jacek - senior officer (1990) 

6. Lt. Col. Snarski Krzysztof - chief of department (1996-1998) 


Counter-intelligence Section of Silesian Military District 

1. Lt. Col. Basinski Pawel - deputy chief of department (1992-1996) 

2. Lt. Col. Bisaga Jan - deputy chief of department (1993-1996) 

3. Col. Cieslak Ireneusz - chief of department (1990) 

4. Lt. Col. Jankowski Wieslaw - chief of department (1990-1996) 

5. Col. Poplawski Jerzy - chief of department (1990-1993) 

6. Lt. Col. Szajerka Wieslaw - chief of department (1990-1997) 

7. Lt. Col. Swider Jozef - senior officer (1990-1997) 

8. Col. Wojtczak Tadeusz - chief of department (1990-1998) 

Counter-intelligence Section of Warsaw Military District 

1. Col. Dabros Lucjan - chief of department (1992-1997) 

2. Col. Gwizdala Wladyslaw - chief of department (1990-1993) 

3. Col. Jankowski Jerzy - chief of department (1990-1996) 

4. Col. Pierzak Zbigniew- deputy chief of section (1995-2000) 

5. Col. Sliwinski Tadeusz - chief of department (1992-1996) 

6. Lt. Col. Zawadzki Krzysztof - deputy chief of department (1996-1997) 

7. Col. Zielinski Wladyslaw - chief of department (1990) 

Counter-intelligence Department of Central Institution of the Ministry of National Defense 

1. Col. Dolata Wladyslaw - chief of section (1990) 

2. Col. Szostek Jozef- senior specialist (1990-1992) 
Bureau of Military Attache's Offices 

1. Col. Bieganski Stanislaw - chief of the office (1996) 

2. Col. Demski Zbigniew - chief of section (1998-2000) 

3. Col. Goszczycki Tomasz - deputy chief of section (2001-2004) 

4. Col. Klimek Tomasz - deputy chief of the office (1996-1999, 2002-2005) 

5. Col. Kolasa Kazimierz - chief of the office (1997-1999) 

6. Col. Pelczar Wladyslaw - chief of section (1991-1992) 

7. Lt. Col. Szlakowski Wojciech - senior officer (1996-1997) 

8. Col. Wozniak Ryszard - chief of section (2003-2004) 


Military Attache's Offices 

1. Col. Henryk Bartkowiak - 1994 attache in Yugoslavia; 1992 attache in Syria 

2. Col. Bekier Maciej - 1997 attache in Austria; 2003 attache in Germany; 2006 
Transferred to the Bureau of Military Attache's Office 

3. Col. Bieganski Stanislaw - 1977-1980 deputy attache in the USA; 1987-1990 attache in West 

4. Cpt. Bobek Janusz - 1988-1992 attache in Sweden; 1993-1997 attache in Russia 

5. Col. Bortnowski Andrzej - 1993-1996 attache in Belarus 

6. Col. Boryszczyk Romuald - 1992-1995 attache in Egypt; 1999 attache in Croatia 

7. Col. Bury Wladyslaw - from 2002 attache in Yugoslavia 

8. Lt. Col. Cibulla Jan - 1989-1992 attache in France; 1995 attache in Belgium 

9. Col. Cukierski Kazimierz - 1974-1978 deputy attache in Great Britain; 1990-1993 attache in 
Great Britain 

10. Col. Czerwonka Wladyslaw - 1975-1978 deputy attache in Belgium 

11. Col. Czyzyk Julian - 1993-1997 deputy attache in Great Britain; 2003-2006 attache in 
Malaysia; 2006 transferred to Bureau of Military Attache's Offices 

12. Col. Demski Zbigniew - 1993-1996 deputy attache in Israel; 2000-2003 attache in Greece 

13. Col. Edward Duda - 1982-1986 z-ca attache in Lebanon 

14. Brig Gen. Dukaczewski Marek - 1990-1992 attache in Norway 

15. Comdr. Dziubinski Ryszard - 1984-1988 deputy attache in Great Britain; 1992-1995 attache 
in Denmark; 1997-1999 attache in Sweden 

16. Col. Cempa Eugeniusz - 1999-2002 attache in France 

17. Col. Ferenz Bogdan - 1978-1982 attache in Sweden; 1990-1992 attache in Germany 

18. Maj. Ferenz Arkadiusz - 1990-1991 deputy attache in Norway 

19. Col. Gajewski Bonifacy - 1974-1978 expert in the Attache's Office in West Berlin; 1983- 
1986 attache in Switzerland; 1991-1994 attache in Romania 

20. Col. Gapys Wladyslaw - 1979-1981 expert in the Attache's Office in Denmark; 1989-1992 
attache in Denmark 

21. Comm Adm. Glowacki Kazimierz - 1979-1983 deputy attache in Canada; 1986-1990 attache 


in Great Britain 

22. Comdr. Goreczny Ireneusz - 1996-1999 attache in Great Britain; 2002-2004 attache in 
France; 2006 transferred to Bureau of Military Attache's Offices 

23. Col. Grodzki Pawel - 1991-1994 attache in Japan 

24. Col. Gryz Jerzy - 1979 expert in the Attache's Office in Norway; 1982-1986 expert of 
attache in Sweden; 1993-1996 attache in France; 

25. Brig Gen. Izydorczyk Boleslaw - 1982-1984 deputy attache in the USA; 1994-1995 attache 
the USA; 1995-1997 attache in Canada 

26. Col. Januchta Roman - 2004-2006 attache in Kazakhstan 

27. Col. Janus Andrzej - 1991-1992 and 1994-1997 attache in Bulgaria 

28. Col. Janus Stefan - 1981-1984 deputy attache in Austria; 1992-1995 attache in Germany; 

1999 attache in Switzerland 

29. Comdr. Karczewski Czeslaw - 1983-1985 officer of Attache's Office in the GDR; 1985-1986 
deputy attache in West Berlin; 1992-1996 attache in Ukraine; 2004-2006 attache in Lithuania 

30. Col. Kedziorek Zdzislaw - 1986-1989 attache in Switzerland 

31. Col. Klimek Tomasz - 1989-1992 attache in Great Britain; 1999-2002 attache in Japan 

32. Col. Klisowski Zbigniew - 1978-1983 expert in the Attache's Office 1998-2002 attache in 

33. Col. Kobacki Jerzy - 1986-1988 deputy attache in Italy; 1998-2001 attache in Italy 

34. Col. Kolasa Kazimierz - 1979-1981 attache in Turkey; 1986-1989 attache in Turkey; 1999- 

2000 attache in Slovakia 

35. Col. Kosla Piotr - 1978-1980 expert in the Attache's Office in France; 1994-1996 deputy 
attache in Russia 

36. Lt Col Kozlowski Andrzej - 1993-1996 deputy attache in Bulgaria 

37. Col. Kruzel Andrzej - 1976-1979 attache in Finland; 1993-1997 attache in Czech Republic 

38. Col. Lendzion Eugeniusz - 1997-2000 deputy attache in Russia; 2003-2004 attache in Latvia 

39. Col. Lesinski Jan - 1974-1977 expert in the Attache's Office in Great Britain; 1994-1996 
attache in Japan 

40. Col. Lesniowski Tadeusz - 1990-1993 attache in Austria; 1997-2000 attache in Romania 

41. Brig Gen. Lewandowski Andrzej - from 2004 attache in Russia 

42. Comdr. Lewicki Ryszard - 1973-1976 expert in the Attache's Office in Denmark; 1982-1984 


attache in Sweden 

43. Col. Lipert Cezary - 1978-1981 expert in West Berlin; 1989-1992 attache in Switzerland; 
1997-2001 attache in Austria; from 2004 attache of defense in Czechs 

44. Maj. Lis Jerzy - 1995-1998 deputy attache in Hungary 

45. Col. Lisak Marek - 1997-2000 attache in Hungary; 2003-2004 attache in Great Britain 

46. Col. La^czynski Wit - 1972-1975 expert in Attache's Office in Cuba; 1983-1987 attache in 
Italy; 1995-1999 attache in Croatia 

47. Col. Marzeda Wlodzimierz - 1999-2003 attache in Lithuania 

48. Col. Matuszak Tadeusz - 1986-1988 deputy attache in Austria; 1994-1997 attache in Romania 

49. Col. Mazurkiewicz Artur - 1986-1989 attache in Denmark; 1994-1997 attache in Sweden 
2002-2004 attache in Denmark 

50. Col. Maka Dobroslaw - 1980-1983 expert of the Attache's Office in France; 1990-1993 
attache in Sweden; from 2003 attache in Canada (w 2004, 3 months at Ministry of National 
Defense disposal; 

51. Col. Michalski Grzegorz - 1990-1995 attache in Turkey 

52. Brig Gen. Mika Henryk - 1997-1999 attache in China 

53. Brig Gen. Mikrut Czeslaw - 1997-1999 attache in India 

54. Col. Nowak Marek - 1990 deputy attache in GDR; 1996-2000 attache in GDR; 2003- 
2004 attache in the Netherlands 

55. Lt Col Obolewicz Zbigniew - 1993-1996 deputy attache in Czechs 

56. Brig Gen. Olesiak Marian - 1997-2000 attache in Russia 

57. Col. Pelczar Wladyslaw - 1983-1987 attache in Finland; 1993-1997 attache in Hungary 

58. Lt Col Piars Stanislaw - 1998-2001 attache in Hungary; 2003-2004 deputy attache in 
Hungary; from 2004 attache in Hungary 

59. Col. Pieniak Janusz - 1981-1984 deputy attache in Belgium 

60. Col. Polkowski Krzysztof - 1996-1999 deputy attache in the USA; 1999-2003 chief of section 

61. Col. Puchta Janusz - 1973-1976 deputy attache in China; 1979-1982 attache in Egypt; 
1987-1990 attache in China 

62. Col. Romanski Kazimierz - 1989-1984 attache in Egypt; 1995-1996 attache in Latvia 

63. Col. Rudnicki Edward - 1972-1974 expert in Attache's Office in Norway; 1994-1996 attache 


in Yugoslavia 

64. Comdr. Russjan Jerzy - 1990-1993 expert in Attache's Office in Germany 

65. Gen. Sadzonek Wladyslaw - 1999-2000 attache in Canada 

66. Maj. Gen. Slowinski Jerzy - 1995-1999 attache in Egypt 

67. Lt Col Smaza Stefan - 1996-1999 deputy attache in the Czechs 

68. Col. Sobkowski Jan - 1979-1982 attache in Austria 

69. Lt Col Solak Janusz - 1999-2002 deputy attache in Romania 

70. Col. Sosnowski Ryszard - 1977-1979 expert in the Attache's Office in France; 1987-1991 
attache in Syria; 1995-1998 attache in Israel 

71. Col. Staluszka Wladyslaw - 1979-1982 expert in Attache's Office in the USA; 1989-1992 
attache in Finland; 1997-1999 attache in Japan 

72. Lt Col Stocki Jerzy - 1995 deputy attache in Romania 

73. Col. Surdyk Krzysztof - 1999-2002 attache in Finland 

74. Lt Col Szlakowski Wojciech - 1997-2000 deputy defense attache in Great Britain; 2002-2003 
attache in Kuwait; 2003-2006 MONS Belgium - NATO 

75. Col. Szolucha Michal - 1990-1993 attache in Germany; 2000-2003 attache in Austria; 
candidate to attache in Germany 

76. Col. Szubert Jerzy - 1990-1993 deputy attache in Great Britain; 2003-2006 attache in Greece 

77. Lt Col Szulik Wladyslaw - 1982-1983 senior, officer in Syria; 1987-1989 attache in the 

78. Comdr. Tomaszewicz Ryszard - 1973-1977 expert of Attache's Office in Great Britain; 1982- 
1985 attache in Egypt; 1992-1995 attache in Israel 

79. Brig Gen. Tyszkiewicz Andrzej - 1995-1998 attache in Turkey 

80. Brig Gen. Ubych Tadeusz - 1992-1995 deputy attache in Hungary; 2000-2004 attache in 

81. Col. Witaszczyk Kazimierz - 1993-1996 deputy attache in Austria; 2002-2003 in military 
staff in Brussels; 2003-2004 attache in Belarus 

82. Col. Wolak Jan - from 2004 attache in Kuwait 

83. Col. Woloszyk Jerzy - 1996-2000 attache in Belarus 

84. Col. Worozbit Zbigniew - 1982-1985 attache in Austria 

85. Col. Wozniak Maciej - 1990-1994 deputy attache in Russia; 2000-2003 attache in Belorus 


86. Col. Wozniak Ryszard - 1997-2000 deputy attache in the USA; 2004 attache in Iran; from 
2004 attache in Iraq 

87. Lt Col Zablocki Marek - 1990-1993 attache in Australia 

88. Col. Zadora Jerzy - 1988-1990 deputy attache in Austria; 1999-2004 attache in Switzerland 

89. Col. Zawilinski Kazimierz - 1984-1987 attache in Norway; 1996-1998 attache in Yugoslavia 

90. Col. Zylowski Zdzislaw - 1969-1972 expert in the Attache's Office in Italy; 1979-1984 
deputy attache in Italy 

The above list confirms the thesis that Military Information Services (WSI) were 
established on the grounds of the cadre selected from the group of officers educated in the Soviet 
Union. They occupied managerial positions in the WSI, hence they were able to decide about the 
policy of these services. 

Russian penetration: threats for the Polish Armed Forces 

In the recent years, in which the Russian Army was based in Poland, GRU and KGB 
intensively recruited the agents and operationally gathered information about the citizens of the 
Republic of Poland. In each of the Russian military facilities there were full-time posts for special 
forces (branches, divisions or KGB and GRU sections), which run operating activity in the circle 
of Polish Armed Forces officers and Polish civil citizens living in the neighborhood of the 
facilities occupied by the Soviet Army or Polish Armed Forces units. The main objective of this 
activity was to create the information base, i.e. so called "frozen net of agents", which could be 
activated in the future by the Soviet or post-Soviet services, when no entities of the Russian 
Army shall be based within the territory of the Republic of Poland. In pursue of these objectives, 
in the years 1994-1996 GRU and KGB undertook actions aimed at repeated undertaking the 
contacts with persons, who were recruited earlier or at recruitment of new agents from among the 
citizens of the Republic of Poland. 

We should identify two information channels, on which Russian special services based 
their activity in Poland. 

The first one was based on officers of the Polish Armed Forces, graduates from military 
high schools and specialist courses in the Soviet Union, while the other was based on contacts 


renewed in 90-ies. 

Another information channels were the contacts with Polish citizens, whom the officers of 
post-Soviet special forces established in the second half of the 90-ies. The contacts were 
established in military and civil circles, they were not however entirely new contracts. Their 
origin should be sought in the period, in which the units of the Soviet Army were based in the 
Republic of Poland. The officers of KGB and GRU units operating under these corps were 
"defreezing" the network of the agents recruited years ago or located a new network of agents 
and intensively gathered all type of information about citizens of the Republic of Poland. These 
actions were very often run under the cover of commercial or economic activity, and special role 
was played there by the companies with participation of Russian capital. Part of these companies 
was oriented to various forms of cooperation with military units and institutions and with 
companies providing services for the Polish Armed Forces. .In addition to typifying and 
recruiting activity, run in the military and civil environment, the Russian services were carried in- 
depth investigation of the process of Polish Armed Forces integration with NATO structures and 
the WSI areas of activity, particularly their activity on so called "Eastern" direction. An 
important element of the WSI activity investigation was typifying the former citizens of the 
USSR by the Russian intelligence, which intended to come to Poland on business-related matters. 
It was assumed, the persons typified by Russian intelligence may become the objects of the WSI 
interest in connection with their activity on so called "Eastern" direction and that due to this the 
Russian party might gain the possibility of misinforming the WSI. 

It can be seen from gathered materials, that the following have arisen active interest of the 
Russian Federation special services: 

• Polish Army cadre keeping in the past business or social relations with the soldiers of the 
Soviet Army, including the graduates from the courses in the Soviet Union and the 
graduates from Central Unit of Signal Troops in Legnica from the years 1990-1991; 

• Professional soldiers and their families from so called mixed marriages; 

• Soldiers and employees of the army, keeping business contacts with citizens of the post- 
Soviet states being the members of CIS, in this the persons taking part in official contacts 
within the territory of Poland or third states, e.g. during peace missions of UNO, CFE 
inspections etc.; 

• The persons contemplated to serve or already serving in the NATO structures; 


• Persons directed to studies, courses, workshop or conferences in the EU and NATO 
states; managerial staff of safeguarded military units and institutions; 

• The employees of defense industry, in this of the companies co-operating or collaborating 
with various NATO entities. 

The effect of information base extension in Poland was taking up by the Russian services the 
actions aimed at identifying and neutralizing offensive actions on so called "Eastern" direction, 
carried by Polish services. 

Counter-intelligence omissions: Russian-Polish companies 

Reliable information about intensified activity of the Soviet special services was obtained, 
among others during carrying the case of operating explanation BZ, which was run in 1993-1995 
by Counter-intelligence Section of Silesian Military District. It confirmed that in the recent 
period in which the units of the Soviet Army were based in Poland, i.e. in the years 1993-1994, 
this activity was intensified. Frequent contacts of Soviet Army representatives with the 
representatives of Polish governmental administration, which were due to the necessity of 
delivering assets and real estates to the Polish party, were conducive to intensified actions of the 
Soviet services. 

Such a situation was e.g. in the Gorzowskie Province, in which the Signal Brigade of the 
Soviet Army was based in K^szyce and radiotelephone intelligence unit of the Soviet Army in 
Bukowiec. KGB units were operating under these corps and their employees, having the occasion 
to establish official business contacts with the representatives of the Polish party gathered 
information very intensively about the officer cadre of the 17 Mechanized Regiment from 
Miedzyrzecz, about Provincial Inspectorate of Civil Defense in Gorzow Wielkopolski and about 
other Polish Armed Forces units, which were based in that region. The investigation carried out at 
that time by KGB officers was not only limited to military circles, but it also covered self- 
governmental administration, customs offices and private companies. Parallel to this type of 
activity, the companies carrying business activity were established in Western Poland on the 
initiative of Soviet Army officers, e.g. "TE" Sp. z o.o. [Ltd. Co.], which temporarily took out a 
lease of certain facilities delivered to Poland by the Russian party. The Company "TE" had 
headquarters in Wroclaw and had branches in other states e.g. in Latvia. 


In addition to management of the facilities belonging previously to the Soviet Army, the 
Company was also dealing with oil exportation. 

Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Army units from the Gorzowskie Province, 
intensified contacts of the Soviet Army officers with the citizens of Republic of Poland were 
noted after 1994, which usually were of apparently commercial or tourist character. 
Intensification of contacts of the Polish Armed Forces cadre with the Soviet Army officers was 
also confirmed in the problematic case Military Intelligence Section of Silesian Military District 
and Military Intelligence Section of Pomeranian Military District, under code name "B". The 
information obtained under this case indicated, among others, that the officers of Silesian 
Military District (among others Col. A. K,. - Chief of Signal Troops of the Silesian Military 
District, Lt Col A.J, - commander of the 10 regiment of Silesian Military District command) 
maintained contacts with officers of the Soviet Army, who were previously staying in Poland. 
Such meetings with the Soviet Army officers were organized by Col. A.K. in his villa in Walim. 
The contacts of Col. A.K, and A.J. with Soviet officers resulted also from the fact that both of 
them studied at the USSR high schools and on this account they were known to many officers of 
the Soviet Army, who decided to renew this acquaintance in half of the 90-ies. Also Lt. Col. J.D. 
and Col. S.P. from Silesian Military District maintained contacts with Soviet Army officers. 
According to the information obtained in this matter, they maintained familiar contacts with the 
former commander of the Soviet Army unit based in Wroclaw and the former employee of the 
Military Mission at the North Group of the Soviet Army in Poland. They also maintained close 
relations with the Company "A", operating in Wroclaw, established in middle of the 90-ies by a 
citizen of the Russian Federation, who was the owner of the restaurant "AR", in which the 
meetings with the officer cadre of Wroclaw garrison of the Polish Armed Forces were held.. In 
the meetings in "AR's" restaurant, organized by the Russians, the representatives of sports club 
"S", commanding cadre of Wroclaw garrison and many other persons representing military and 
politician circles participated. The "meetings" in this restaurant were organized in a trusted circle, 
with participation of women from escort agencies and at the costs of the restaurants' owners. 
According to the opinion of the employees managing this case, during these "meetings" so called 
"pressure" materials were gathered against the participants. 

The employees carrying the case code-named "BK" drew attention to the fact that many 
such contacts were established by the former officers of the Soviet Army under the cover of 


business activity, what was defined as follows: "A material threat from the part of Eastern special 
services is trade expansions of the persons originating from CIS countries to the territories in 
which the units of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army were based in the past. It relates 
mostly to Wroclaw and Strzegom garrisons. We estimate that among the persons dealing with 
trade activity, the majority were professional soldiers, civil employees of these units, who under 
the cover of the business activity may also execute the tasks of investigation character. 

In addition to individual business activity organized in Poland after 1990, several 
thousand companies with participation of Russian capital were established. For example, only on 
the territory of Poznan, 35 such companies were incorporated in the years 1990-1998, and few of 
them were incorporated by the officers of the Russian Army. Most of these companies were 
established in these cities and town of the western Poland, in which the Soviet garrisons were 

In Warsaw, three exceptionally attractive plots of land located in the city center are still 
managed by the Soviet companies. One of these companies is Avtoexport, whose representative 
in Poland is the Company 'Abexim', having been servicing the WSI vehicles up to the autumn 

Counter-intelligence omissions: espionage tolerating 

Problematic cases "B", "BK" and "BZ", being de facto the analysis of espionage threats, 
were completed in 2001 and 2002, making entirely no use of the gathered information. Correct 
diagnosing of the threats relating to the safety of the Polish Armed Forces and Polish armaments 
industry was not followed by any further actions, and failure in finding a solution for described 
problems of the WSI cadres themselves, in which most officers keeping managerial positions 
underwent training in the USSR academies, should be regarded as giving origin to this status. 

Like in other cases of this type, also in the event of control of the problematic case "B" 
files, the traces of removing documents are visible. This is confirmed by: 

• changed pagination, from which It can be seen that files contained 234 cards at the 
minimum (presently 76). 

• there is no annotation stating when the missing documentation was removed and by 
whom; between the memo dated November 30, 2000 (cards 59-64) and information of 
November 30, 2001 (cards 65-70) there are none other documents. Upon analyzing the 


documents collected in the files you can not regard as true the thesis that for so many 

months none actions, which should be confirmed with documents, were performed. 

A real discredit for the WSI - in the aspect of the threats as discussed above - was case 
"Z" carried from 1996. It was taken up after the signals attesting to establishment of foreign 
intelligence residency in Poland. The object of the case was establishing the character of informal 
contacts of the command of one of the military units with A.B., born in Poland and a citizen of 
the German Federal Republic. 

This most probably former STASI co-worker is the owner of three companies; two seated 
in Berlin, and third in Poland dealing with forwarding business, through the intermediary of 
which he runs business in Poland and in the countries of the former USSR. Most of the 
employees of one of his Berlin companies are former National People's Army officers, STASI 
employees and the graduates from Russian military schools (including the participants of KGB 
and GRU courses). 

Through the intermediary of S.K. (the former employee of Security Service, from 1992 
the policeman of Criminal Section of 'Poviat' (County) Police Headquarters, the owner of 
safeguard agency "CT" and M.M. (warrant officer of the Polish Army reserve) A.B. established 
contact with the cadre of the military unit.. The meetings were held under the cover story of 
official contacts, whose purpose was making use by him of military facilities: mess and shooting 

A.B. very quickly established familiar relations with the military unit cadre, and wishing 
to make them dependent on him he was very open-handed in granting loans against confirmation 
of their receipt, covered the costs of their visits in escort agencies, being his property and often 
invited them to his villa for drinking bouts with the participation of prostitutes. Those meetings 
were documented with use of cameras and video, and A.B. carried these materials abroad. 

A.B. was also often invited to events with participation of officers. E.g. during the event 
organized by Col. M. G. and Major M.R. in the district of so called "generals' villas" A.B,. 
together with his wife F.Z. were parading in [German] Bundeswehr uniforms during, as it was 
noted in the files "ordinary drinking bout", in the presence of completely drunk officers of the 
Polish Armed Forces. 

A.B. has also organized a trip to a shooting competition in National People's Army 
facility in Germany, in which the cadre of the military unit represented by Col. G., Lt Col W. and 


major P., W. Officer S. from the Military Police (Zandarmeria Wojskowa - ZW) participated 
without consent of their superiors, accompanied by sub-inspector of police T. The organizer 
insisted that they should come in their field uniforms, which was then documented on photos. 
The Chief of the Staff of Military Unit recognized in one of the participants of the event the 
lecturer of German Group from Military Academy in Moscow in 1986. The above maintains 
close contacts with H. J.C., the friend of A.B, and STASI officer and with M.P. the officer of the 
Soviet Army and the agent of special services. 

The person of A.B. passes as suspected in the case of robbery of a large quantity of fuel 
from the Military Unit. As it can be seen from the files, another friend of his was to be implicated 
in the robbery - Lt Col G.L, transport engineer, deputy commander of the Military Unit. He was 
also the accused in the case of fuel robbery from another military unit. 

When establishing new contacts, A.B. always focused his attention on prospectus persons, 
occupying managerial positions in the structures of military units and other military institutions, 
or on such whom could fulfil such function in the near future. Another criterion of equal value in 
making acquaintance by him was participation in the courses in the USSR, which made a natural 
recruitment base. 

The soldiers, with whom A.B. maintained contacts were, among others.: 

• Lt Col A.G. (Chief of Military Unit Staff, graduate from KGB course in Moscow), 

• Lt Col G. L.. (transport engineer, deputy commander of the Military Unit), 

• Lt Col Z.G. (Chief of Training Department of the Military Unit 1), 

• Maj. M.R. (commander of the Military Unit), 

• Maj. R.O. (chief of training, deputy commander of the Military Unit), On similar 
principle A.B. established contacts with Military Police cadre: Col. M.G. (at present 
deputy of District Commander of Military Police (ZW), graduate from KGB course, 
earlier chief of the Military Intelligence Department, deputy chief of Military Police 
Branch, deputy chief of Military Police had close contacts with KGB during the period, in 
which the Russian Army based in Poland, friend of another student from Moscow - K.W. 
(WSI officer), 

• Lt Col J.W. (deputy of District Command Chief of ZW), 

• Senior Staff Warrant Officer W.S. (commander of ZW, previous Military Internal 
Services, close co-worker of Captain M.N - officer of Military Counter-intelligence 


Department and A.B. friend), 

• Lt Col W. S. (commander of ZW Section), 

• Lt Col W.R. (commander of ZW Section) 

and with 'Poviat' (County)Police Commanders: 

• Younger Inspector E. K. 

• Younger Inspector Z. T. 

and officers from the Border Guard and soldiers from GROM ('THUNDER') Unit - among 
others with A.M. (in 1996 and 1999 A. B. was invited to GROM exercises). 

A.B. functioning in the circle of the Polish Armed Forces cadre was a great threat for 
guarded entities. He obtained information about defense and data of personal character, in these 
exact characteristics of the persons being of interest for him (disposition, addictions, customs, 
views, and sexual preferences). Due to gathered information he could easily control the persons 
being of interest for him through blackmail, financial dependence or through taking advantage of 
very familiar contacts. 

A.B. statement, that he had a partner in Ethiopia, with whom he run business in that part 
of the globe was interesting in the context of suspected cooperation with foreign intelligence. He 
disclosed also that he had acquaintances dispersed all over the world (Lebanon, Libya, 
Nicaragua) and that these were the persons met by him at the courses in the USSR. A.B. also runs 
business with the company "A.I. S.I." in Berlin, whose representatives are suspected of illegal 
trade and smuggling of strategic elements. The representative of this Company for Moscow is a 
person named Alganow. The cover of this illegal activity is among others a Night Club M., 
whose owner is A.B. As It can be seen from the reports of Border Guard, this club is guarded, 
among others by former soldiers of SPECNAZ and KGB. In addition to the above Club, A.B. 
owes a villa (the buildings are adjacent), in which he often arranges events with participation of 
servicemen and prostitutes. At present this building is adapted for the needs of hotel and 
dormitory base for managerial staff and lecturers of one of the higher schools. A friend of A.B. 
colonel of National People's Army, living in Berlin and being a real property broker of unknown 
name is reported to act as an agent in this transaction. It is without any doubts that the investment 
adjacent to escort agency may facilitate to A. B the access to staff working in this high school and 
its recruitment. 

It can be seen from the obtained information, that he confirmed keeping contacts with 


Minister of Justice Grzegorz Kurczuk. He stated that he visited the Chancellery of President A. 
Kwasniewski, and he also referred to his acquaintances in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Warsaw. In spite of this, those institution have never been inquired in this matter in order to fix 
any dates and establish the persons meeting with A.B. in their territory. It does not result from the 
files, either that counter-intelligence of the WSI warned the representatives of the Republic of 
Poland authorities of the threats resulting from acquaintance with former STASI co-worker, 
suspected presently of acting in favor of intelligence of some of the former USSR states. 

The actions undertaken in this matter are characterized by inefficacy - from the lowest 
level of the WSI through the Minister of National Defense. For 1 1 years of carrying the case none 
operational advantages were obtained. On the contrary, it seems that all the actions were 
intentionally carried in such way "not to disturb" the suspected person. A.B. acted entirely 
unfettered, extending every year the circle of people dependent on him. It was never established 
for whom he worked, who received the information from him, how many people he managed to 
recruit. For the first 6 years of this procedure, the officers of the Counter-intelligence Department 
at the WSI did not even check who was officially running the escort agency, in which all his 
interest intersected on behalf of A.B. 

In order to assess this matter the fact that tests of state-of-the-art military technologies 
were tested on Military Unit territory during A.B. activity, is not unimportant. It is also worth 
repeating in this place that during the recent period of the Soviet Army units stay in Poland 
(1992-1993), acting in the area in which the Signal Brigade of the Soviet Army and 
Radioelectronic intelligence units were based in this region, the KGB also intensively collected 
information about the officer cadre of the military units. These two elements, fundamental for 
estimation of the matter, are not even mentioned in the files. 

The successes of A. B. (actually a man having only elementary education, earlier a digger 
operator) does not confirm any of his extraordinary or exceptional abilities, but they are rather the 
effect of the preparations made by the KGB almost 15 years ago and a lack of appropriate 
counteractions on the Polish counter-intelligence part. The thing is that already several years ago 
the entire cadre of Military Unit was investigated, including the cadre safeguarding the Military 
Counter-intelligence Section in the Military Internal Services. It was not incidental that A.B,. 
typified two KGB trainees from Moscow: Lt Col A.G. - Chief of the Staff of Military Unit and 
Col. M.G. - deputy commander of Military Police (ZW) district, who remained in close relations 


with the chief and officers of local KGB Department as his informants 

It can be seen from documents gathered in the files, that the case was managed from the 
level of the WSI Headquarters by Lt Col Krzysztof Klosinski (Chief of the 3rd Directorate WSI), 
Col. Marek Slon (chief of Section 32 of the 3rd Directorate WSI) and Col. Zenon Klamecki 
(deputy chief of the 3rd Directorate), and the case was also known to Gen. Marek Dukaczewski. 

Having analyzed the actions undertaken in the described case, it should be stated that the 
responsibility for improper carrying out of "K" procedure at the level of the WSI Command 
should be borne by the following persons: 

1 . Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Chief of the WSI 

2. Lt Col Krzysztof Klosinski, Chief of the 3rd Directorate WSI 

3. Col. Zenon Klamecki, Deputy Chief of the 3 rd Directorate WSI 

4. Col. Marek Slon, Chief of Section 32 of the 3 rd Directorate WSI 

5. Col. Waldemar Dzi^gielewski, Chief of Military Counter-intelligence Directorate WSI 

Operational case "GWIAZDA" ('STAR'): origins and facts 

The WSI have never undertaken a comprehensive operational investigation of officers and 
soldiers, who underwent training in the USSR and favored them in their service and in the Polish 
Army. Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk states that "the WSI analyses the contacts of officers trained 
formerly in the USSR, since it is always possible that they may be recruited now. But so far no 
such event was noted" is not a truth 

Only certain former trainees were handed specially prepared questionnaires, but their 
detailed filling out was not exacted. Some persons who received them gave only general or 
laconic responses, often hiding behind oblivion. The general character of response decreases any 
operational value. Also during carried verification proceedings resulting from the Act on 
restricted information, no reference was made to the records of these points in the questionnaire 
on public safety, which concern international contacts and training abroad. 

The graduates from the training courses were not subject to any comprehensive polygraph 
tests, which could serve as confirmation of their loyalty and bona fides. No systematic polygraph 
tests were run in order to explain any possible relations of the persons trained in the Soviet Union 
with special services of the East. No active operating actions were undertaken in order to 
establish whether such persons give a warranty of keeping secrecy. None active investigation 


actions were undertaken, either, in order to verify their honesty and loyalty and to find possible 
symptoms of intelligence-related threat. 

Only in the second half of the 90-ies a decision was made on initiating problematic 
control under code name "GWIAZDA". Undertaking the problem was a reason for which some 
persons trained by the KGB and GRU decided to quit the service. The cadre, who remained in the 
services hindered conducting investigations of the issue. No response was given to the set of 
questions relating to training asked to the officer, hiding behind the oblivion or lapse of time or 
filling in laconic "no" in reply to questions requiring more extensive presentation of their subject. 

The "GWIAZDA" procedure (relating to shielding and verification of the WSI officers 
trained at the academies and specialist courses of KGB and GRU in the former USSR) was 
formally initiated on January 14, 1998 and approved by the Chief of Safety Section Col. Andrzej 
Zietidewicz, participant of the course in KGB Higher School completed in June 1983. A similar 
situation occurred in the past. In the files of the case, single documents from the middle of the 90- 
ies remained, from which It can be seen that the WSI gathered information about officers 
studying in the USSR. In a memo dated December 1995 Col. T. Koczkowski aptly pointed out 
the indications resulting from improper human resources policy towards the former trainees of 
GRU/KGB and developed an action plan aimed at the neutralization of the threats resulting from 
this fact. The assumptions presented by Col. T. Koczkowski were approved by Col. Stefan Janus 
- a participant of GRU course completed in August 1987. He instructed Col. Mieczyslaw Kulita, 
a participant of the course in KGB Higher School, completed in March 1983 to exercise the 
supervision of carrying the matter under consideration. From then, the proceeding was under 
control of the persons to whom it could be detrimental, eliminate them from service in the Polish 
Armed Forces or even commit for trial. It is no wonder that none actions were made in order to 
bring the matter to a close. 

The files of the case include e.g. the information that "Safety Section I of the WSI is in 
possession of information evidencing that certain persons were the object of interest of the Soviet 
special forces". There is no information, however, that any actions have been made under 
"GWIAZDA" procedure in order to deepen or verify this information. 

Only on January 14, 1998 the Chief of Safety Section of the WSI Inspectorate in a 
"Memo relating to threats and relations between special services of People's Polish Republic and 
the USSR" indicated that there is a need to carry operating and shielding actions aimed at 


establishing whether the cadre related with the East guarantees keeping the secrecy. WIS did not 
possess exact information about the number of officers, who underwent such training. The Safety 
Section of the WSI understated these figures and did not indicate all the participants of the 
courses, known to them. 

It was estimated in the special services centers and in military academies of the USSR and other 
socialistic camp countries ca 300 officers of Military Internal Services (WSW) and the 2 nd 
Directorate of the Staff General were trained, who served in the WSI at the moment of 
establishment of these services. In 1998 over half of them were in service (i.e. 153 persons) and 
most of them (ca 75%) occupied prominent and managerial positions. 

The "GWIAZDA" case: procedure bona fides 

It should be underlined that various figures are cited in the "GWIAZDA" case, in the WSI 
materials from 1998, only 153 officers are mentioned, while in one of the earlier documents it is 
stated that in 1980-1992 ca 800 officers from military services of Polish People's Republic were 
studying in high schools, and ca 3 thousand soldiers graduated from various courses and training. 
The files do not contain full and uniform list of the participants of such training, and new names 
appear in subsequent versions.. 

It is characteristic that the name of General Marek Dukaczewski, who underwent a course 
in Moscow in 1989, was placed on the trainees list issued only in October 2005, though the 
information about his training is contained in his personal files, kept currently at the National 
Remembrance Institute. In a computer database of the WSI, made by default a comprehensive 
source of knowledge about every WSI soldier, there is no information concerning the 
professional career of general Dukaczewski prior to 1990. This circumstance allows for 
advancing a thesis about the intentional manipulation of previously developed materials in the 
"GWIAZDA" case. Absence of comprehensive list of Polish Armed Forces soldiers trained in the 
Soviet block countries means that a fundamental document, which should make a starting point 
for making any shielding actions, was not issued for several years. Maybe the works undertaken 
under the "GWIAZDA" case were only apparent. 

This analysis is confirmed by the information that Verification Commission received from 
the soldiers giving evidence before the Commission that the "GWIAZDA" case "was run very 
unreliably" and this was "collecting and not content-related conduct of this case"; as it was 


enough to "select the persons and carry an operational investigation against them under counter- 
intelligence shielding files (TOK) or operational case". 

Improper management of both procedures of the "GWIAZDA" case was not an ordinary 
omission, but the effect of actions of subsequent chiefs of individual WSI units. In the years 
1990-2006 the persons trained in the USSR were located practically in all WSI units, mainly on 
managerial posts in: the WSI command, the 2 nd Directorate, the 3 rd Directorate, Internal Safety 
Office, Department 'Y' (later Department 22), military attache's offices, Department 24, 
Department 'Y' of Technical Infrastructure Center, Teleinformatics Safety Center and many 
others important organizational units of the WSI. The officers trained in the Soviet academies 
have also been delegated as officers under cover (OPP) - to serve outside the WSI in state-owned 
firms and institutions in Poland and aboard. By virtue of occupied positions, the persons trained 
in the USSR, in the years 1989-2005, had access to WSI information that was secret intelligence 
and counter-intelligence, in this, information originating from international exchange. This 
constituted a threat for the state and had negative bearing on the bona fides of military special 
services for NATO. However, the WSI treated any critics of this status quo as an attack to State 
safety. At the beginning of the 90-ies raising such issue in the public was even a reason of 
initiating operational investigation of politicians, newspapers and even foundations.. 

The "GWIAZDA" case : consequences 

The effect of such state of affairs was insulation of the Polish safety services in NATO, 
which was expressed, among others in rejecting by Germany the candidature of Col. C.L., former 
soldier of 'Department Y' and participant of GRU course in 1985, for the service in Attache's 
Office in Cologne (instead of this he was entrusted a function of Deputy Chief of the 2nd 
Directorate of the WSI in 1994-1997; then attache in Vienna in the years 1997-2000 and Deputy 
Chief of the WSI responsible for operational affairs in the years 2001-2004, lately has fulfilled 
the duties of attache in Prague). 

As it can be seen from the report of April 20, 1998 the information about threats resulting 
from persons serving in the WSI who were trained by GRU and KGB was communicated to the 
then Minister of National Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz. 

When M. Dukaczewski was the Chief of the WSI (2002-2005), running the "GWIAZDA" 
procedure was discontinued, even in this restricted dimension. The schedule of operating 


activities was only issued on October 12, 2005. The case, resumed at the turn of 2005/2006, was 
still carried in very narrow scope; neither appropriate forces nor sufficient funds were destined 
for this purpose, which remained at counter-intelligence disposition. In consequence, at the 
beginning of 2006 there were still 38 officers identified as graduates from Russian special 
courses, who served in the WSI. Only then was the action of checking the incoming and outgoing 
calls in their phones initiated, but this time these actions were once again paralyzed - of 8 
applications for telephone billings, four numbers of stationery phone and 1 number of mobile 
phone were established, in other cases none actions were undertaken, explaining it by the 
impossibility to establish a phone number. 

The case "GWIAZDA" was the only attempt of the WSI of facing the issue of infiltration 
by the Russian services of Polish special services after 1989. In view of the method of carrying 
the case, GWIAZDA procedure did not bring any measurable effects. 

The analysis performed by the Verification Commission confirms that WSI knowingly tolerated 
and conduced hiding connections of their soldiers and officers with communist and Soviet 

1. The verification procedure, which using the provisions of the Act on Secrecy could 
cause not granting safety certificates to these persons, as not giving the warranty of credibility, 
has never been developed and deployed in the WSI. 

It would be the simplest way of clearing the services from these people, but undertaken actions 
were just the opposite. The Verification Commission found numerous cases of giving instructions 
to the officers under cover not to confess to the fact of work in favor of communist special 

An example of such performance is the action undertaken in the case of collaborator "R", 
a diplomat with long experience, in this in the Embassy in Minsk, whom the WSI officers had 
instructed that he might confirm falsehoods in p. 11 of the Personal Safety Questionnaire (this 
point relates to secret cooperation with special services of Polish People's Republic). 
Such an instruction was given by:: 

• On June 10, 1999 by Col. Jozef Wa^sik - the following persons put their signatures on 

documents as persons approving the action: Cpt. Wojciech Resiak and Maj. Krzysztof 

Rola. The direct decision relating to this action was made by the then Chief of ZWW 

(Union of Struggle for Liberation) 


• On February 18, 2005 Lt Col Boguslaw Swiatek and Col. Kazimierz Kolasa - document 
bears the signature of Col. Grzegorz Sobecki. 

2. Another example of hiding the truth about the stay at courses in the USSR is the action of 
Lt Col Ryszard Piwonski, officer of Military Counter-intelligence, who being delegated in 1999 
to work in the Chancellery of Prime Minister, undertook the trial to "clear" his personal files from 
the elements discreditable for him. He applied to the active officer of the division to change the 
text of Ministry of National Defense decision on transferring him to the reserve in such a way 
that it would not result from it that he was the officer of Military Internal Services (WSW). He 
also asked to return the certificate of finishing the KGB course in Moscow (written in Cyrillic 
alphabet) kept in his personal files to him. After obtaining a negative reply from active officer, 
Lt Col Piwonski stated that "in this situation he shall attain his goal in another way". 
After retirement (military pension) he was reported to take a managerial position in the human 
resources department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

3. A commonly known effect of failure in undertaking any actions in the described matter 
was enabling carrying intelligence activity to Lt Col Czeslaw Wojtkun, the ex-chief of Military 
Internal Services counter-intelligence (then WSI) in Lodz. In February 1986 he finished the KGB 
course and in all probability he was already at that time recruited by the Soviet services. He was 
sentenced to degradation and four years of imprisonment for delivering the documents of Polish 
intelligence to the Russians. 

A thesis was also advanced that Lt Col Wotjkun was disclosed out of revenge by KGB 
agents, with whom he had common dealings and whom he stole of one billion of "old" Polish 
zlotys, withdrawing such amount from a banking account. It is a fact, that even at the beginning 
of the 90-ies, KGB agents visited him in the counter-intelligence offices. The feature 
characteristic for the situation prevailing in the WSI is the fact that the investigation and arrest of 
Wojtkun was possible due to the action of the State Security Office (UOP) and not the WSI 
actions, which did not undertake any activity in this matter. 

4. A similar situation may be observed in counter-intelligence matters aimed, from a 
formal point of view, at counteracting the Russian penetration. For example the case "K" was 
established in order to develop a recruitment situation towards the officer of the Russian 
Federation, but in result of scandalous conduct of the case, an in result its none effects, all the 


actions were directed to the figurehead, a senior officer of military counter-intelligence, in order 
to hide the real state of the affair. However, no clues of the matter, among others involvement in 
the matter of KGB officer and Cpt. J.S., the participant of the course in Moscow in the years 
1985-86, were undertaken. It was never explained whether this entire matter was not a result of 
KGB provocation and whether Cpt. J.S. was not the collaborator of foreign services. The entire 
procedure was oriented only to secondary issues 

Procedure "S" was established against the officer of the Polish Armed Forces, Lt Col J. J. 
("S") and was conducted by military counter-intelligence, aiming at investigation of his possible 
activity in favor of Russian intelligence. The key issues in this matter was lack of information 
flow between Military Intelligence Directorate (ZWW) and military intelligence, resulting first of 
all from protection of not precisely determined interest of Intelligence. The realization of planned 
operating actions was ceased, which could bring counter-intelligence advantages. The "S" 
investigation was carried superficially, the clues of the matter were not continued. In 1980-1983 
"S" stayed in the Academy in Kiev. It can be seen from obtained information that during this stay 
he informed one of the lecturers, co-operating most probably with the KGB about the student 
environment. "S" also declared his readiness to serve in the former Soviet Army. He kept social 
and commercial contacts with a Russian woman, who had been for several years in close 
relations with Polish officers studying in the USSR. In September 1989 r. "S" started studies at 
the Commanding and Staff Academy of State Air Defense Forces in Tver. It is not known, who 
the inspirer of his return to Moscow 10 years later for annual studies was, but in the same year 
shielding actions against J. J. were undertaken. It was done by ZWW officer Maj. Jan Szcz^sny, 
formerly trained in the USSR. 

After returning from studies in Moscow, "S" became the acting Chief of Staff I of Rocket 
Brigade of Air Defense in August 1999. During the procedure, the following facts were 
established, among other, confirming the justified suspect ions of "S" contacts with foreign 

• between 1992 (stay of "S" in Tver), and 1999 (stay in Moscow) two attempts of 
establishing contact with "S" by persons having relations with Russian special forces were 

• "S" was hiding his contacts, including the contacts with citizens of the Russian 


• "S" demonstrated special initiative in establishing contacts with the cadre of NATO 

• "S" solicited contacts with Air Defense Army and the General Staff of the Polish Armed 
Forces staff in order to promote his person in Air Defense Army and General Staff of the 
Polish Armed Forces command; 

• during run verifying proceeding "S" did not disclose contact with foreigners; 

• during his stay abroad "S" realized telephone connections with the Russian Federation; 

• without his superiors' consent "S" invited military attache of the Embassy of France in 
Warsaw for military exercises; 

• "S" was keeping contacts with unknown man visiting him in his military unit; 

• "S" had negative result of polygraph test - a strong reaction to questions relating to his 
cooperation with foreign special services, in spite of this no securing actions have been 

• in February 2002 "S" went to the Baltic Coast under the pretext of inspection in rocket 
commands ; he did not inform his closest circle about it, he took two heavy suitcases and 
his service laptop, from which he sent correspondence, whose content and addressee were 
not established; the actual stay of the figurehead at the Coast has never been established, 

• the trial of handing money to "S" in the form of a bribe was stated, to the order of Russian 
special forces (payment to the account was to be effected after his retirement). 

In spite of so much expressed signals, the thesis that "S" is a collaborator of foreign services 
was consistently rejected and the procedure was conducted in a way, which simply shielded his 
suspected actions. Probably in 2005 his case was placed in the archives. In the same year "S" quit 
the service and was employed in Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej ('Bank for Sustenance 

The case under code name "K" relates to cooperation of Col. Marian Kastelik (graduate of 
GRU course in the USSR), recalled by way of punishment from post in Norway for alcohol abuse 
with lieutenant colonel of the Soviet military intelligence Kozyrev and disclosing the information 
which could be detrimental for the Republic of Poland to him. During his stay on the post in 
Democratic Republic of Korea Col. Kastelik disclosed the data of the WSI officer under cover 


and the scope of the activity carried by him in the Russian Federation. He did not either inform 
the Command of the attempt of recruitment by intelligence services of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea and Russia of the officers subordinated to him - Lt. Col. J. and Lt. K. 
During his stay on above mentioned post Col. Kastelik: 

• contrary to Command instruction remained in very friendly contacts with employees of 
the Russian Federation Embassy, including GRU soldiers (Kozyrev) and had numerous 
intimate contacts with Russian women dangled to him by GRU; 

• during his entire stay he bought deficit objects for the Embassy of the Russian Federation 
(because of the embargo), and leaving the post he instructed his successors to continue 
these actions; 

• he was running correspondence through the intermediary of Americans between Lt Col J. 
and a former employee (women) of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Pyongyang, 
neglecting the official communication channel; 

• he acquainted Gen. K.O. with GRU residents in Korea (Kozyrev and his chief Smirnoff). 
As It can be seen from the files of the case, Gen. K.O. provided to Russian Federation 
diplomats, in this GRU and KGB officers, information he received by virtue of his 
position, including also information obtained from the chiefs of other missions; 

• many times he spent the time in the Polish Embassy in Moscow in the company of a 
Russian women dangled to him by Kozyrev; 

• he participated in the scandal relating to the purchase and service of computer hardware 
for the Embassy of the Polish Republic in Pyongyang through a Russian Company, which 
enabled insight to the computer data by the service technician - a Russian citizen. 

The case against Col. Marian Kastelik was established no earlier than a year after his coming 
back from the post. No individual cases were carried out, which would investigate the events of 
contacts of other WSI officers on the Mission in Korea with the Russians, no action was 
undertaken, either, which could lead either documenting the contacts of Col. Kastelik with 
representative of Russian special forces after this return to Poland. 

In spite of admitting that Col. Kastelik "does not guarantee by his behavior the honesty and 
loyalty, he is unreliable as intelligence officer and may make a threat for the safety of operating 
tasks realized by the Institution for safety of the Republic of Poland", the only action that was 


suggested was transferring above mentioned person to reserve. 

The following persons, knowing the case as described above, did not undertake any action 

relevant to the scale of the involved threat: 

1 . Lt Col Ryszard Niedzialkowski (conducting the case) 

2. Col. Janusz Bogusz 

3. Col. Andrzej Zietidewicz (participant of course in the USSR) 

4. Col. Stanislaw Manczynski 

5. Col. Marek Witkowski 

Another example of lack of appropriate reaction to the connections of the WSI officers 
with Eastern special services was the case of operating shielding (SOZ) under code name "P", in 
which the figurehead was Comdr. Piotr Gawliczek from Division 2 of the 2 nd Directorate (earlier 
the officer of 'Division Y' and expert of Attache's Office in Norway). In the course of 
conducting the case, the figurehead did not avow his acquaintance with GRU officer, which was 
established in 80-ies in the Brigade of Soviet Army, which was based in Swinoujscie. As it was 
established, GRU officer, appearing in the role of the interpreter of this unit, was performing in 
fact investigation and intelligence tasks. At the beginning of the 90-ies he considerably 
intensified his activity in the environment of the Polish Armed Forces and among civil persons 
from the circle of the Military Navy in Swinoujscie and Polish Armed Forces Units in the region 
of Western Pomerania. In the following years, the officer of GRU has come many times to 
Poland under the cover story of commercial activity, re-establishing his contacts with Polish 
citizens, whom he met earlier. His actions in Poland after 1994 were aimed at penetrating the 
officer cadre and the closest environment of military units due to his contacts established during 
earlier stay in Poland.. In spite of serious and unexplained suspicions Gen. M. Dukaczewski 
made a decision on directing Comdr. Gawliczek to work in the analytical unit of the WSI, in 
which his access to confidential information was extended (and in 1999 he was promoted to the 
position of Chief of Command of Studies and Analyses (ZSiA). 

The files of this case include an internal note of Maj. Jan Zukowski to Col. Tadeusz 
Rusak, in which the first states that though it could not be excluded that above mentioned rear 
admiral undertook cooperation with GRU, no actions should be initiated against him, since "it 
would impinge negatively on bona fides of Polish military special services before alliances from 


The conclusion which resulted from above described case was not used for planning and 
organizing the operating work of the WSI, the result of which was the WSI abandonment of 
deepening its knowledge about the activity of special services of the former USSR states in 
Poland, particularly in the areas, in which the Soviet Army was based in the past. Because of this 
the conviction that the cooperation through the network of agents with the USSR services was 
tolerated, if not approved, became established. 

Russian penetration: resume 

The above analysis of selected operational cases indicates that the WSI were incapable to 
carry effective counter-intelligence work to that extent. During the entire period of their existence 
they did not detain even one Russian spy. All success in this field was the result of civil services 
actions. Event the representatives of the WSI themselves disputed the bona fides of this services. 
In one of "GWIAZDA" documents it was stated: "I state with full responsibility that these 
services are not reliable, which is mainly due to their cadre, involved in unexplained contacts 
with the East". 

In turn, in an internal note dated March 24, 1999 it was indicated that the graduates from 
KGB and GRU courses "made a natural recruitment base for Eastern special services". According 
to another document, military counter-intelligence and intelligence obtained many interesting 
information" on this subject, but they did not bring any effects. It was aptly noted that one of the 
reasons of this situation "was and is the WSI infiltration by special services of the East, for whom 
the officers trained in the East could make a recruitment and information basis".. The assessment 
of the WSI operating actions both in intelligence and anti-espionage area, must be negative. For 
several recent years the military special services have not been in condition to build any operating 
structure, which could carry intelligence reconnaissance and provide counter-intelligence 
security, unexposed to the Soviet infiltration. 

It should be also considered that the main actions undertaken in the case under code-name 
"GWIAZDA" were both apparent and ineffective by default, or they were doomed to failure 
because they were supervised by the officers trained by GRU and KGB. It should be taken into 
consideration in that place, that the pragmatics resulting from the regulations on registration of 
procedures in special services records, provided a guarantee that each interest in this subject or 
appearance of any additional information or suspect ions must be co-ordinated - which is equal to 


referring them to the unit, which conducted the case "GWIAZDA". 

In the light of the above cited facts, the proceeding of the following persons fulfils the 
instruction contained in Art. 70a subpar. 2 of the Act of June 9, 2006 Regulations Implementing 
the Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Act and of the Act on 
Duties of the Officers of Military Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service: Brig 
Gen. Jan Zukowski, Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Col. Marek Slon, Col. Zenon Klamecki, Col. 
Andrzej Zietfdewicz, Col. Stanislaw Manczynski, Col. Marek Witkowski, Col. Waldemar 
Dziejgielewski, Col. Mieczyslaw Kulita, Col. Kazimierz Kolasa, Col. Grzegorz Sobecki, Col. 
Stefan Janus, Col. Jozef Wajsik, Col. Marian Kastelik, Col. Janusz Bogusz, Lt Col Krzysztof 
Klosinski, Lt Col Jerzy Rzepecki, Comdr. Piotr Gawliczek, Lt Col Boguslaw Swiatek, Lt Col 
Czeslaw Wojtkun, Lt Col Ryszard Piwonski, Lt Col Ryszard Niedzialkowski, Lt Col Pawel 
Selwet, Lt Col Krzysztof Gardian, Lt Col Andrzej Goczal, Lt Col Janusz Luszcz, Maj. Grzegorz 
Wilczewski, Maj. Piotr Jaskolski, Maj. Marek Kwasek, Maj. Jacek Poplawski, Maj. Marek Orzel, 
Maj. Maciej Antczak, Maj. Krzysztof Rola, Cpt. Wojciech Resiak. 

In the light of Art. 70a subpar. 3 of the Act cited in the introduction, the persons 
occupying lead governmental positions, which learnt about the actions inconsistent with the law 
and did not undertake any actions aimed at ceasing such actions was the Minister of National 
Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz. In the above-described period the Chief of the WSI was Brig. 
Gen. Marek Dukaczewski. In Art. 5 subpar, 1 of the Act of December 14, 1994 on the Office of 
Minister of National Defense a regulation is contained, that Military Information Services (WSI) 
were subordinated directly to the above Minister. More precise information on this regulation 
was brought by § 1 p. 16 of the Decree of Council of Minister of July 9, 1995 on detailed scope 
of Minister of National Defense activity. It imposed on the Minister of National Defense a duty 
of exercising supervision of Military Information Services (WSI) activity, particularly of their 
operational and investigation activity. According to the Act of July 9, 2003 on Military 
Information Services (WSI), the supervision of activity of these services was a duty of Minister 
of National Defense, who appointed persons to this position and dismissed WSI Chief. 

Pursuant to Art. 9 subpar. 1 of this Act the chief of the WSI was directly subordinated to 
Minister of National Defense. The Ministers of National Defense in that period were: Stanislaw 
Dobrzanski, Bronislaw Komorowski and Jerzy Szmajdzinski. 

The facts cited in this Chapter give rise to objections as to the lawfulness of the WSI 


soldiers' proceeding, in connection with the above the Verification Commission submitted a 
notice of suspect ion of committing a crime to the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office pursuant to 
Art. 304 § 2 of the code of criminal proceeding. 


4. WSI use of the 'Security Service' apparatus - case study 

The WSI used negatively verified apparatus of communist Security Service (Sluzba 
Bezpieczenstwa - SB) for the organization of its non-central structures. An example of such 
illegal action was establishing in Bielsko-Biala in half 90-ies a secret field residency under the 
case code-named "O". 

This case was run from October 10, 1994 to September 25, 1996. Dynamically developed 
in the first period (autumn 1994 - spring 1995), it was later inhibited, which probably may be 
appropriated to the changes in the cadre employed in the WSI. 

Two documents remained from this period. The first one (dated November 30, 1995) is a 
collection of opinions expressed in military circles, and as M. Wolny added, this was realization 
of the WSI Chief task. Another (dated April 16, 2004 related to business environment invited to 
"Bal Orla Bialego" ['White Eagle Ball; the white eagle is located on Polish flag] in Vienna. In 
this information such names as Kuna, Zagiel and Wiatr are mentioned, representing among others 
the companies BILLA or SLAVIK. The fact of involvement of these persons in the trade in arms 
with the states of former Yugoslavia was also noted. Information came from Piotr Wawrzyczek 
(the partner of S. Zasada [former racing car driver, industrialist in automotive industry in 
Poland]) and it was received indirectly by source code-named "GRAZYNA". This signalizes the 
tendency of keeping the activity of established informants' structure. 

The plan initiating the files under code name "O" indicates to the necessity of building a counter- 
intelligence security system in the area of Bielsko-Biala Province with use of negatively verified 
former officers of SB [Communist's Security Service in Poland] and their human sources. This 
activity was to be carried under cover as guard security Company by the name: "Komandos" 
['Special Service Soldier', Commando]. The residency was to be composed of three former SB 
agents, who were expected to re-recruit the former agents and secret SB collaborators in the 
circles being of interest for the WSI, in Poland and abroad. It was planned to re-establish contacts 
with former employees placed in journalists' circles, being officers of governmental 
administration, acting in business, occupying management positions and persons associated with 
special services and the army. It was also planned to recruit 8-10 former secret collaborates per 


one residency member. In addition, the plans assumed that the chief of residency (negatively 
verified), the former employee of SB shall be provided with recommending document addressed 
to Police and Border Guard authorities, inducing the chiefs of the local Ministry of Internal 
Affairs authorities to render their assistance. The remuneration for the residents was to be PLN 4- 
5 mln (in "old" PLN; [10,000 zlotys = 1 US Dollar]) per month. Col. Marek Wolny and Lt Col 
Jan W^gierski were appointed as liaison officers for the residency. The contacts of residency with 
open field procedures of the WSI Counter-intelligence were excluded. It was a procedure 
enabling conspiracy of actions, causing at the same time that the structure was not subordinated 
to any supervision, neither content-related, nor financial one. 

Three former SB agents were engaged to the actions, which were recruited to cooperation 
as residents with the following pseudonyms "RYSZARD JAWORSKI", "WLADYSLAW 

Most probably they were the former agents from Section III and V of SB from the District 
Internal Affair Office (RUSW) in Cieszyn [on the border with the Czech Republic]. Detailed 
relation about personal information sources, carried in the area under their control in the 80-ies 
were taken from them. A list of over 100 names were issued (though in the files it is incomplete, 
which is confirmed by the selection of documents included in the files). It can not be excluded 
that the persons who were not found in the files of the case have later realized undertakings 
breaching the law to such extent that the persons carrying the matter did not take a risk to 
document them. 

Then, double-track actions were carried. Typified names were checked in the operating 
records of UOP getting the confirmation, which reminded registration and the possibility of 
insight into the materials. Certain persons were subject to investigation through carrying 
interviews with people from their close environment, and the interviews with the persons 
concerned were undertaken. 

On the grounds of documents kept in files "O" it is possible to reproduce the eligibility 
criteria for the agents. The persons sought by the services: 

• had to pass the verification (in case of agents) and 

• should have negative attitude to the governments of the Republic of Poland after 

• should be interested in joining newly established services, 


• should evaluate the reality before 1989 as organized and see the reason for growth 
in criminality and various social pathologies in democracy. 

Therefore the sought persons should be truly dedicated to communistic state structures, 
and in view of their placement should be ready to co-operate and at the same time be prone to 

An example of such approach is the activity of former SB agent aka, "JANUSZ 
OKRZESIK" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], who before his recruitment had disclosed, 
that he possessed hidden materials from the case run in the time, when he served in SB (the case 
had code name "PALESTRA" [= 'BAR', understood as a corporation of lawyers], and it may be 
concluded from the orientation of the functionary that it could be bound with juridical circles 
from Bielsko-Biala region). He delivered approximately 300 pages of these materials to the WSI. 
They contained among others the facts discrediting the persons from juridical circles, indicated to 
secret collaborators in this environment (e.g. prosecutor, judge, and notary). M. Wolny and K. 
Glowacki were informed about hiding the material and about their contents. Another SB agent 
aka "WLADYSLAW KORCZAK" indicated to his sources, which were recruited in order to 
investigate the structures of NSZZ "Solidarnosc". The Commission did not yet establish what 
happened to these materials. From the way of the WSI activity, analyzed so far it may be 
concluded that they were used either for blackmailing of the persons appearing therein, or as a 
pretext for their re-investigation and re-recruitment. Meanwhile, it was the WSI's duty to transfer 
the files of the "PALESTRA" case to the Institute of National Remembrance. 

Information gathered by the residency related to: 

• Foundation "V", whose secretary is the former employee of the apparatus of Polish 
United Worker's Party (PZPR) and SB agent (until the moment of liquidation of these 

• Russian Company "N" trading in lentex; 

• Plant "W" processing the scrap non-iron metals; 

• The Company "I", trading in agricultural and food products, non-ferrous metals and 
offering consultancy services in the field of fire protection. 

This makes it possible to explain why the residency activity could not bring any intelligence 
or counter-intelligence effects. It is difficult to find in the activity of the above-mentioned 


companies any elements associated with State safety in the sphere of defense. The fundamental 
objective of this residency action was different, therefore it is no wonder that it was not expressed 
in the documentation outright. This fact is confirmed by: 

1 . the tendency in typifying and verification of agents - persons typified for in-depth verifications 
in the State Security Office (UOP) had neither the competencies related to state safety, 
particularly in the aspect of armed forces (actor, politician, tradesman), nor the required 
possibilities (e.g. year of birth 1920); 

2. absence of any presumptions which could indicate to running the work in order to secure the 
State safety; 

3. typifying for further development prior to recruitment as collaborator, the persons, whose 
knowledge or professional career were not bound with statutory WSI tasks: 

- economist A.W., he was supposed in the WSI opinion to have knowledge of Art. -B affair and of 
business relations of politicians' group - in this about carrying out from Poland the equivalent of 
800 billion "old" Polish zlotys (WSI were also interested in political friends of W.) 

- lawyer B. involved in cooperation with SB; 

- former secret collaborator aka "KRZEMINSKI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], a 
criminal and smuggler, having established contacts with international criminal groups, trading in 

4. looking for the possibilities of obtaining information from banking environment (such 
possibilities were deciding in case of typifying for recruitment of former and negatively 
verified operating agent of SB, Stanislaw Bajda), which was explained with the fact that the 
close co-workers of Boguslaw Bagsik were two employees of Section V of SB in Regional 
Office for Internal Affairs on Cieszyn. 

5. accepting these actions by the Chief of Counter-intelligence Services of the WSI Comdr. 
Kazimierz Glowacki, which may indicated to the fact that scheduled verification of business 
and juridical circles in Bielsko-Biala Province was carried, with visible interest in getting such 
knowledge, which would enable blackmailing of selected persons. 

The material in the case "O" was produced by the 3 Directorate WSI, but after its 
completion it was sent to Safety Section at the WSI. The records of the case run by main 
specialist of the 3rd Directorate WSI Col. Marek Wolny with consent of the Chief of Counter- 
intelligence Services WSI Comdr. K. Glowacki was referred to Safety Section, which was aimed 


at hiding it before the employees of the 3rd Directorate WSI. Carried actions were going beyond 
the WSI counter-intelligence competencies since they were oriented to region of Bielsko-Biala 
and were typical of intelligence. The planned activates were executed in strictly selected location 
and time, which could be connect with the smuggling activity of the "Vienna" businessmen 
environment. These actions could have twofold dimension: on the one hand they served for 
investigation status of shielding by special services of certain circles and persons, on the other 
hand they could be a prelude for planned actions, for which it was necessary for investigation of 
political and juridical environment. Looking from this perspective, you may admit that we could 
have here to do with shielding actions associated with planned business activity, for which the 
region of Bielsko-Biala was of special importance. Such an intention of the authors of this 
undertaking may be confirmed by the fact, that the WSI residents - with the consent of the 
services command - made a decision to give to their informants the pseudonyms being the real 
names of publicly known persons, playing an important role in Bielsko-Biala society (e.g. 
"JANUSZ OKRZESIK" or "JAN MICHNA", [cryptic names for secret collaborators )]). In this 
place we have to do with masking criminal actions, which in case of instituting a criminal 
proceeding have to cast suspicions to non guilty persons and to discredit such persons by the 
same in the public opinion eyes. 

The case of "non-public residency O" is a good example of special services pathology in 
the 90-ies, when depraved and criminal elements were used in order to obtain information able to 
discredit politicians and be used to control them Such intentions of the authors and organizers of 
"O" residency are confirmed not only by fact that it did not bring any operating advantages, but 
that none of identified criminals was held liable. Selection of persons securing flow of 
information and constituting potential shielding apparatus in case of conflict with law, supports 
the assumption that establishing such secret branch of Military Counter-intelligence WSI in 
Bielsko-Biala had nothing to do with military services tasks and assignments. 

In the light of the above facts, the performance of the following persons fulfils the 
instruction in Art. 70a subpar. 1 and 2 p. 2 of the Act of June 9, 2006 Regulations introducing the 
Act on Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service: Comdr. 
Kazimierz Glowacki, Col. Marek Wolny, Lt Col. Jan W^gierski. 

In described period the Chief of the WSI was Brig. Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk. 

Up to 1995 the supervision of the WSI's activities on the principle of general 


responsibility of subordinated department was exercised by the Minister of National Defense. In 
the described period this office was held by: Zbigniew Okonski and Stanislaw Dobrzanski. 

The facts cited in the Chapter hereof raise objections as to legitimacy of the WSI soldiers 
proceeding, in connection with the above the Verification Commission sent to the Chief Military 
Prosecutor's Office a notification of suspected commitment of crime pursuant to Art. 304 § 2 of 
Code of criminal proceeding. 


5. Surveillance of political environment by the WSI 

WSI actively penetrated the political circles, first of all the politicians of the right wing. In 
spite of manipulating by the WSI the archive documents and falsification of the contents of files 
of run operational cases, it may be decidedly stated that certain right wing parties were 
methodically put under surveillance. These were the circles creating or sympathizing with among 
other Center Agreement, Movement for the Republic of Poland, Movement for Third Republic of 
Poland and Polish Liberation Party.. 

The operating actions were organized, oriented to Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski. The 
objective of these actions was splitting of the Center Agreement, involving its leaders and 
disintegration of this party. The operation was run from 1990 up to as late as 2001. Already in 
1990 Grzegorz Zemek was directed to investigate J. and L. Kaczynski, and particularly intense 
actions against Centrum Agreement circles were run in 2000-2001, when public TV managed by 
Robert Kwiatkowski broadcasted the film "Drama in three acts" (WSI officers engaged in 
surveillance of political party the 'Porozumienie Centrum' /'Agreement of the Center'/ at the 
beginning of the 90-ies, among others Zenon Klamecki, kept the command of the WSI currently 
informed about their contacts with the authors of the film "Drama in three acts"). 

Continuation of practices from the People's Polish Republic period 

The actions relating to these circles prove that the WSI behaved like communist Military 
Internal Services (WSW), which being so called "political police" in the army, controlled the 
political views of soldiers and commanding cadre and were fighting their "ideological enemies".. 
The activity of this formation was evaluated already at the beginning of the 90-ies by 
Extraordinary Subcommission for Examination of the Activity of the former Military Internal 
Services (WSW) of the representative Janusz Okrzesik, After completion of the works in April 
1991, this Commission prepared a special Report, in which it indicated, among others, to carrying 
by Military Internal Services the actions against political opposition. In all the instructions of this 
service there was a record on fighting hostile political activity. 

The tasks of Military Internal Services (WSW) included, among others control of 


participation of the soldiers in religious practices and listening to Western broadcasting stations 
and detecting in the army the offences of political character. 

WSI acted like Military Police in Polish People's Republic times 

Soldiers being under surveillance 

The WSI actions against military associations, postulating the necessity of introducing 
changes in the army were correlated with the actions against civil persons; there occurred 
fundamental convergence of operating actions. The actions against the soldiers may be regarded 
as justified to the extent in which they were carried under statutory frames. The fact that the 
actions against the soldiers were only a pretext for political parties' investigation is a 
characteristic feature of discussed cases. In their active search for information about relations 
functioning between the Polish Armed Forces officers (e.g. 'Association of Officers for Changes 
in the Army', Association 'Facta Non Verba', Association "VIRITIM", the WSI assumed as their 
operating foundation a thesis that "VIRITIM" is an organization inspired by political circles 
concentrated around politician representing the government of Jan Olszewski. It leads to the 
conclusion that the actions of the WSI described herein were aimed at fighting political 
opponents of the system represented by the WSI. The WSI actions to this extent were carried on 
supra-ministerial level. After June 4, 1992 the then WSI Chief Boleslaw Izydorczyk was 
regularly sending the findings (including those operational one) relating to military associations, 
their sympathizers and the former management of the Ministry of Defense, to other governmental 
authorities. The WSI undertakings were coordinated with the Counter-intelligence Section of the 
State Security Office (UOP), and the Chief of this department Konstanty Miodowicz applied to 
the WSI for its assistance in investigation of informal groups acting in the army and their 
relations with the sections subordinated to Ministry of Internal Affairs. 

In handwritten instruction to handle the case dated July 17, 1992 it was ordered "not to 
establish contact with UOP until the moment of official regulation of cooperation Military 
Counter-intelligence WSI with UOP". However, it is beyond any doubts, that cooperation 
between the WSI with Konstanty Miodowicz department was established. It was indicated by the 
WSI Chief in the letters to the Chief of the National Security Office (BBN) Jerzy Milewski of 
July 8, 1992 and to Minister of Internal Affairs Andrzej Milczanowski of July 17, 1992. 
WSI informed also the Chief Military Prosecutor about the necessity of taking into consideration 


the fact, that press and radio indicated that the leaflets of the Association "are produced and sent 
at least with the knowledge of J. PARYS, R. SZEREMIETIEW and R. SIKORSKI". 

Political opponent doctrine 

There is a wide-ranging convergence in the actions of so called Jan Lesiak (UOP) group 
with the WSI actions, whereby the military special services have more precisely determined their 
operating actions and indicated outright whom they perceive as the main opponent for the State 
structures. This opponent was to be the environment with expressly determined anti-Communist 
program, both military and civil. According to the WSI, all the circles criticizing the power 
centers or military special services should be strictly controlled. 

These actions were carried from the beginning of system transformations in Poland, and 
the WSI have worked out a specific doctrine of political opponent, which should be fought, since 
it is dangerous for State structures. Under the pretext of gathering information on articles 
appearing in the press, interviews in radio and leaflets critical for the Ministry of National 
Defense, Polish Armed Forces and the WSI, the information about journalists and politicians was 
gathered. The object of surveillance were first of all groups, political parties and persons, who 
demanded carrying de-Communisation and 'lustration' (vetting) in the army, dissolution of 
Warsaw Pact, accession to NATO etc. Taking issue with the persons disclosing irregularities or 
remainders of the patronage system of the Polish People's Republic (called nomenclature) in the 
army, the WSI acted in favor of keeping communistic influence in the armed forces. 
It was regarded that the persons and circles, whose purpose is, among other: 

• presentation of the WSI as discredited organization, 

• proving that the WSI are related with special services of the former USSR states, 

• accuse the WSI of serving in favor of the President and taking issue with the government; 
provide information about personal and organizational changes in the WSI should be subject to 

At the beginning of the 90-ies the WSI carried investigation of the circles of officers 
demanding changes in the Armed Forces, verification of higher commanding cadre, and 
withdrawal of discredited persons and making the persons liable for political purges from the 
years of martial law being in force. 

Up to now not all of documents were found, and the found files of "Association of Junior 


Officers. Counter-intelligence Prevention" proved manipulation of the file contents 
On March 29, 1991 the Chief of Counter-intelligence Section of Central Institutions at the 
Ministry of National Defense in internal note to the Deputy Chief of Directorate II of General 
Staff described the activity of Association in Favor of Transitions in the Army in Warsaw 
garrison. It contained, among others, the following statements: "Notwithstanding declared lofty 
purposes, for whose realization the association was established, e.g. promoting patriotism, 
officer's honor, the way of recruitment of the members bears the features of conspiracy". 
During next months the WSI undertook in-depth operating actions towards these circles. Among 
others the issue of the authorship of the letters with leaflets sent to military units was explained. 
The WSI has subject to analysis the leaflet peddled in July 1991 in WAT Military University of 
Technology, signed by Association 'Facta', 'Non Verba'. 

Right-wing parties surveillance 

The WSI also carried out operating activities against civil circles. It can be seen from materials 
being in possession of the Verification Commission that at the beginning of 1990, Col. Henryk 
Dunal from Directorate II of General Staff instructed Grzegorz Zemek to enter the environment 
of Kaczynski's brothers and undertake their investigation. According to these materials the 
actions undertaken further towards Kaczynski's brothers and their co-operators have operational 
character and made an attempt of realization of the task". The officers related with Zemek were 
Lada, Zylowski and Klamecki . This information is important insomuch that the names of the 
same officers appear at the beginning of the 90-ies in connection with investigation of the 
'Agreement of the Center' by the WSI. It means that the meetings of the group of officers from 
the 2 nd Directorate of the General Staff carrying the case of Grzegorz Zemek with Maciej 
Zalewski made part of considerably bigger WSI operation, in connection with Center Agreement 
surveillance, In summer 1991, Col. Zenon Klamecki initiated a meeting of Lt Col Jerzy Klemba 
with M. Zaleski. The meeting was held in the cafe at the Grojecka Street. Col. Klemba stated that 
M. Zalewski had an intention to typify the officers from military special services, who would 
work in the Office of National Safety. It is reported that two further meetings with M, Zalewski 
took place soon, first in the Office of National Safety seat, second in the Company "Klif" near 
Marsa St. After resignation of M. Zalewski from the Office for National Safety these contacts 
ceased. One of the participants of these meeting, Col. Jerzy Zadora was reported to inform Lt Col 


Zylowski about meeting with M. Zalewski. In addition, Col. Zadora stated that about these 
meeting were informed other higher officers of military special services: "The knowledge of 
these meeting was not closed in the narrow circle of the 2nd Directorate officers. The interlocutor 
stated that 'all chefs knew about them". 

According to explanations of Col. Zadora "contacts of the 2nd Directorate officers with persons 
from ministers, and Mr. Zalewski as such a person, were at that time frequent and natural".. It can 
be seen from the relation of Col.. Klamecki that he had never met Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Adam 
Glapinski from the 'Centre Agreement', personally. 

It is worth mentioning that Col. Klemba was carrying out intensive business activity from 
the middle of the 80-ies. In the department under his management the repair services of electronic 
equipment, in this of radio receivers, were performed, it was also the place in which "Jowisz" TV 
sets were assembled, and they were two times cheaper compared to prices in shops and the 
majority of this production was destined to private homes of the chiefs of the 2nd Directorate. At 
that time, Col. Klemba started to build a house and incurred subsequent credits for this purpose. 
In order to cover his expenditures he was to establish a commercial company dealing from import 
of goods from duty-free zones. After leaving the service "he started to move in the then financial 
circles, having connections with FOZZ ( Foreign Debt Service Fund). One of his acquaintances 
reported at the beginning of the 90-ies that Klemba "works for Prime Minister [Tadeusz] 
Mazowiecki and shall be in the team dealing with Polish debt". 

More or less at the same time two young WSI officers, Lt. Piotr Polaszczyk and Comdr. 
K.[name in the files of Verification Commission], established contacts with the circle of civilian 
politics. In second half 1991 they established contacts with politicians from right wing parties 
(among others Jan Parys and Jan Olszewski). These contacts might fulfil their role, aiming at 
determination of attitude of these politicians to any possible changes in the army and in the WSI. 
The superiors of both officers knew about these meetings. K. submitted reports on meetings with 
politicians of the right wing to his superior Col. M. Czaplinski. 

For the first time K. contacted the right wing politicians in autumn 1991, when Lt. 
Polaszczyk suggested to him participation in the meeting at a social with lawyer Jan Olszewski 
and doctor Wojciech Wlodarczyk. This meeting was a beginning for many other meetings with 
persons of right political orientation and with church dignitaries. The meeting with J. Parys was 
held in private flat, but in order to talk with him they went for a walk to park. 


Besides J. Parys the following persons participated in the meeting, among others Jozef 
Szaniawski, bishop [of the Roman Catholic Church, and the Chaplain of the Polish Armed 
Forces] Slawoj Leszek Glodz, Col. Franciszek Sznajder (in K. opinion he was the person who 
could be the intermediary in establishing contacts with J, Parys), Col. Jozef Pawelec 
(representative to Parliament of the Republic of Poland in the years 1991-1993 and one of the 
founders of "Viritim" association) and Leszek Moczulski (the meeting with him was organized 
after election in 1991, in which he was mentioned as a candidate to the position of Minister of 
National Defense, the initiator of the meeting was Col. Pawelec, and the meeting was held n his 
house in the place called Nadarzyn [30 kilometers south of Warsaw]). 

The object of the conversation were the changes taking place in the country and in the 
armed forces (including the WSI), the attitude of younger officer cadre to these changes and the 
atmosphere prevailing among the cadre. K, estimated that contacts of Lt. Polaszczyk with right 
wing politicians could be inspired by high officers of Military Police command: Col.. Aleksander 
Lichocki (last chief of Directorate I of Military Police Command) and Col.. Marek Wolny (last 
chief of Section 2 in 3 rd Directorate, and earlier the Chief of Section 3 in 1 st Directorate I of 
Military Internal Services command. 

According to K. Lt. Polaszczyk kept at that time frequent contacts with these officers. 
In September 1992 K. was called for an inquiry to the officer of the then to Safety Section. Col.. 
Krzysztof Kucharski, to whom he explained and described the details of history of his 
participation in the meetings with these politicians. 

Surveillance of political life in 1992 

The WSI noted the cases of sending to military units the letters containing leaflets on 
enfranchisement of the nomenclature (communist patronage system) in the army and decrepitude 
of Ministry of National Defense chiefs (J. Onyszkiewicz and B. Komorowski). They wanted to 
find the authors of the leaflets and organizers of associations presented as acting in the army. 

WSI performed among others the analysis of post stamps, run criminal biological 
examinations of post stamps for presence of saliva of the persons sending the letters, the writing 
patterns of various typewriters were compared. The copies of documents issued by the 
servicemen typified as the persons who could participate in the action of sending the letters, were 
obtained. Also the examples of their handwriting were subject to graphology tests (a decision was 


made on obtaining the samples of such persons' handwriting - without their knowledge). A wire- 
tapping was used for selected numbers. However, none actions were undertaken aimed at 
explanation of the information presented in the leaflets as regards economic irregularities. 

In the memo of June 3, 1992 the Chief of Section of Military Counter-intelligence of 
Polish Air Forces Col. Andrzej Firewicz wrote that the authors of the leaflets were rather the 
senior officers from General Staff or from Education Department of the Ministry of National 
Defense, dissatisfied with their career path in the army, The informants from Military Counter- 
intelligence indicated that the authors could originate from Pomeranian Military District. A week 
later Col. Firewicz stated that the letter of the Association of Junior Officers in Favor of 
Transformations in the Army could "be an attempt of interference of certain political parties into 
military circles".. The interlocutor of Col. Firewicz indicated that it could be done by such 
parties as Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) Polish National Party (PPN), Center 
Agreement (PC), but "he did not give any hard fact, making a reservation that it is his private 
estimation, backed however by the declaration of support for Parys and dislike to Komorowski 
and Onyszkiewicz". 

More detailed information was in the possession of the Warsaw WSI Section. The Chief 
of Capital City WSI Section Lt Col Jerzy Draj> informed that the inspirers of the action of 
sending the letters were typified in result of operation and that they were expected to be subject to 
operational control . Another part of this memo proves that the Ministry of National Defense 
management from the times of J. Olszewski government was surveillanced: "On the grounds of 
possessed operating data the following persons are named, among others, as the inspirers of 
political actions in the matter under consideration: Jan Parys, Romuald Szeremietiew, Radoslaw 
Sikorski, gen. Marian Sobolewski and other officers of the Polish Army directly related or 
sympathizing mainly with the Association "VIRITEVI", KPN, PPN" 

A decision was made on using special undertakings towards typified persons, and their 
"control of HUMINT source" was organized". However, there are no reports issued by the WSI 
informants in the files. We should take notice of the fact that the actions aimed at identifying the 
organizers were carried by various groups of the WSI, which did not exchange their findings 
between them. 

In that time the WSI monitored also the activity of other civil circles, In "monthly information 
relating to aspects forming the counter-intelligence situation" for May 1992, Section 4 WSI draw 


attention to the mass meeting of the Independent Alliance of Malopolska ('Niepodleglosciowy 
Sojusz Malopolski'), Fighting Youth Federation ('Federacja Mlodziezy Walcza^cej'), "Solidarnosc 
'80" and 'Liberty Party' (Partia Wolnosci) taking place in Krakow on the occasion of the 
anniversary of 3 May Constitution passage. During the meeting, the establishment of National 
Guard was announced among other, "an independent military organization, composed of young 
people, not having relations with the former Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR)", The initiator 
of this undertaking was Krzysztof Kopec from KPN. WSI received information about the 
organizational meeting of this formation, which were held on May 15 and 18 in the seat of 
Fighting Youth Federation. The WSI suspected that the organizers were recruiting volunteers to 
fights in Yugoslavia (according to the WSI in April 1992. Krzysztof Kopec and Wojciech 
Polaczek placed the posters in Krakow, on which they informed about the fights of so called 
"Legion Polski" (Polish Legion) in the former Yugoslavia and postulated the fights "with the 
remainders of communism in Poland"), but both activists denied to have run the recruitment 

In June the WSI did not hide their disquiet with publishing an article in "Gazeta 
Krakowska" ('Gazette of Krakow'), which was a briefing for the persons refusing to undergo the 
military service. The churches in Nowa Huta (close to Krakow) and posts of Krakow anarchistic 
organizations rendered their assistance in writing applications for military service postponing. 
One month later an event of distribution of leaflets of "Wolnosc i Pokoj" (Freedom and Peace') 
organization was noted in Warsaw. 


The Investigation of Bronistaw Komorowski 

Surveillance of the Mass Media 

Most operational cases related to opposition politicians were always run by the same 
group of the WSI (Military Information Services - MIS) officers. In other words, in the military 
secret service's structures there was a specialized group of officers whose task was to collect 
information about the WSI soldiers' contacts with the journalists, publishers and politicians' 
circles. Those cases were under personal supervision of Col. Lucjan Jaworski, then the Chief of 
the Third Directorate of the WSI. The group of people who run or approved the actions 
undertaken in those cases included inter alia: Lt Col Ryszard Lonca, Col. Janusz Bogusz, Col. R. 
Bocianowski, Col. Krzysztof Kucharski and Maj. Niedzialkowski. The person who was the most 
engaged in running the cases related to politicians (or carried out those cases directly himself) 
was pplk Lt Col Ryszard Lonca. The decisions of instigation in cases then started were 
supposedly taken by the WSI Chief, gen. Boleslaw Izydorczyk. 

Under the pretences of cover for specific institutions or people, information was collected 
that was intended to harm and compromise them. As early as August 11, 1992, the case code- 
named "WYDAWCA" (PUBLISHER) was instigated. Here the case officer was pplk Ryszard 
Lonca as well. The main goal was to identify the true authors of press articles of 1992, which 
contained critical information about the WSI. Determining the information sources of those 
authors was also included. In particular, the following articles were indicated: "Telepatia w 
wojskowej dyplomacji (Telepathy in Military Diplomacy)" ("Nowy Swiat", ['New World', daily] 
of April 24, 1992), "Oficerowie Dwojki odchodz^. z pracy (Officers of the 2 nd Directorate Leave 
Their Jobs)" ("Ekspres Wieczorny", ['Evening Express', daily] of June 20, 1992) and "Wojskowy 
wywiad PRL (Military Intelligence in People's Republic of Poland)" ("Honor i Ojczyzna" 
['Honor and Fatherland' magazine). 

In the opinion of Col. Lonca, those texts slandered the WSI and proved that their authors may 
have information sources within the WSI. 

Col. R. Lonca made an interesting conclusion, stating that by creating a dark picture of the WSI, 
the authors "demand changes using the slogan of de-communization of the service". He assessed 
that the information for "the extreme rightist groups" should be cut off. He ordered operating 


activities to be undertaken in order, inter alia, to identify "magazines' editorial teams and 
political groups which try to obtain restricted information about the WSI with the aim of 
compromising this service". His operational interest focused mostly on the circles associated with 
"MYSL" (THOUGHT) Foundation and its publication, "Honor i Ojczyzna" as well as on the 
circles around "VIRITIM". 

Among the people about who the WSI was actively collection information were, inter alia, 
Janusz Szpotanski as well as Janina Lukasik-Miklasz and Pawel Miklasz from the "Mysl" 
[Thoughts'] Foundation, Jozef (sometimes incorrectly named in the files as Jerzy) Szaniawski 
and Lt. Col. (Reserve) Stanislaw Dronicz. The WSFs sphere of interest extended also to the 
supporters and members of "VIRITIM" (among them: Czeslaw Bielecki, Wojciech Bogaczyk, 
Henryk Czarnecki, Col. (Reserve) Ryszard Dorf, Cpt. Damian Jakubowski, Romuald 
Szeremietiew [in the future Deputy Minister of Defense] and Piotr Woyciechowski). This interest 
went beyond the usual framework of counter-intelligence cover of the Polish Army. In the case of 
Pawel Miklasz and Janusz Szpotanski, the case files preserved the inquires of Unit 4 of the WSI 
(the so-called E-15) addressed to Section 2 of the Registry and Archive Office of UOP (State 
Security Office). The indicated reason of inquiry was "before investigation".. The measures taken 
in the course of the case were aimed at operational access to those people. 

In the course of further actions, the person of Col. Jan Bak from thel5 th Directorate of the 
General Staff was selected as a person, who being associated with Minister J. Parys team could 
provide information about the WSI. According to the case officers, Col. Bak, who served in the 
past in a radio-electronic surveillance unit in the town of Przasnysz, knew about that unit's 
participation in the investigation of political opposition circles before 1989, and as a person 
associated with the "Honor i Ojczyzna" editorial team, could be interested in providing such 
information to those circles. This information, however, has not been confirmed in the course of 
the case. Next, the authorship of the articles about the WSI was attributed to Jerzy [correctly: 
Jozef] Szaniawski who, according to the case officers, was associated with J. Parys and had 
contacts with military circles gathered in "VIRITIM" (among them with the editor-in-chief of 
"Honor Ojczyzna" Lt. Col. S. Dronicz, Lt. Col. Grudniewski and Col. Manka). In order to verify 
this, an active investigation was launched with respect to the editorial team of "Honor i 
Ojczyzna" magazine. The "WYDAWCA" case files preserved the notes about, the "Mysl" 
Foundation - its economic profile, organization chart, local branches and accommodation 


conditions were described; there were also mentions of financial problems, information about the 
local space plan and the facts that the editorial office was equipped with telephones, an alarm 
system and hardware, that the secretary had a notepad (this was indicated to be an important 
piece of information) and that there was some financing from the veterans resident in the UK. 

Despite the evident manipulation with the content of "WYDAWCA" file, there is still 
proof that the WSI conducted covert (inspirational) actions. On one of the notes, Col. J. Bogusz 
made a hand-written annotation: "On Oct. 3, 1992, 1 informed the WSI Chief about the interest of 
Mr. Krzemien, a journalist, in the attaches' offices. Col. Izydorczyk agreed to the proposed 
concept of dangling Mr. "K" a WSI officer. The details are to be discussed." 

Case Code-named "SZPAK" ['STARLING'] 

In 1992 - in the framework of Operational Investigation Case (SOR) code-named "SZPAK" [a 
bird name, Sikorski's last name is made of 'sikorka', a blue tit] - a detailed investigation of the 
Deputy Minister of National Defense, Radoslaw Sikorski, started as well. The exact date of 
commencement of SOR "SZPAK" is not known. The adopted reason for the commencement of 
SOR "SZPAK" was the fact that R. Sikorski was "engaged in political activities of groups which 
were aimed at weakening the structure and cohesion of the military and erosion of the authority 
of the Supreme Commander and the MOD leadership. In the perspective of subordination of the 
Army to the specific political goals, "Szpak" [i.e. Radoslaw Sikorski] is particularly fierce in his 
attacks at the Military Information Services, questioning their goals and tasks; he wanted to 
paralyze the WSI activities." 

The SOR "SZPAK" was also assigned to Col. Lonca to run; he was supervised by Col. Lucjan 
Jaworski and Col. Janusz Bogusz. According to Col. Lonca' s explanations, he was supposedly 
ordered to run SOR "SZPAK" by the WSI Chief himself, Gen. Izydorczyk, besides Col. Lonca 
was supposedly only continuing a case that had already been in progress. 

In the course of the case, actions were taken to "inspire" the press articles which would 
show Sikorski in a negative light, in particular in his capacity of the Deputy Minister of National 
Defense in Jan Olszewski's cabinet. One of the persons inspired by the WSI, was a journalist of 
"Gazeta Wyborcza" [biggest daily in Poland, left-wing, post-Communist, anti-vetting], Edward 
Krzemien. It is possible that in the course of SOR "SZPAK" the WSI themselves could have 
created the negative image of the figurehead (i.e. Deputy Minister Sikorski) by disclosing and 

publicizing some discrediting events he had participated in. 

Case Code-named "PACZKA" (PARCEL) 

At the beginning of March 1993, the case code-named "PACZKA" was started, where the main 
figurehead was Cpt. Piotr Polaszczyk (the same who in 1991 was establishing contacts with right- 
wing politicians). At the turn of 1992 and 1993, he started operating in car business, where he co- 
operated inter alia with 'Polmot Trading' Company. 

In the course of this case, the WSI also dealt with the "Pro Civili" Foundation (established 
with the participation of inter alia Austria's citizens: Manfred Hollestschek and Anton Kasco), 
which was to support former state officials and officers. Among those associated with the 
foundation was also Cpt. P. Polaszczyk whose wife held the function of the Director General of 
the Foundation. The members of the Foundation's Council were [sic - so in the original, this lapsus 
made a lot of comments in part of Polish Press], among others, Janusz Maksymiuk. The Foundation 
was ultimately taken over by the WSI officers (among them Col. Marek Wolny) and became part 
of the network of companies, which exploited the Military Technical Academy (WAT). 

With the lapse of time, the investigation of "economic activities" of Cpt. P. Polaszczyk 
ceased to be the fundamental purpose of the case. The case officer became interested mainly in 
the figurehead's contacts with political circles, in particular with the politicians from J. 
Olszewski's cabinet. Among others, the operational investigation has been conducted with 
respect to the contacts of Cpt. Polaszczyk with the former minister J. Parys, who at that time was 
the head of the "Mercury" Hotel in Warsaw and gathered a group of right-wing politicians around 
him, organizing political meetings at his place. The politician's meetings in the "Mercury" Hotel 
were under operational monitoring (static surveillance). Information was also actively gathered 
about E. Malecki (former mayor of Warszawa-Praga District and later the Chairman of "Pro 
Civili" Foundation), Member of Parliament Mariusz Marasek, Witold Nieduszynski (one of the 
creators of Christian Social Movement), Jozef Szaniawski and Pawel Rabiej, the last two being 
journalists. In the course of further actions, the links of Cpt. Polaszczyk with the right-wing 
circles were investigated through HUMINT sources ("PACZKA-2" and "PACZKA-3"). At the 
end of the case, the thread related to Cpt. Polaszczyk' s contacts with right-wing circles and 
investigation of those circles constituted the dominant thread. The documentation of "PACZKA" 
case is, however, incomplete as it contains almost exclusively the documents produced in 1995, 

though, as it has been mentioned, the case was supposedly conducted till February 2000. 

Surveillance of the Critics of Post-Communists and Russia 

The WSI was also investigated the journalists' circles in connection with the "Odezwa" 
(Appeal) of January 1995, where the authors alarmed the public opinion in writing about the 
political exploitation of Polish Armed Forces and military secret services by the President of the 
Republic of Poland at that time, Lech Walesa, with the purpose of the alleged coup d'etat he had 
been supposedly preparing for. In order to find the authors of "Odezwa", the styles of the articles 
about the WSI, published in the press, and the leaflet of Stowarzyszenie Oficerow Mlodszych na 
Rzecz Przemian w Wojsku ('Association of Junior Officers for Changes in the Military'), 
distributed in May 1992, were compared. Lt. Col. Lonca assessed that the style of "Odezwa" 
['Proclamation'] indicated: 

- hostility to the 'Belweder' [Palace; then site of President Lech Walesa], 

- the authors are associated with the right-wing groups, hostile against UOP which was 
surveilling them, 

- they have negative attitude to the post-communist groups, are hostile to Russia, 

- negative attitude to the clergy, that they indoctrinate the faithful, 

- the authors indicated that they represented the WSI. 

On that basis, R. Lonca marked out that the authors of the aforementioned "Odezwa" should be 
sought in the circles tied to the former Minister Jan Parys. In his memo, Lonca also pointed to 
specific individuals ("a part of that group, known to us, consists of), including, next to J. Parys, 
Col. Wladyslaw correct name Franciszek - Verification Commission's note] Sznajder from the 
Central Planning Office (CUP), Jozef Szaniawski, Pawel Rabiej and Cpt. Piotr Polaszczyk, the 
latter characterized with the words "our officer" (it should be reminded here that at the beginning 
of 1991, P. Polaszczyk established contact with J. Parys, J. Olszewski and L. Kaczynski). 
The alleged authors of "Odezwa" were to be verified operationally (also in the context of their 
contacts with Cpt. Polaszczyk - Lt. Col. Lonca' s memo). The case was given "urgent priority", 
such an instruction was signed by Col. R. Bocianowski, and the alleged authors were covered by 
the operational activities. Aside from the active gathering of information, the active penetration 
of the authors' circles was conducted with the use of HUMINT sources, among whom there was 
a source named "REDAKTOR" (EDITOR) who had direct contact with Jozef [sometimes 

erroneously referred to in the WSI documents as Jerzy] Szaniawski. 

Investigation of Bronistaw Komorowski 

The WSI have also investigated the political circles around Bronislaw Komorowski. The 
pretext for this kind of interference was his contact with Janusz Paluch. However, the military 
services collected information that decidedly goes beyond the scope of their competence. The 
pretext for this type of activities supposedly consisted of the prevention of interference of foreign 
intelligence, but the obtained information could have been used to excerpt pressure on the afore- 
named people. 

In 1993, the WSI counter-intelligence obtained, through a collaborator named 
"TOMASZEWSKI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], the information that a French citizen 
Julien Demol tried to reach people from the state administration (Deputy Minister Bronislaw 
Komorowski, Maciej Rayzacher, Jerzy Milewski) and senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces 
(Gen. Leon Komornicki, Gen. Zalewski, Gen. Roman Pusiak, Gen. Zenon Bryk). The WSI and 
the UOP assessed that there were clues pointing to J. Demol' s connections with foreign 
intelligence. The documents do not give evidence whether the representatives of the 
administration and the military were warned about the possibility that J. Demol worked for 
foreign intelligence. This situation was used by the WSI as the pretext to start investigation of 
Bronislaw Komorowski and Maciej Rayzacher. In the course of the operation, the WSI gathered 
inter alia Rayzacher' s profile and information about Komorowski' s stay in the internment camp 
in Oleszno. In the course of that investigation Cpt. Piotr Lenart questioned the collaborator 
"TOMASZEWSKI" inter alia about the circumstances in which he had met Komorowski and 
about the events from the internment times. Those actions were undertaken even though the 
collaborator "TOMASZEWSKI" emphasized that he did not want to take part in investigating the 
politicians. The services were also interested in the financial contacts of Komorowski and 
Rayzacher with Janusz Paluch, who conducted so-called "para-banking activities". Komorowski, 
Rayzacher and Benedyk supposedly invested 260 thousand DEMs in Paluch's undertaking. Col. 
Janusz Paluch operated among officers and one of his intermediaries in deposits was Lt. Col. 
Janusz Rudzinski. After Paluch went bankrupt (in the spring 1992), the collaborator 
"TOMASZEWSKI", Bronislaw Komorowski and Maciej Rayzacher wanted to recover the 
invested money through the investigation agencies they hired, but those agencies quickly 


withdrew from the contract, in fear of Paluch's political connections. It was suggested to 
Komorowski that the WSI's counter-intelligence could help in recovering the money as they 
helped other senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces who had been deceived. 
"TOMASZEWSKI" maintained that the funds collected unofficially by Paluch could have been 
used to finance the election office of Lech Walesa or a candidate he supported. During the period 
of his problems with the police, Paluch hid in the flat of Wachowski's [friend of L. Walesa; 
former car driver and minister] sister in the town of Bydgoszcz and in November 1994 he offered 
joint business to "TOMASZEWSKI". 

Only on May 22, 1995, the Chief of the WSI, Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk, notified the 
Chief of General Staff, Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, that J. Demol operations posed a threat to the 
defensive capabilities and the State Treasury of the Republic of Poland. Following this, it was 
decided to notify the senior commanders about J. Demol' s activities and warn them against 
keeping contact with him. We do not know anything about the fate of the criminal operations of 
J. Paluch and the officers of Polish Armed Forces who were associated with him and were 
identified by the WSI. 

Radio Surveillance of the "Drawsko Dinner" 

The WSI controlled the activities of senior representatives of the administration to the 
extent of eavesdropping their conversations. A clear example is the so-called Drawsko Dinner. 

On September 30, 1994, the soldiers of the Radioelectronic Unit of the WSI recorded the 
conversations held by Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki and gen. Konstanty Malejczyk with the UOP Chief 
Gen. Gromoslaw Czempinski and the conversation of the Deputy Minister of National Defense 
Jan Kuriata with Gen. Henryk Mika. The conversations concerned the performed contract of the 
sale of 62 APCs BWP-2 to Angola. The observers immediately reported the course of those 
conversations to their superiors.. At the superiors' order, the tape with the recording was secured 
and the content was written down, but it did not receive the required secret clause. The Chief of 
Radioelectronic Unit of the WSI conveyed the tape with the recording to the Deputy Chief of 
Counter-intelligence Directorate, who in turn conveyed it to his superior, Comdr. Kazimierz 
Glowacki. The latter presented the materials to the then chief of MOD, Piotr Kolodziejczyk. The 
minister returned the document to Comdr. Glowacki, who in undetermined circumstances, lost it. 

On June 16, 1995, the Chief of the National Security Office (BBN), Henryk Goryszewski, 


turned to the Minister of Justice with a request to instigate penal proceedings against persons 
responsible for eavesdropping the telephone calls made by senior state officials at the military 
training and proving grounds in Drawsko Pomorskie. In August 1995, the Prosecutor's Office of 
the Warsaw Military District refused to instigate the initial proceedings in this case. As the 
grounds for its decisions, the Prosecutor's Office stated that the WSI did not violate the law 
because they conducted open "radio surveillance", and not "eavesdropping". 

The Matter of Contacts with "NIE" Weekly 

Compared to the broad operational activities against the right-wing politicians and the 
officers who postulated changes in the military, the reaction of the WSI command to the 
information about leaks to "NIE" weekly was modest. At the beginning of 1992, the Counter- 
intelligence Directorate of UOP notified the Chief of Counter-intelligence Directorate of the 
WSI, Col. Lt Jaworski, about the contacts some soldiers had with "NIE" [post-Communist, pro- 
China & pro-Russian] weekly magazine. Those were: Col. J.Cz., Warrant Officer Z.G., Lt. Col. 
Z.K. from the military communications services command, Lt. Col. M.S., Col. W.R. (member of 
the editorial teams of military broadcasts in Polskie Radio /'Polish Radio', public/), Mjr (Reserve) 
C.R. and Lt. Col. L.Z. 

The actions taken by the WSI prove that those soldiers were under protection of their 
superiors. Despite the information indicating the possible leak, no standard action was taken. 
There were only some simulated actions, but even that limited undertaking was abandoned later. 
The manual notes on the documents show that Col. Lt Jaworski ordered to determine the sources 
of information leak to "NIE". On the report, the Deputy Chief of the WSI, Comdr. Kazimierz 
Glowacki, requested that the legal state be verified (whether a soldier's contact with "NIE", as 
described by UOP, is forbidden?), the conveyed facts confirmed and the report on conclusions 
made. The files also preserved a report for minister Jan Parys, signed by the WSI Chief Czeslaw 
Wawrzyniak, about the soldiers' contacts with "NIE" weekly. The handwritten note at the end of 
the document shows that the copy No. 1 was destroyed, and the report itself was made against the 


position taken by the 3 Directorate. It was probably never presented to the MOD chief. The files 

are missing the motions for instigation of operational case, there are only pages with inquiry to 
the Records of the 3 rd Directorate of the WSI. 

Contrary to the operational cases conducted against the members of the military who 


postulated the need to conduct the "de-communization", the WSI took an indulgent and tolerant 
stand towards the soldiers who had contacts with Jerzy Urban' s weekly, which proves that the 
actions in this case were simulated. 

The WSI Operations against Left- Wing Politicians 

A similarly dismissive approach was adopted by the WSI with respect to the signals about 
possible crimes committed by the post-communists. Although such information about the 
politicians from these circles was gathered, but in these cases the military services were very 
abstemious. That information was never used by the WSI to start any operational cases. There 
were also no documents preserved which would prove that the signals about possible crimes were 
conveyed to those persons' superiors or to the prosecutor's office, to civil special services or to 
the ministers in charge of a given domain. Contrary to the cases involving right-wing politicians, 
here the occurrence of an event was only recorded. This could mean that either the military 
services were directed to investigate and only gather information about one political group, which 
posed a serious threat to the existing post-communist line-up, or the WSI were in fact an 
autonomous entity striving for control over social, economic and political reality regardless of 
underlying ideas. 

There is a fact that speaks in favor of the second option, namely the fact that the WSI 
undertook the operational activities and investigations against SLD politicians as well. 
According to the information contained in the memo from the meeting with secret collaborator 
Wojciech M., numerous left-wing politicians were also involved in the illegal trade in arms and 
fissile materials at the beginning. 

The WSI tried to gather materials against the President of the Republic of Poland, 
Aleksander Kwasniewski. The Verification Commission found the documents discussing the case 
of alleged acceptance of a one million USD check for Jolanta Kwasniewska's Foundation. The 
operations of the WSI against President Kwasniewski resulted from the involvement of some 
WSI officers in the competition of foreign companies on the Polish alcohol market. Lt Col M. 
Trylinski supported the interests of a French company EURO-AGRO (his brother companies), 
which tried to take over the profits from production and the sale of products of Zaklady 
POLMOS in Zyrardow.. The competitor of the French company was the American company 
Philips Millenium Beverage, owned by G. Philips; the representative of that company had ties 


with UOP. In 1996, the American company took over the distribution of the products of 
Zyrardow-based POLMOS on the world alcohol market and could have earned great profits on 
this activity. Obviously there was a conflict between the WSI and UOP, based on their support of 
the companies, which competed to take over Zyrardow-based POLMOS: EURO-AGRO and 
Philips Millenium Beverage. The conflict of interest between UOP and WSI was called by the 
Polish media "the alcohol war". 

The Case of Jerzy Szmajdzinski 

The asymmetry in the approach to the assessment of intelligence threats related to the 
activities of the political world is visible also in yet another example. 

The WSI received information about the Polish visits of a certain Russian, Valerij Topalov, and 
his contacts with the MOD, Jerzy Szmajdzinski. In the 80-ties, Topalov was the head of 
'Komsomol' in the Northern Army Group of the Russian Army and (according to the WSI's 
sources) a special service agent, probably in GRU. He stayed, among others, in Swidnica, where 
he officially occupied himself with youth's affairs. After his return to the USSR, he supposedly 
headed the security of the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. After retirement to the reserve, he 
established contact with a youth activist from the National People's Army (of the former East 
Germany - NAL), Manfred Marko, a graduate from an academy in the USSR and later an 
employee of the Main Political Directorate in NAL and military special services. They were to 
set up a company, which would intermediate in medicine trade. 

On this occasion, the WSI gathered information about other Russians, among them a 
certain A. Oskin. It was a general opinion that Topalov and Oskin worked for the Soviet special 
services. Both Russians often visited the Main Political Directorate of the Polish People's Armed 
Forces, where they could review the documents concerning the situation and moods in the Polish 
Armed Forces. They used those documents in a separate room, which they locked for the time of 
their work. Their guardian was Col. Tadeusz Rzepecki who also organized similar meetings with 
Gen. Jaruzelski. The WSI also obtained information that during his stay in Poland around 
2000/2001, Topalov paid a visit in the Sejm [Poland's Lower Chamber of Parliament], where he 
talked to several MPs about economic undertakings. Oskin stayed in Poland several times as well 
and supposedly contacted Leszek Miller's "people" at that time. Oskin' s known contacts 
included, among others, Jaroslaw Pachowski, head of Polkomtel Company and Waldemar 


Swigon, former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Poland - PZPR. 
On the basis of the collected information, the WSI officer stated that: 

1. The Russian are using their contacts in the Republic of Poland to carry out economic 

2. The economic activities are only the 'legend' for intelligence activities, which at their current 
state can consist of restoration of "old contacts" with people who presently occupy prominent 
political and administrative positions." 

After subsequent information about Topalov's Polish contacts, the WSI officer again 
pointed to the existence of a real intelligence danger: "For the present findings it shows that the 
Russians, in the past identified as members of KGB staff, use the contacts established in the 
youth activists circles to conduct business activities. Considering the conclusions from the 
investigation of Russian intelligence activity, it cannot be ruled out that the business is only a 
cover for their special services." 

Those conclusions are important in the light of other documents. Namely, the WSI 
obtained the information that Topalov arrived to Poland at the invitation of Jan Chaladaj, vice- 
president of the company called 'Kolmex'.. One of the objectives of the Russian's visit in Poland 
was to prepare the contracts for the delivery of railway cars to Afghanistan, which was to be 
carried out by the 'Kolmex'.. In Poland the Russian inquired about the officers he met during his 
stay in Poland, among them, about Col. Tadeusz Rzepecki. According to the information 
obtained by the WSI, Topalov was a guest of minister Szmajdzinski during the celebration of his 
50 th birthday. During the party, Minister Szmajdzinski supposedly talked to Topalov "face to 
face" for a dozen minutes. The entry to the Sejm Topalov owned to Chaladaj; later he moved 
around the building on his own. The WSI also obtained detailed information about Topalov's 
business intentions. News reached the WSI about the planned visit of the 'Machinoexport' 
Company delegation in Poland. The Russians were probably to meet the Mr. Janas, MP: "The 
subject of the talks will be the matter of business activities in the territory of the Republic of 
Poland, also with regard to the military. The current project involves the purchase of the 'ZNTK' 
plant in the town Jelenia Gora and production of railway tank cars (about 6 thousand pieces for 
the Eastern market, also including Afghanistan). The foregoing enterprise is to be carried out 
with the participation of: Kolmex, Manfred Marko, the 'ZASTA' company from Slupsk, for the 
inclusion of which the MP Sienko from SLD [post-Communist, strong party in present-day 


Poland], Deputy Chairman of the Sejm's Committee of National Defense, strongly opts - 
Machinoexport". The WSI obtained the information that "the organizers of the undertaking 
(Pertek, Ciereszko and MP Sienko) are to receive about 5% commission on the value of the 
concluded contract". 

According to another document, "the undertaking was accepted by the Minister of 
National Defense who supposedly has personal contact with Valerij Topalov (meeting during the 
celebration of 50 th birthday of J. Szmajdzinski)". The fact that next to that text was a note that 
read "inf. 100%" proves that the WSI deemed that information as very reliable. In addition, the 
WSI were aware of the fact that contacts with Topalov create a "serious threat" for Minister 
Szmajdzinski: "It cannot be ruled out that the activity of the Russians in the territory of Poland is 
unofficially inspired by the Russian special service. This is indicated inter alia by the interest 
Valerij T. has in military circles. This creates a serious threat both for the Minister of National 
Defense (possible use against him in propaganda) and for the foreign affairs of the Republic of 

Despite drawing such far-reaching conclusions from the possessed information, no action 
was taken in this case to provide effective counter-intelligence guard for the people who, as the 
WSI pointed out, "occupied prominent political and administrative positions". 

To recapitulate: in the WSFs assessment, the right-wing circles were considered the 
extreme part of the Polish political scene. The services suggested that this was the direction from 
which the threats for the state security should be expected. Creation of such a diagnosis by the 
WSI resulted in fact from the intention to protect the WSI's own interests and had no relation 
whatsoever to the real security of the State and the Polish Army. 

The basic goal of such misinformation was that the WSI obtained "the political consent" 
for more active investigation of right-wing circles that had been deemed "hostile".. As the reason 
for commencement of the aforementioned operational cases ("APEL", "PACZKA", "SZPAK", 
"WYDAWCA") the critical approach of then oppositionist circles to the WSI, their negative 
attitude to post-communist groups and Russia and their aversion to the Belweder's policy were 
indicated. At the same time, the WSI officers who were trained in GRU or KGB could work in 
the service would any major obstacles, even more - it was them who headed the service and 
indicated the directions of its operations. In this context, the leniency that the WSI showed to 
post-communist circles and to the soldiers who contacted those circles is even more striking. 


Although such information was gathered, but generally speaking, it did not incline the WSI to 
start operational cases. The information about crimes was not conveyed to other state authorities 
either. Thus, a thesis can be proposed with a considerable certainty that the military services were 
directed to investigate the pro-independence right-wing circles. 

In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition 
contained in Article 70a. 1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military 
Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the 
officers of Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 
2006: Brig. Gen. Boleslaw Izydorczyk, Col. Zenon Klamecki, Col. Lucjan Jaworski, Col. 
Ryszard Lonca, Col. Henryk Dunal, Col. Zdzislaw Zylowski, Col. Jerzy Zadora, Col. Marek 
Czaplinski, Col. Aleksander Lichocki, Col. Marek Wolny, Col. Krzysztof Kucharski, Col. 
Andrzej Firewicz, Col. Janusz Bogusz, Col. Ryszard Bocianowski, Comdr. Kazimierz Glowacki, 
Lt. Col. Jerzy Klemba, Lt. Col. Mieczyslaw Trylinski, Maj. Niedzialkowski, Lt. Piotr 

The WSI Chiefs in the described period were: Counter- Admiral. Czeslaw Wawrzyniak, 
Brig. Gen. Boleslaw Izydorczyk, Brig. Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk. 

Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 
14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated 
directly to that Minister. This regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of 
National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National 
Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information 
Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the 
Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those 
services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI 
Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated directly to the 
Minister of Defense. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz, Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Zbigniew Okonski and Stanislaw Dobrzanski. 

The facts cited in this chapter bring doubts as to the legality of conduct of the WSI 
soldiers; thus, the Verification Commission sent a notification of suspected crime to the Supreme 
Military Prosecutor's Office, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure. 


6. The Impact of the WSI on the Forming of the Public Opinion 

The WSI influenced the mass media through the recruitment of journalists and members 
of management of television stations, owing to which they could have indirect impact on the 
publishing policy and program line of the publications or broadcasters. 

At the beginning of the 90-ties, the operational activities were conducted both in public 
and in private media, leading to the achievement of such a position by the WSI where they could 
control all TV stations and most nationwide press. The WSFs operations in public media were 
conducted, among others, by the informers of those services or by the so-called Under Cover 
Officers (OPP). 

The example of an OPP is Janusz Brodniewicz aka "BURSKI" [cryptic name for secret 
collaborator] or "GRZEGORZ" [cryptic name for secret collaborator]. The headquarters strictly 
steered the activities of "BURSKI". This is proved by the notes about indicating appropriate 
business associations or foundations which that officer's company should join (e.g. Fundacja 
Kultury /Culture Foundation/, Dom Polski /'Polish House'/, TVP /Public TV/, TV 'POLSAT'). 

In 1994, "BURSKI" was put in TVP, at the position of deputy director in the then 
organized Prasowa Agencja Telewizyjna (Television Press Agency - PAT) where he formally 
was in charge of verification of TVP's contracts with its partners, drafting of such contracts etc. 
"BURSKI" aimed at gaining influence over TVP and in 1994 he proposed the WSI HQ a project 
related to the control of information flow. The project was about using the so-called 
dissemination stations to transfer information gathered by all regional TV stations in Poland. The 
WSI planned to have early access to that information and intended to gather it through the then 
existing TVP Defense Office. The use of that information transfer system by the WSI was 
supposed to involve benefits for the services, inter alia by way of: 

- generation of additional funds for HQ from the distribution of equipment to receiving machines, 

- transfer of data and open and coded information in Poland and abroad to the HQ and archiving 
such data and information, 

- possibility to control all recipients and information sent by them (network repair service 
provided by a company or institutions where the HQ have or could put its representatives and 

Furthermore, "the production of decoders and network repair service by a business entity 
dependent on WSI but not related to MOD. Such solution would allow to transfer profits to the 


HQ with the omission of MOD".. This was because the legal regulations then in force provided 
that the finds obtained on the external market had to be transferred to the state budget. 

The main purpose of this undertaking was to consist in the possibility to control the 
information flow of all regional TV stations in Poland and generate additional funds for the WSI. 
It seems justified to advance a thesis that the efforts of "BURSKI" [cryptic name for secret 
collaborator] constituted a part of operation aimed at control not only over the journalists' circles 
or media environment. All plans and actions of "BURSKI" were every time analyzed and 
approved by his superiors before implementation. 

"BURSKI" was also involved in establishing and taking over the institutions and 
companies that dealt with information flow and processing. His most spectacular action was the 
take-over of the culture and information centers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the 
intelligence. As early as in December 1991, "BURSKF", through the support of his acquaintance, 
then Deputy Minister of Culture Maciej J. Ramus, became the office director of Fundacja 
Kultury. In 1993, "BURSKI" also became the member of the Executive Board of that 
Foundation. The "Fundacja Kultury" was established at the end of 1990 and had "a license within 
the EEC quota to conduct business and commercial activities with the partners in the USSR".. 
This was probably what made it so interesting for the intelligence, which decided to take over the 
Foundation. The decision to attempt the take-over of the foundation (after examination of the 
report by "BURSKI") was made by the then chiefs of 'Units Y' and 'A', Col. Konstanty 
Malejczyk and Col. Zdzislaw Zylowski. Shortly after that, the organizational and legal 
transformation within the Foundation, suggested by "BURSKI", gave the military intelligence a 
decisive influence on the directions of expansion of the foundation. 

The intelligentsia took over the Foundation's management and used it to appropriate, 
organizationally and financially - the Culture and Information Centers Abroad. This was made 
through establishment (by the Foundation and a state financial enterprises) of the company "Dom 
Polski".. This company was given, by Minister [for Foreign Affairs] Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the 
Information and Culture Centers, where the existing materials show that the take-over most 
certainly applied to the centers in Berlin, Minsk, Prague, Vienna and Dlisseldorf (in the latter 
case, real property was also obtained, formerly owned by "Ars Polona"). 

The company "Dom Polski - Towarzystwo Handlu Miedzynarodowego" ('Polish House - Intl. 
Commerce Co.] was set up on October 23, 1992, at the initiative of "BURSKI" [cryptic name for 


secret collaborator] and an experienced collaborator of the WSI known as "SAS". The project 
was prepared in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the activities were 
supported inter alia by minister Skubiszewski, who supposedly pressed for quick completion of 
this matter, Director General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tomasz Drzewosowski and 
Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Culture and Art Piotr Lukasiewicz).. The foundation 
deed was signed by the representatives of National Chamber of Commerce (KIG) (in agreement 
with minister Andrzej Arendarski and at his knowledge) and Business Foundation, among them 
Izabela Cywinska, Bogdan Chojna, Andrzej Sadkowski and Andrzej Voigt. 

The objective of the company was "to generate funds for the promotion of the Polish 
culture abroad and to conduct business, commercial and promotional activities with regard to all 
things Polish (using the mark and emblem "Teraz Polska" ['Poland, now!'])". However, the most 
important thing was the take one word over of the Institutes and Centers of Polish Culture abroad 
and "exit to the East and making profits on the transit business between Germany and the former 
USSR countries". 

The company documents were made so that the foundation of the Executive Board had 
direct impact (through the president of the company) on the company's staff selection and its 
directions of operation. Owing to the efforts of "BURSKI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], 
the president of the company was the aforementioned collaborator of the WSI, "SAS". 
"BURSKI" conducted talks in this matter in the Ministry of Culture and Art (with the Minister 
Professor Andrzej Sicinski) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as with the aforesaid 
Executive Board of the Foundation which had a decisive impact on the appointment of the 
president of the new company. In his report to the HQ, "BURSKI" proudly stated that "the 
competencies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were limited to the right to supervise that part of 
the institutes which had diplomatic status, by way of appointment of directors (on the existing 
terms). Those directors, however, did not have any impact on the company's operation in the 
commercial part of the institutes". 

Attention should be paid to the participation of "Ars Polona" in this enterprise; the 
company transferred, free of charge, the real property in Dusseldorf to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, though in theory it had no legal title to that property (it housed the Institute of Polish 
Culture). The go-between was the liquidator of RSW Prasa [Press holding from the Communist 
times] and consent was given by the Ministry of Culture and Art, and the Ministry of Foreign 


Affairs also transferred, the property to Fundacja Kultury free of charge, which in turn transferred 
it to "Dom Polski".. The Center, probably already used by the intelligence before, returned to the 
services, this time with the legal title of ownership. The talks with "Ars Polona" on behalf of the 
Foundation were conducted by "SAS". 

This way, the WSI gained a network of companies all over the world and focused on 
organizing their own economic structure at the expense of the Polish State, instead of the 
information acquisition. These activities were accepted by Col. Konstanty Malejczyk, Col. 
Zdzislaw Zylowski and Ryszard Sosnowski (on June 30, 1992, Col. K. Malejczyk personally 
decided to put "SAS" at the head of "Dom Polski"). 

In 1993, at the initiative of "BURSKI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], Fundacja 
Kultury started talks with the central authorities of the Republic of Poland in order to organize 
the Central Information Bank (CBI). The WSI wanted to use that bank and its data for 
information and operational work. CBI was to be established in the framework of then prepared 
"Centrum Informacji i Kierowania" ['Center for Information & Management'] ("at the witting or 
unwitting consent of the BBN", as the intelligence stated). The Bank was to improve the 
information transfer, co-ordination of activities between the authorities, control of border traffic 
and the work of business intelligence. The staff employed in the CBI were to have direct access 
to the gathered data and decide to a certain extent about the scope of information to be sent to the 
addressees. Burski believed that the Ministry of Interior (MSW) would fill the posts in CBI with 
"their" people and therefore suggested the HQ to become involved in the project through MOD. 
Also Marian Zacharski as the vice-president of "InterArms", IBM distributor for Eastern Europe, 
participated in the MSW work on computerization and improvement of information flow. All 
works were to be co-ordinated by BBN in the framework of then developed "Krajowe Centrum 
Informacji i Kierowania" ('National Center for Information and Management). It should be noted 
that, next to BBN, Ministry of Finance (MF), Fiscal Control Office (UKS), MSW, Main 
Statistical Office (GUS), CUS and Telekomunikacja Polska, a not very well know Swiss 
company PDT was also engaged in this enterprise. The consent for these activities was given by 
Col. Konstanty Malejczyk. 

Another initiative of "BURSKI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] were the efforts to 
establish a company that would deal in business intelligence. "BURSKI" wrote about that 
possible company: "properly guided with regard to the organization, it would allow to transfer 


selected operational HQ units under cover". 

During the work of the Verification Commission, many cases were also revealed where 
the WSI soldiers exerted influence on the journalists' circles. The WSI officers undertook covert 
actions against the journalists, with the basic goal being the creation of a specific image of a 
given event or phenomenon. This usually happened when the WSI interests or WSI-related 
matters were involved. The method usually applied in the kind of actions where the WSI officers 
talked to the journalists who were given specific information or the information materials 
prepared by the WSI officers were passed to the journalists, usually with inter-mediation of third 

An example of such covert actions of the WSI in the media was a set of articles by the 
services' collaborators known as "SKRYBA" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] and 
"DROMADER" [cryptic name for secret collaborator]. In the articles published in military press, 
they engaged in the promotion of Patria Vehicles Oy's offer for the wheeled APCs. When writing 
his article, "SKRYBA" emphasized only the positive results of the APCs tests, he did not take 
into account the technical defects of the equipment, and he further strongly stressed that the 
conducted trials of the APCs were positive. He stated even that: "So far, everything is on the 

The case officer gave "SKRYBA" the task of obtaining the image documentation and 
information about AMV ['Armored Military Vehicle'] 'PATRIA'. Meanwhile, "SKRYBA", 
during a meeting with the case officer, criticized a female journalist who published in the military 
press (and also was a WSI collaborator, only she was known [in WSI] as "SARIS" [cryptic name 
for secret collaborator]). In his opinion that female journalist showed "a complete lack of even 
rudimentary knowledge in the field of military sciences and the presented equipment. When 
snacks were offered, she caused a commotion strongly criticizing one of the guests, for, in her 
opinion, improper behavior." In the assessment of "SKRYBA", the conduct of the person 
criticized by "SARIS" gave no grounds to such reaction. 

Meanwhile, "DROMADER" published an article praising the contracts made with Patria 
Vehicles Oy. He stated that the contract saved "Wojskowe Zaklady" (Military Plant) in 
Siemianowice. He minimized the tender problems. "In accordance with the tender structure, the 
issues of conformity with tactical and technical assumptions (about 100 parameters) were treated 
marginally".. He also wrote, only in superlatives, about the selected vehicle. "As the 


representative of Patria Vehicles emphasize, AMV was the only vehicles among those offered to 
Poland where the need to reduce the thermal, electromagnetic and acoustic image, which has 
serious importance for its survival on the future battlefield, was taken into account as early as at 
the planning stage".. Meanwhile, reliable information existed already that AMV "PATRIA" did 
not meet a number of parameters (e.g. weight with load, range and water speed). In the experts' 
opinion, the vehicle was a prototype, which was not in regular production, or in the equipment of 
any army. 

Another type of this type of covert actions were the actions taken by mjr Mieczyslaw 
Trylinski with respect to the so-called "alcohol war" which involved, among others, the WSI. In 
August 1998, mjr Trylinski held a meeting inter alia with journalists Piotr Najsztub and Maciej 
Gorzelinski, to who he gave strictly directed information about the investors' operations on the 
Polish alcohol market, as a result of which these two journalists published an article "Belvedere 
wojna" ['Belvedere War'; 'Belvedere = brand of vodka] in the Internet. The article by Michal 
Matys "Czyja wodka" ['Whose vodka?'] (in "Gazeta Wyborcza") and the article by Henryk 
Schulz "Wodka Marsyliankej spiewa" ['Vodka sings "Marseilles'" /French Anthem/] (in "Nie" 
[weekly owned by former Communist high-ranking official Jerzy Urban]) were inspired by Maj. 
Trylinski. The purpose of those actions was to support the French company EURO-AGRO, 
which wanted to invest on the Polish alcohol market and belonged to K. Trylinski, Mjr 
Trylinski' s brother. 

The WSI files show that there were many secret collaborators in the media circles whose 
services have been used by the WSI. Among those who are known the best were: Krzysztof 
Mroziewicz aka "SENGI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator, etc.] (journalist of PAP, 
"Polityka" [prominent (post-)Communist weekly] and TVP); Maciej Gorski aka "GUSTAW" 
[cryptic name for secret collaborator] (vice-president of PAI S.A.); Andrzej Nierychlo aka 
"SASIAD" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] (journalist of "Kurier Polski" and editor-in- 
chief of "Przegla^d Tygodniowy" [Communist weekly]); Jerzy Tepli aka "EUREKO" [cryptic 
name for secret collaborator] (journalist and correspondent of "Polsat" in Germany); Piotr 
Nurowski aka "TUR" (vice-president of "Polsat"; the WSI officers counted that Nurowski would 
help them to establish cooperation with "Polsat" owner Zygmunt Solorz); Rafal Steffen aka 
"JERICHO" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] (president of PAI S.A.); Milan Subotic aka 
"MILAN" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] (journalist of TVP, later Program Vice director 


in TVN; the officer who investigated and recruited M. Subotic to collaborate with the WSI, 
served as an attache in Korea where he had cordial relations with a staff officer of GRU, Col. 
Sergey Kozyrev, and in 1982-83 was trained in Moscow); A. Bilik, aka "GORDON" [cryptic 
name for secret collaborator] (editor-in-chief of 'Dziennik Telewizyjny' [main news program] of 
TVP [Public TV]). 

The archive resources of the WSI contain a personal file pertaining to cooperation of 
Andrzej Madera aka "CHARON" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], a journalist of "Nowiny" 
daily in Rzeszow and "Lad" weekly in Warsaw, with the Intelligence Directorate of the WSI in 
1994-2000. Andrzej Madera was recruited for cooperation with The Intelligence Directorate of 
the WSI in 1994 in Rzeszow, by Cpt. Leszek Piotr. "CHARON" was mostly given tasks 
concerning the selection of candidates for collaboration with the WSI. The cooperation with 
"CHARON" was formally terminated in September 1999, due to his "engagement in political 
activities within the structures of one of the right-wing parties, gathered around the former 
President of the Republic of Poland" and "loss of intelligence opportunities".. There is no 
information in the materials that the termination of cooperation has ever been formally notified to 
this collaborator. 

Through well-placed HUMINT sources, the WSI had a current review of staff in media 
and interesting political contacts. The WSI tried to recruit such people from the media who 
guaranteed the control over journalists' circles for cooperation. Also gen. Konstanty Malejczyk 
was personally engaged in handling the agents in the public and commercial media. He 
personally handled, among others, Slawomir Przada aka "TEKLA" [cryptic name for secret 
collaborator] (chief of "Teleexpress" [popular news program] in TVP 1, who provided the WSI 
with written analysis of the press market in Poland, their capital situation after the liquidation of 
RSW "Ruch" and the level of foreign investments on the press market in Poland). K. Malejczyk 
was also interested in the form of the Press Law Act. Here he availed himself of extensive 
analyses written by "TEKLA".. When S. Przada aka "TEKLA" lost his job with TVP, gen. 
Malejczyk promised to find him a job with "one of the newspapers". 

Another informer of the WSI was Andrzej Ledwoch. he was selected as a candidate for 
cooperation when he was just a graduate of the Management Faculty of the Warsaw University 
(UW) and Postgraduate Journalism Studies UW and a student at the Institute of Developing 
Countries in the Faculty of Geography UW. On October 6, 1989, Mjr Zbigniew Demski (later to 


become the case officer) decided that the education of A. Ledwoch and the fact that he planned to 
start a job with Polska Agencja Prasowa soon spoke in favor of the recruitment. After a meeting 
with the candidate on January 30, 1991, Lt. Col. Zbigniew Demski moved for using the candidate 
by the Military Intelligence. Since then, A. Ledwoch was known in his operational work as 
"ALF" [cryptic name for a secret collaborator, undercover officer, etc.] At the time of 
recruitment, Ledwoch worked in "Trybuna" [Communist daily] and later in "Nowa Europa", 
edited by Krzysztof T. Toeplitz, where he joined the parliamentary service team. The 
collaboration with "ALF" proved promising enough to cause a meeting between "ALF", his case 
officer and Lt. Col. Gryza (known as "Grymski"), the chief of HQ Unit of the Military 
Intelligence. One of the topic was the way the WSI are described "in the Polish daily press". 
After such "inspiration", "ALF" obligated to publish an article based on the materials delivered to 
him by pplk. Gryza and pplk. Lt. Col. Demski in "Nowa Europa", which were to show [the WSI] 
in a positive light. During a meeting on September 3, 1992, Ledwoch obligated to prepare a 
synopsis of two articles: one about the affair in "Lucznik" Company, the other discussing the 
arms trade issues. After the consultation, those texts were to be published in the press. 

The documents preserved the consultation materials related to the preparation of the 
aforementioned articles. They include "Thesis for article about WSI", prepared by Cpt. 
Chymkowski on October 2, 1992; suggestions regarding the presentation of "history of 
intelligence services" and information about WSI structure, prepared by Rear Adm. (Reserve) Cz. 

Next consultations of "ALFA" [or "ALF" - cryptic name for a secret collaborator] (on 
October 9 and 14, 1992) brought the fruit in form of the preparation and discussion of a text on 
reorganization of special services. Already in the first sentence we find a suggestion that the 
reorganization of services is harmful, because it would allegedly cause the intelligence's 
involvement in "political games". We can also find a complete, consulted and printed article 
"Tajne puzzle" ['Secret puzzles'], signed by Andrzej Ledwoch and published in "Nowa Europa" 
[journal] in October 22-23, 1992 in the files. 

In recognition of his merits, Andrzej Ledwoch became a secret collaborator released from 
the obligation to draw his "signature under the cooperation statement". As early as November 3, 
1992, Ledwoch has also been known as "LANED". Since July 1994, Ledwoch has also worked 
in the editorial team of "Teraz" magazine, edited by Andrzej Bilik. He belonged to the 7-member 


Program Council, which met in the building of "Polskie Nagrania". There he also worked there 
after the ownership changes, when the company changed its name to "Super Ekspress". On May 
1, 1995, he left the magazine at his own request. Soon he started working in the editorial team of 
"Gazeta Bankowa" ['Banking Gazette'], which he assessed as the most prestigious and the best 
paid Polish weekly. 

"LANED" was considerably active in selecting candidates for collaborators. With this 
purpose he pointed Ms. Maria Kulczycka (his female colleague from "Nowa Europa"), Ms. 
Dorota Bardzinska (from "Sztandar Mlodych" daily), Ms. Maria Graczyk ( a female journalist in 
"Wprost" weekly) and Mr. Jaroslaw Sroka from "Gazeta Bankowa". Since 1996, "LANDED" 
has worked as the press officer of the president of BGZ. He continued his selection work there as 
well as collected information about economic entities. "LANED" documentation contains a 
mention of the planned remuneration of a tangible gift to the amount of up to 500,000 old Polish 
zlotys from the operational funds of 'Unit IV in November 1992. 

An example of the active role of the services in the media domain was the matter related 
to "Przeglad Miedzynarodowy" ('International Revue'), an insert to "Trybuna Slajska", which 
was established by the WSI in the mid-90ties. Among those involved in this initiative were Gen. 
K. Malejczyk and Gen. M. Dukaczewski. One of the persons engaged in the completion of this 
undertaking was Grzegorz Wozniak aka "CEZAR", a well-known and experienced journalist 
who specialized in international issues. On March 3, 1994, Wozniak met with pplk. Lt. Col. Jerzy 
Gajewski and Comdr. S.T. as a candidate for a collaborator known as "CEZAR". It was decided 
that Wozniak will operate in the framework of Grupa Wywiadowcza ('Intelligence Group') 
"GROT" (ARROWHEAD), operating under cover as a monthly magazine "Przeglacl 
Miedzynarodowy". The magazine's editorial office was in Warsaw at Koszykowa Street. 

"CEZAR" was accepted by "EUREKA", the organizer of 'Grupa Wywiadowcza' 
"GROT", and by the publisher of "Przeglaxl Miedzynarodowy" /'International Revue'/ magazine 
(and at the same time the editor-in-chief of "Trybuna Slajska"). Wozniak agreed to be the 
secretary of the editorial team of "Przeglaxl Miedzynarodowy" and its manager in Warsaw, which 
would suggest a plan to organize a field branch of "Przeglaxl". The intelligence reserved the right 
to all information and to review the articles, including their possible suspension from publication 
(while observing the author's right to the fee). "Przeglad" was to order studies from well-known 
journalists, politicians and experts. One of the arguments in favor of recruitment of Wozniak was 


his "easy access to the leading politicians, both in Poland and abroad". The secret collaborator 
"CEZAR" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] was approved by Comdr. Jerzy Zak (April 11, 
1994) and Col. Konstanty Malejczyk. The monthly fees of "CEZAR" amounted to 1200 DEM, 
and the documentation contains 18 receipts for such an amount, signed with the collaborator's 

A interruption in the work of "CEZAR" occurred on April 12, 1995, when he informed his case 
officer (pplk Lt. Col. Jerzy Gajewski) about his intention to conduct the TV election campaign of 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, candidate for the President of the Republic of Poland (he earlier 
worked at the SdRP ['Social-democrats of the Polish Republic', in fact: (Post-)Communists] 
campaign for elections to the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland). The officer decided 
that the WSI expected "more commitment" from Wozniak, even before the start of the election 
campaign. As a consequence it was decided to cut his earnings by half. The collaboration of 
"CEZAR" with the WSI lasted about 9 months. It was, however, assessed critically. As a 
consequence of such an assessment of "CEZAR", at the request of his case officer, it was decided 
to resign from his cooperation. The preserved documentation does not allow to confront those 
assessments with the documents. 

Another collaborator of the WSI was Krzysztof Marcin Krzyszycha. He studied at the 
Moscow Institute of International Relations [MGiMO], from where he moved after two years to 
Minsk, where he completed studies at the 'Radio and TV Journalism' Faculty. His investigation 
by the military intelligence started on February 25, 1993, on the basis of direct conservation. 

When selected for collaboration with the intelligence, Krzyszycha worked as a journalist 
in a Lublin-based daily "Ekspress Fakty". He was selected for collaboration by pplk Lt. Col. 
Robert Luczkiewicz. On August 24, 1993, he signed the statement of collaboration with the 
intelligence, thus obtaining the status of a secret collaborator aka "TERON" [cryptic name for 
secret collaborator]. In the opinion of an intelligence officer, "working as a journalist, 
Krzyszycha has the opportunities to collect materials and information". He may "constitute a (...) 
source leading to interesting people" and "has possibility to go abroad under cover". Another 
important argument was the knowledge of other countries and languages. 

From November 2, 1993 to April 30, 1995, Krzyszycha worked as a civil senior expert in 
Army Unit 3362. Next, from September 1994 to April 1995, we was employed under a contract 
for a specifically rendered service [in Polish: 'umowa-zlecenie'] by [Governmental] 


Stowarzyszenie "Wspolnota Polska" [Association "The Polish Commonwealth", working for 
expatriates, Poles living abroad]. His files were kept without due care, thus not stating his status 
clearly and explicitly, but it is beyond doubt that he was a secret collaborator. 
During his intelligence training, Krzyszycha was persuaded to continue his journalist career 
(among the persuaders there most surely was Col. Marek Dukaczewski). He was also referred to 
"Kurier Polski", "under the care" of a journalist Andrzej Nierychlo (now the publisher of "Puis 
Biznesu" ['Pulse of Business']), but Krzyszycha did not show any serious interest in this kind of 
work. From August to October 31, 1993, he worked in the Warsaw-based company "Public 
Relations Center". 

In May 1997, Krzyszycha started working in the Office of the Senate of the Republic of 
Poland, initially as an expert in the Studies and Analyses Section, and later in the Information and 
Senate Documentation Office. "TERON" established contact with Krakowski Osrodek Mysli 
Politycznej /'The Center of Political Thoughts in Cracow'/, which he notified to his case officer. 

Krzyszycha' s files contain incomplete expense statements incurred as his fees and the 
bills paid during meetings in restaurants. In the period from March 8 to July 24, 1993, he was 
paid over 1.8 million zlotys, out of which 422.2 thousand zlotys was for investigation of various 
people (including the costs of meals). Other titles for his fees included the preparation of various 
kinds of studies and translation of foreign texts as well as provision of materials. Two "TERON" 
receipts were preserved, for the total amount of 650 thousand old Polish zlotys, signed with the 
collaborator's name. 

During the course, "TERON" was assessed critically: as emotional. Finally, on January 
14, 2003, Mjr Ryszard Sztorc ordered to cease any further collaboration. 

The WSI focused their activities also on recruiting well-known columnists, who derived 
from the "Solidarnosc" opposition and had a direct or indirect impact on Poland's political life, as 
they were often hired as consultants: Andrzej Grajewski aka "MUZYK" [cryptic name for secret 
collaborator, etc.] (journalist, later to become a member of IPN College and deputy editor-in- 
chief of [the Roman Catholic Church's weekly] "Gosc Niedzielny" /'The Sunday Guest/) and 
Jerzy Marek Nowakowski aka "FALKOWSKI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator, etc.] 
(journalist of [weekly] "Wprost", columnist and a TV commentator, [also former under-secretary 
of State in Prime Minister J. Buzek's Chancellery]). 
The analysis of archive materials concerning Andrzej Grajewski shows that on September 7, 


1992, Col. Z. Jachniak established contact with "MUZYK" [cryptic name for secret collaborator, 
etc.] at his place of residence. "MUZYK" was given a list of topics the WSI were interested in 
and the request to collect and information materials and studies. The date of that meeting is not, 
however, the stating point in "MUZYK" contacts with WSI officers, because from the file 
content we learn that such meetings - inter alia with the then WSI Chief, Col. Izydorczyk and 
with the Chief of the WSI's BSiA [Analytic Bureau] Col. Wozniak, had place before. It is 
certain that on September 7, 1992, during the meeting with the officer of the Military Intelligence 
Directorate (ZWW) WSI, "MUZYK" agreed to provide information materials and studies about 
the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. As the reason for commencement of cooperation, 
"MUZYK" stated the fact of earlier relations with WSI, supposedly inspired by the deputy 
minister B. Komorowski. According to the WSI officers' records, during the next meeting, on 
December 2, 1992, "MUZYK" was to make an offer of assistance in activities aimed at 
publication of press articles favorable to WSI as well as commencement of misinformation 
actions in the press to the WSI representatives (Col. Wozniak, Col. Pa^gowski and Col. 
Laczynski). As the important circumstances for the assistance offered to the WSI, he supposedly 
pointed at the fact that being the liquidator of RSW in past, he had influence upon filling the 
posts of editor-in-chief in many press titles and for this reason he had the opportunity to influence 
the selection of subjects of many press publications, among them in [dailies:] "Zycie Warszawy" 
and "Dziennik Zachodni".. Grajewski denies this relation, maintaining that it is a fake and that 
his role was limited to that of a consultant. He also questions some of the signatures under the 
proof of receipt of money, deeming them falsified. 

During the next meeting, on December 10, 1992, Grajewski was formally given (due to 
the fact that next to the tasks of the consultant, he performed also operational tasks) the name 
"MUZYK" [cryptic name for secret collaborator, etc.], which he used since then to confirm the 
receipt of money. The main result of that meeting was that Col. Laczynski and Col. Jachniak set 
the direction of "MUZYK" work to, as it was stressed - "informational and operational matters". 
Among the operational tasks assigned to "MUZYK" there was "the selection and suggestions of 
possible candidates from among the journalists, including those who - like "Muzyk" ('Musician') 
- could conduct informational activities". Due to the further increase of the operational tasks for 
"MUZYK", he was given operational training. In the memo from the meeting with "MUZYK" on 
January 21, 1993, it was stated: "with respect to unofficial activities, "Muzyk" will select and 


preliminarily investigate people employed in the center with respect to the purposefulness and 
opportunity of using them in unofficial activities as well as select candidates for consultants and 
informers from among the experts co-operating with the center".. Grajewski questions this 
information, maintaining that his cooperation was limited to the role of a consultant. The 
clarification of this matter will be undertaken by the Verification Commission. 

Jerzy Marek Nowakowski aka "FALKOWSKI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator, 
etc.], when working as a consultant of the Military Intelligence WSI, in 2002 reported inter alia 
his involvement in the activities of right-wing political organizations, including the group headed 
by Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski (SKL ['Popular-Conservative Party']). He named as is political 
protectors Czeslaw Bielecki from "Ruch 100" ['Movement of One Hundred'] and Agnieszka 
Miszewska, who worked with the Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek. "FALKOWSKI" also reported his 
activities in PiS [presently co-governing party in Poland, right-to-center 'Law and Justice'] and 
the meetings of representatives of PO [presently main opposition party in Poland, 'liberally- 
oriented' 'Citizen Platform'] and PiS in connection with the local government elections in 2002. 
He forecast then, that cooperation between PiS and PO would not last long. 

In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained 
in Article 70a. 1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter- 
intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of 
Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Brig. 
Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk, Brig. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Col. Zdzislaw Zylowski, Col. 
Ryszard Sosnowski, Col. Miroslaw Kosierkiewicz, Col. Ryszard Nieczypor, Col. Z. Jachniak, 
Col. Wozniak, Col. Pa^gowski, Col. La^czynski, Lt. Col. Zbigniew Demski, Lt. Col. Jerzy 
Gajewski, Comdr. Jerzy Zak, Lt. Col. Gryz, Lt.Col. Robert Luczkiewicz, Mjr Mieczyslaw 

The WSI Chiefs in the described period were: Counter-Adm. Czeslaw Wawrzyniak, Brig Gen. 
Boleslaw Izydorczyk, Brig Gen. Marek Dukaczewski. 

Until 1995, supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services [WSI] on 
the general terms of responsibility for subordinated Ministry rested with the Minister of National 
Defense. In the described period, this office was held by: Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Piotr 
Kolodziejczyk, Zbigniew Okonski. 

Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 


14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated 
directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of 
National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National 
Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information 
Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the 
Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those 
services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI 
Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of 
Defense directly. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Stanislaw 
Dobrzanski, Bronislaw Komorowski i Jerzy Szmajdzinski. 

The facts cited in this chapter bring doubt as to the legality of conduct of the WSI 
soldiers; thus, the Verification Commission sent to the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office a 
notification of suspected crime, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal 


7. Illegal Arms Trade 

Until 1989, the monopoly for arms trade rested with the 'Central Engineering Board' 
(CZInz) within the Ministry of Foreign Trade and later within the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Cooperation. After the Economic Business Act entered into force in 1989, the competencies of 
CZInz were changed and the commercial activities related to international arms trade were taken 
up by commercial companies "CENZIN" and "CENREX". 

At the turn of 1991 and 1992, the WSI developed the so-called concept of organization of 
counter-intelligence protection for arms production and of monitoring of special trade conducted 
by the Polish companies. It was decided that there was "a provocation threat for the safe arms 
trade carried out by Polish institutions". The real purpose was to create a mechanism of illegal 
arms trade. This was one of the goals for which a special unit was created to handle these issues - 
'Unit 6' (later: 36) of Armaments Industry Guard, composed of 14 military men. Marek Slon 
served in this Unit from the start and the Unit was headed, among others, by the officers deriving 
from 'Unit Y' and trained in the USSR: Eugeniusz Lendzion and Cezary Lipert. The actions of 
'Unit 6 (36)', the 3 rd Directorate, were a in a way to secure interests of the 2 nd Directorate 
(intelligence) of the WSI. 

Reasons for Monitoring 

As a matter of fact, instead of monitoring, the authors of this concept, K. Malejczyk and 
K. Glowacki (both were at some point officers of 'Unit Y' in the 2 nd Directorate), at the consent 
of Gen. Izydorczyk (participant of a GRU training course), aimed at gaining a share in that 
market and controlling it through the military special services. The profits from the operation 
were to constitute "off-budget sources of financing of the activities of military special services". 
The main base was to be constituted by companies established by the 2 n Directorate of the 
General Staff of the People's Polish Armed Forces or controlled by officers under cover and 
agents of the 2 n Directorate. This was the nature of the companies selected for the operations, 
which dealt in arms trade: 'Cenrex', 'Steo', 'Falcon'.. According to Gen. Malejczyk, this 
undertaking was a reproduction of similar actions carried out by UOP with respect to the 
company called "Nat".. One can see here the direct continuity of the concept and actions 


developed yet in the 80-ties, when the profits from illegal arms trade were one of the sources of 
financing of the military special services. 

The actions, which were expected to bring off-budget profits from arms trade, were, 
according to the WSI officers, conducted at MOD's consent. The WSI counter-intelligence 
claimed that the legal grounds for those actions were constituted in the Directive concerning the 
operational actions and investigations, issued by the Minister of National Defense J. 
Onyszkiewicz, dated December 3, 1992. In that Directive, Minister Onyszkiewicz allowed that 
the counter-intelligence's operational fund be provided with the funds obtained as a result of 
operational actions. Minister Onyszkiewicz also decided that the operational fund shall be 
excluded from the control exerted by other state authorities (e.g. NIK, ['National Chamber of 
Controlling', controlling body in Poland, especially concerned with finance spending of budget 
money]), which gave the counter-intelligence a privileged position. 

As a result of the engagement of civil and military services in the special trade practices, 
there were may cases of Polish-Polish competition, which led to the exclusion of the rivals from 
commercial negotiations, while the desire of profits caused that the trade partners included some 
representatives of terrorist groups. 

In order to obtain tangible benefits, the WSI were using their powers and facilitated the 
process of obtaining of relevant permits for activities in this domain. In order to receive the 
relevant documents, the WSI officers often used officers under cover or collaborators employed 
in the relevant units of the state authorities. 

The Steo Company 

Under the pretext of fulfillment of operational objectives of the 2 nd Directorate, concerning the 
collection of opinions about military and political situation in Latvia and in the Russian 
Federation as well as about the Latvian-Russian relations, gen. Malejczyk decided to carry out a 
contract of arms sale to Latvia. To this end, he used the Cenrex company (then headed, among 
other, by an officer under cover "WIRAKOCZA", i.e. Col. Jerzy Dembowski) and Steo (set up 
for the secret collaborator Edward Ochnio aka "TYTUS" [cryptic name for secret collaborator, 
etc.],, who was been used by the 'Unit Y' of the 2 nd Directorate before). The transaction was to 
bring the WSI a commission worth about 150-200 thousand US Dollars. These intentions was 
approved by the then WSI Chief, Gen. Izydorczyk. He informed the Chief of General Staff of 


Polish Armed Forces, T. Wilecki, about this enterprise. A written consent of the Chief of General 
Staff of Polish Armed Forces has not been found in the available documentation. 

Lt. Col. Jerzy Dembowski (officer under cover aka "WIRAKOCZA" [cryptic name for 
secret collaborator or undercover officer]) conducted, as the intelligence representative, arms 
trade operations with Arab terrorists in mid-Eighties and at the end of the Eighties he directed the 
operations aimed at illegal import of IT technologies to the territory of Soviet states, to be later 
delivered to the USRR (to Ukraine) and to North Korea. In 1989, at the order of Gen. Wladyslaw 
Sewerynski, Dembowski established the Cenrex company taking over for this purpose the 
property of the State-owned CZInz. 

In 1992, Dembowski, then still a representative of "Cenrex", sold arms to the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, represented by "Mezner Gabon", i.e. in fact a Syrian terrorist 
Monzer Al-Kassar. That man was involved in terrorist attacks in which over 400 people died. His 
name showed up on the occasion of the jumbo-jet explosion over the Scottish town of Lockerby. 
J. Dembowski met him and at the order of the military intelligence of People's Republic of 
Poland conducted negotiations regarding arms trade, when in 1982-1987 he held the function of 
trade attache in Tripoli (Libya). 

The transactions between Dembowski and Al.-Kassar were finalized in 1992 with the sale 
of arms to Croatia and Somalia (the latter was then covered by the international embargo on arms 
and military equipment deliveries, imposed by the Security Council UN). To carry out those 
transactions, Jerzy Dembowski used the company registered in Panama, "Scorpion Int. Services" 
S.A. with its seat in Vienna. These activities were of criminal nature and in 2000 charges were 
brought by the public prosecution. The Regional Public Prosecutor's Office in Gdansk charged 
among others J. Dembowski with issuance of untrue documents with regard to the destination 
point of the arms and ammunition sold. Instead to Latvia, the arms went an undetermined 
recipient in Somalia. 

These activities and the previous period of operation in arms trade gave Col. K. Malejczyk the 
grounds for selection of Dembowski in 1992 for the operation of illegal arms trade. It is also 
important that for protection of this operation Edward Ochnio ("TYTUS", [cryptic name for 
secret collaborator]) was used, who has been a collaborator of Unit Y of the 2nd Directorate since 
the 80-ties. 

As early 1991, the WSI had information that the decision-makers in the Ministry of 


Foreign Economic Cooperation obtained tangible benefits in the course of issue of the permits for 
arms trade. In this case, the permits were to be issued by Jan Suwinski from that Ministry. The 
practice's mechanism, according to the saved internal note, looked as follows: "The submitted 
documents were photocopied and sent to MSW for verification, which took about 6 months. 
Suwinski received a specific percentage (up to 50%) of profits for speeding up the decision up. 
This was handled by Jerzy Dembowski (...). Suwinski was allegedly accepting bribes in return, 
to the amount of 20 - 50 thousand US Dollars. According to the collaborator Wojciech W., the 
permit for a company called 'Net' (he probably meant NAT, it was established by UOP [civilian 
security agency in Poland] officers) cost its president Cichocki 20,000 USD. Other people who 
were allegedly involved in these practices were: Leszek Grot, Leszek Gaj, Col. Moraczewski and 
Andrzej Gluza. An important role was supposedly played also by a high official who in 
December 1991 was to accept up to 50,000 USD for issuing the permit for transporting arms 
abroad.".. None of the aforenamed people have ever been held liable. To the contrary, the WSI 
tried to conceal the matter and to better organize the illegal arms trade. The only consequence of 
this affair was that Dembowski left 'Cenrex' and started working in Steo and that the burden of 
illegal arms trade was shifted exactly to 'Steo'. 

In November 1993, Malejczyk asked Glowacki in writing for his assistance in obtaining 
the concession for Steo. In that letter, Malejczyk informed that "In accordance with the decision 
of the Minister of National Defense, Mr. Piotr Kolodziejczyk (note No. 078/W/93), the 
Intelligence Directorate of the Military Information Services carries out a transaction of sale of 
used military equipment and ammunition to Latvia". K. Glowacki referred the case to the Chief 
of 'Unit 6' of the 3 Directorate, E. Lendzion, who ordered M. Slon: "to urgently take actions 
aimed at obtaining an export permit. Mr. Spis is aware of this matter. For further details, please 
contact Col. K. Malejczyk directly ". When watching over the affairs of 'Steo', Col. Slon stressed 
to the decision-makers in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, that the WSI very 
much wanted the formalities to taken care of be fast and positively. All permits and concession 
for Steo were dealt with on the spot (the applications were fulfilled on the day of submission). 
Despite that the arms were in fact prepared for illegal trade. It was smuggled on the pretext of 
export of various goods to the East. 

In May 1994, the Estonian police intercepted a large number of TT guns, including 2420 
pieces from Poland. This situation did not put E. Ochnio and J. Dembowski off and they 


continued their cooperation with Estonian criminals. Two years later, the Estonian customs 
officers reveal another case of smuggling arms from Poland - this time it was 1600 TT guns in 
the containers with pasta belonging to "Danuta" SA from the city of Malbork. J. Dembowski and 
E. Ochnio knew that those goods were to be received by an Estonian crime group headed by 
Railo Riis and Rain Raimo. This way, the limitations on export and use of goods were violated as 
the arms, being subject to strict export restrictions, again left the Polish customs area, and that 
with the exporters being aware that it was going to be received by unauthorized persons, namely 
the members of a crime group in Estonia. In spite of the two instances of smuggling operations to 
Baltic countries with participation of Steo being blown, the operational contact with Steo's owner 
was continued as evidenced by the memos from the meetings with E. Ochnio, made by Mjr M. 

The unsuccessful delivery in 1996 put an end to the criminal activities of PHZ [PHZ 
(abreviation in Polish) = 'Establishment for Foreign Commerce'] 'Steo' with respect to the trade 
in arms and ammunition. 

When the affair of smuggling arms to Estonia was revealed in 1996, the WSI consciously 
misinformed the then Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who was notified, through 
UOP, that the WSI had no information about any collaboration of E. Ochnio with the military 
special services. Meanwhile, it was exactly in the framework of this operation that Ochnio, who 
remained the WSI collaborator the whole time, co-organized the illegal arms trade with the 
Russian Mafia and Arab terrorist groups. When replying to the Deputy Chief of UOP, Col. Jerzy 
Nozka, Comdr. Glowacki omitted the fact of relations between the WSI and the 'Steo' owner 
(Ochnio) and its representative in Latvia, and earlier a director in Cenrex, Lt. Col. Dembowski. 

The WSI chiefs did not inform any other state authorities (Prime Minister, President) 
about the activities in illegal arms trade either, while the profits generated by those companies 
were to be used as additional source of financing for the WSI activities not disclosed to the 

All transactions performed by 'Steo' and 'Cenrex' with Latvia consisted of the fact that 
the arms and ammunition exported from Poland were intended for other recipients than indicated 
in the applications for permit and the Permits for Export of Arms and Ammunition. Ochnio and 
Dembowski intentionally gave untrue destination points of the arms to avoid giving the names of 
states covered by the SC UN embargo. 


Despite the engagement of such large efforts and means, many times there was no success 
in winning valuable commercial contracts, which would be of defense benefit to the country. 

The Falcon Company 

Another of the WSI's business undertaking of this kind was the establishment of "Falcon" 
Sp. z o.o. [Ltd. Co] with its seat in the city of Szczecin. It can be seen from the notes of officer 
Marek Slon that the owner of that company was a collaborator acting as a reliable asset (RA) aka 
"MATUS", i.e. Col. (Reserve) Witold Wajsikowski. The establishment of that company and its 
operations involved from the start the illegal participation of the WSI in business activities and 
their use of state machine for this purpose. In March 1993, Marek Slon presented to his superiors 
(E. Lendzion, C. Lipert and K. Glowacki) the following project: "RA Matus would be useful as 
someone heading a company which would specialize in special equipment transactions in order to 
perform the task in the field of detection of illegal arms transactions, prevention of possible 
provocations against Polish manufacturers and traders of special equipment. Furthermore, I 
suggest concluding with him, a legally valid commercial agreement through a dangle. The 
grounds for the agreement could consist of a loan to be given to Matus by the HQ, which should 
provide funds for buying out the controlling block in the company that is to be established with 
his participation, and in exchange for that loan Matus would obligate to provide data and 
documents related to each transaction as well as to transfer to the agreed account a certain percent 
of profits on each commercial operation. The value of the extended loan could be 10 thousand US 
Dollars. Out of which 2,5 thousand US Dollars in cash and 7,5 thousand US Dollars as non-cash 
value; 'HQ support' in awarding the relevant concessions of MSW and Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Cooperation to Matus' company. However, a receipt for the amount of 10 thousand 
US Dollars would be received with obligation to refund in case of non-performance of the 
concluded agreement".. "Falcon" was also to transfer to the WSI a part of the profit on each 
completed order. The project of the undertaking devised by officer Marek Slon was accepted by 
the Deputy Chief of 'Unit 6', the 3 Directorate of the WSI, Lt. Col. Eugeniusz Lendzion, and 
the Chief of 'Unit 6', the 3 rd Directorate of the WSI, Lt. Col. Cezary Lipert. The described 
actions were, as results from the WSI records, performed, with the WSI decisions aiming at 
taking over the arms trade, inter alia to gain profits. In the scope of operations of "Falcon", there 
were instances of use of the state machine to support illegally operating companies. The support 


of the commercial activities of "Falcon" is shown by the correspondence between the WSI and 
the Special Trade Department in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation. On February 14, 
1995, Andrzej Spis, Deputy Director of the Special Trade Department in the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Cooperation, turned to the WSI with a request for an opinion in awarding "Falcon" a 
one-off concession for the export of equipment to Peru. On February 23, 1995, the chief of 
Military Counter-intelligence, Comdr. Kazimierz Glowacki gave a positive reply, where we can 
read, among others, that: "We hold the view that the companies which participate in the special 
trade with the participation of the MOD, need - aside from meeting the statutory formal criteria - 
give a guarantee of loyalty to the political and defense-related interest of the state. We assess that 
these criteria are met by "Falcon" Sp. z o.o." 

In the case of "Falcon" (and other companies discussed here) the guarantee meant that the 
companies were owned by the services, i.e. that the company owner de facto confirmed his own 

Money Laundering 

The WSI protected its collaborator "WOLFGANG FRANKL" [cryptic name for secret 
collaborator] and his illegal operations, not only those related to the arms trade, but also with 
money laundering together with the Italian Mafia. To this end, specific operational actions were 
taken against the Police. On February 27, 1995, the Chief of 'Unit 6', the 3 rd Directorate WSI, 
received a letter from the Head of Organized Economic Crime Section in Regional Police 
Department in Szczecin, notifying that it planned to take operational actions against Witold 
Wajsikowski, because the Police obtained information that points to joint actions of the 
collaborator "WOLFGANG FRANKL" with T. M. from Warsaw, related to money laundering, 
and possible relation of this operation to the international arms trader Monzer Al Kassar from a 
reliable source,. The amount of the transaction was supposedly about 100 million USD. The WSI 
waived the Police information about its collaborator and suggested incompetence of the 
Organized Economic Crime Section in Regional Police Department in Szczecin. On July 31, 


1995, the Chief of 'Unit 6', the 3 Directorate of the WSI, received another letter from the 
Organized Economic Crime Section in the National Police Department, where, after the analysis 
of materials from Szczecin, the previous findings about Witold Wa^sikowski were confirmed; the 
letter stated further that: "All relevant information about the course of operation and people 


involved therein come from the operational technique means used with respect to T. M. in the 
form of telephone line eavesdropping and as such is credible." The Police were not able to 
determine whether the "money laundering" operation was actually put into effected. On August 
11, 1995, the Deputy Chief of Counter-intelligence Directorate of the WSI, Col. Jan Maria 
Oczkowski, ordered the Chief of Counter-intelligence in the Pomorze Military District to contact 
the Organized Economic Crime Section in Regional Police Department in Szczecin in order to 
arrange the cooperation terms. However, no action against Wajsikowski was taken, and 
Oczkowski did not demand any. In November 1995, the superior of officer Marek Slon forbid to 
document any non-military activities of the collaborator "WOLFGANG FRANKL" [cryptic 
name for secret collaborator]: I have made a point several times in the past that you should avoid 
any engagement of the collaborator in the matters not in the scope of interest and competencies of 
the WSI. Please direct the collaborator "Frankel" to the problems strictly related to the military 
and exactly such problems should be documented". 

The protection over illegal actions of a WSI collaborator also lead to suggestions to lie to 
other state authorities. In February 2002, the collaborator "GUSTAW" (= "WOLFGANG 
FRANKL") had a meeting with the Chief Director of UOP/ABW Branch Office, Col. Wieslaw 
Kowalski, who headed that post in 2002-2005 (earlier he was a WSI soldier). In connection with 
that conversation, officer Marek Slon told the collaborator "GUSTAW" to give UOP only such 
information as is generally known and available. He also ordered not to reveal, under any 
circumstances, the nature of contacts with the WSI. 

The WSI not only protected their people from the Police and UOP, but also sought 
assistance in solving problems by way of informal contacts with the justice, in criminal cases etc. 

This kind of engagement had place in case of support for Stanislaw Wyrozemski 
(collaborator "MARIA", "MAX", "MAKSYMILIAN" [all - cryptic names for secret 
collaborators]). Wyrozemski was an employee of the 2 nd Directorate of General Staff of the 
People's Polish Armed Forces and since 1985 had worked as a resident in the CENZIN 
representative office in Austria. He also met other officers dealing with special trade there, 
among them: Stanislaw Terlecki, Zbigniew Tarka and Tadeusz Koperwas. 

After he left the professional military service, Wyrozemski began to work as go-between 
in special trade. He ran two companies: "Arespo" and "Kunat". He was the cause of the 
conclusion of a commercial transaction between BHZ Bumar-Labedy and Myanmar (formerly 


known as Burma). The collaborator "MAKSYMILIAN" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] 
used that contract to take out over 8 million USD from Poland and transfer it to a non-existent 
company Paladion in Geneva. In this matter, the Prosecutor's Office in Katowice has been 
conducting an investigation since 1992, as a result of which Wyrozemski ("MAKSYMILIAN") 
was arrested in 1993. The WSI intervened then with the General Prosecutor of the Republic of 
Poland to have him released from detention. In 1995, the case of 'MAKSYMILIAN" became 
discontinued. Knowing that it could be resumed, he turned to the WSI for assistance in "earlier 
achievement of a stand, which he could present in case that the penal proceedings are resumed".. 
He kept the WSI informed about his legal situation related to the contract with Myanmar. In 
December 2002, the District Court for Warszawa-Praga discontinued the proceedings against the 
collaborator "MAKSYMILIAN" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], who upon positive 
settlement of the criminal case, terminated his cooperation with the WSI. The analysis of this 
case shows that a WSI collaborator was willing to help the military special services as long as 
those services were helpful in the penal proceedings conducted against him. 


Many times the result of involvement of both (civil and military) services in the special 
trade practices was Polish-Polish competition on foreign markets and reaching for support of the 
Russian side. Meanwhile, the arms trade operations led to establishing contacts with terrorist 
groups. An example of ties with terrorists is the participation of Al Kasser in the Egyptian 
transaction. Al Kasser was well known for his international operations and punished for arms 
trade; he was also the partner of Edmund Ochnio aka "TYTUS" [cryptic name for secret 
collaborator] and Jerzy Dembowski aka "WIRAKOCZA" [cryptic name for secret collaborator]. 
The role of Al Kasser in the transaction was concealed and known only to a very limited number 
of people from Cenrex and the Counter-intelligence Directorate of the WSI. The line of 
procedure, adopted by the WSI towards Al. -Kasser, envisaged that the meetings would be held 
abroad in previously agreed places, and the negotiations would be carried out by authorized 
entities, covered by the WSI counter-intelligence service. Special caution and concealment of 
contacts with Al-Kasser resulted, according to the WSI, from the situation assessment and the 
information that could be associated with terrorist organizations operating in Middle East. It was 
known that at the request of some governments he was to organize arms deliveries for those 


organizations. It was also known that before 1989 he was used by the special services of the 
People's Republic of Poland as a helper who organized arms deliveries for the PLO from the 
countries at war with Israel and pursuing anti-American policy. After 1989, contacts with this 
man were resumed by the I s Directorate of UOP [civilian security service agency in Poland]. The 
contact died at the turn of 1993/1994, when Al.-Kasser was detained in Spain in connection with 
the process of the terrorists who assaulted the ship 'Achille Laura'. 

Nonetheless, Col. Slon tried to maintain the contacts with Al-Kasser. In the framework of the 
modernization program for the air protection system NEWA in June 1997, the collaborator 
"WOLFGANG FRANKL" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] started, at the knowledge and 
consent of the WSI, talks with Al-Kasser' s group, which was to obtain about 400 million USD 
from Saudi Arabia to finance the modernization of that system by Egypt's armed forces. This was 
probably the reason why Col. Slon proposed, as early as in March 1989, to notify the Prime 
Minister's cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This proposal was not accepted by his 
superiors. The Chief of Unit 36, Jerzy Marszalik, wrote, "I assess these proposals as pointless". 
Instead, the WSI decided to carry out, in concealment from the Polish political authorities, joint 
operations with Al.-Kasser. The WSI accepted Al-Kasser' s participation in the Egyptian contract, 
and the instruction prepared in July 1999 by pplk Lt. Col. Slon for the collaborator 
"WOLFGANG FRANKL" stated, "please negotiate the participation in the transaction according 
to Al-Kasser's proposals (without specifying your own ties that will actually be used). (...) 
Maximize the price of the provided service by making Al-Kasser aware of the consequences if 
the participation of your company in the arrangement of the transaction was revealed, consisting 
in the possible revocation of special trade concession by the Export Control Department.".. The 
WSI did not prevent the operations of Al-Kasser in the Republic of Poland, did not warn the 
politicians and businessmen, to the contrary, they facilitated the arms trade for someone who was 
suspected of terrorist contacts. 

Another example of the WSI operations in arms trade was the operation "H", run by the 2 nd 
Directorate. The objective of that operation was to put Polish agents in the Russian ship-building 
industry, but in fact it was the other way around; the Russian services placed their man in the 
Polish ship-building industry, at the same time corrupting the command of the Navy. When the 
company 'Pertron' (then controlled by WSI Counter-intelligence) appeared in the case, it dealt in 
special equipment trade and its financial settlements gave rise to justified doubts, for example, 


large sums of money were transferred to the account of an Italian company 'Fiatagri', which had 
no relation to Pertron. The settlements were run through a branch of the Kredyt ('Credit') Bank in 
port town of Gdynia where the director was Lt. Col. Leszek Fiertek, senior officer of the 2 nd 
Directorate of the WSI (1993-1997 serving as an under cover officer). The branch of Kredyt 
Bank in Gdynia was created by Adam Kisler, then the director of the branch of Kredyt Bank in 
Gdansk (earlier an employee of the Kredyt Bank in Kaliningrad, next an employee of a company 
Enamor which dealt in special trade and ran its settlements through the Gdynia-based branch of 
Kredyt Bank, still headed by the aforesaid L. Fiertek). Adam Kisler, former collaborator of the 
2 nd Directorate of General Staff, was taken over by the WSI Counter-intelligence after 1991 to 
conduct the Pertron operation on behalf of the intelligence. Kisler, associated by the WSI with the 
Russian Mafia, maintained contacts, among others, with Naum Isakovitch Slucki, a FSB [present 
Russia's replacement for KGB] agent, and Comm. Adm. (Reserve) Nikolai Kachanovitch, a 
former Deputy Commander of the Russian Federation's Baltic Fleet, who dealt in special trade. 
The transfers of large sums of money between 'Pertron' and 'Fiatagri' companies were the result 
of settlements made by the representatives of criminal circles from the former USSR countries. 
Kisler' s Mafia activities were possible only due to intelligence protection. 

In the scope of operational actions run against Pertron, Col. Marek Nowakowski of the WSI 
could have reproduce the information about an alleged spy in the Navy structures, only to justify 
the operational interest in Andrzej Fornalski, the president of PHZ [Intl. Commerce Co.] 
'Pertron'.. The interest in that company was to provide some kind of cover against the actions of 
other services (including UOP) during the performance of the criminal practices consisting in 
bribing the Navy officers and taking out money from MOD's budget. 

In 2002-2003, the Control Department Team from the MOD, headed by Gen. Jozef Flis, 
controlled all tenders in the Navy. The result of that control was a report, which contained a 
number of observations regarding irregularities in the performed tenders. The report was 
classified and never made available to law enforcement institutions, at the consent and approval 
of the Minister of National Defense, Jerzy Szmajdzinski. 

The engagement of the WSI officers in operations of companies which dealt in special 
trade could have helped to transfer the obtained funds out to the party accounts, foundation 
accounts or abroad. 
When analyzing the aforementioned case, information was revealed regarding the abuse of power 


and failure to fulfil duties in connection with the protection of state secrets by the Commander of 
the Polish Navy, Adm. Ryszard Lukasik. He did not respect the WSI's refusals to issue clearance 
certificates for Comm. Adm. Popek and Comdr.. Kaszubowski. Admiral Lukasik delayed the 
handing of the clearance certificate document to Comm Adm. Popek and kept him as the Chief of 
Logistics of the Navy for a long time. Holding this function without a clearance certificate is not 
possible and Comm Adm. Popek should have been dismissed from that post immediately. 
However, he was only dismissed 3 years later, after the well-known case of the theft of grenades 
and ammunition from the warehouses of the Military Port in Gdynia. 

The reoccurring violation of law by the owner of 'Pertron', Andrzej Fornalski, consisting of 
bribing Comm Adm. Popek many times (about 200 thousand Polish zlotys) caused no reaction on 
the part of M. Dukaczewski. He was informed about the bribes with letter No. 00-45 of February 
2002, which he did not register in the classified office before May 2005, not to mention taking 
any actions he was obligated to take as a state officer. 

The decisions made by the Navy officers, WSI officers and the Military Policy officers as 
well as the prosecutors from the Military Prosecutor's Offices led to the information about 
actions incompliant with applicable law being blocked. The source of irregularities related to the 
arms trade conducted by the WSI can be linked with a fact that the concept of organization of the 
so-called counter-intelligence protection for arms production and of monitoring of special trade 
did not give any operational results. The intelligence played the initiatory and leading role here, 
while the counter-intelligence secured its operations so that the civil services or other state 
authorities did not threaten the intelligence's monopoly. To recapitulate: most operational actions 
were a way to conceal the participation of military services in special trade through the 
companies they created (among them: 'Steo', 'Cenrex', 'Falcon'). The companies, which dealt in 
special trade, together with people who supervised them at the WSI level, in fact, created an 
organized crime group and supported criminal activities. 

In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition 
contained in Article 70a. 1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military 
Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the 
officers of Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 
2006: Brig. Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk, Gen. Boleslaw Izydorczyk, Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, 
Comdr. Kazimierz Glowacki, Col. Jerzy Dembowski, Col. Marek Slon, Col. Cezary Lipert, Col. 


Jan Oczkowski, Col. Witold Wa^sikowski, Lt. Col. Wieslaw Kowalski, Lt. Col. Leszek Fiertek, 
Adm. Ryszard Lukasik, Adm. Zbigniew Popek. 

The activities of Edward Ochnio, Jacek Merkel and Andrzej Spis meet the disposition of 
Article 70a.2.1 of the aforecited Act. 

The WSI Chiefs in the described period were: Brig. Gen. Boleslaw Izydorczyk, Brig. 
Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk, Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Counter- Adm. Kazimierz Glowacki. 

Until 1995, the supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services on the 
general terms of responsibility for subordinated Ministry rested with the Minister of National 
Defense. In the described period, this office was held by: Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Piotr 
Kolodziejczyk, Zbigniew Okonski. 

Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 
14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated 
directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of 
National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National 
Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information 
Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the 
Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those 
services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI 
Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was directly subordinated to the 
Minister of Defense. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Stanislaw 
Dobrzanski, Bronislaw Komorowski and Jerzy Szmajdzinski. 

With respect to some issues described herein, the public prosecution conducts or 
conducted penal proceedings, however, due to the new circumstances revealed in the course of 
hearings and the documentation obtained by the Verification Commission, the public 
prosecution's interest as to the object and the subject of these cases may be extended or new 
proceedings may be instigated. Thus, the Verification Commission sent to the Supreme Military 
Prosecutor's Office a notification of suspected crime, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the 
Code of Penal Procedure. 


8. Irregularities Related to the Protection of the Tender for Wheeled APC. 

The WSI actions, focused on profits earned in special trade, did allow the services to react 
properly to the irregularities related to the conducted tenders for army weaponry. An example of 
such a situation is the counter-intelligence protection of the tender for APC. Gen. Marek 
Dukaczewski publicly said that the WSI had no objections to the tender. The WSI Chief 
convinced that the objections regarding the technological requirements applied not only to the 
selected bid, but also to other wheeled APCs offered. These statements are contradictory to the 
contents of preserved documents. 

The tender commission was appointed on August 2, 2001, and on August 13th the 
invitation to bid was sent to the manufacturers of military equipment. The application for the start 
of the operational procedure regarding the tender for the Wheeled APC ['Armored Personnel 
Carrier'] was approved on November 14, 2001. Bids were made by the following companies: 
Austrian 'Steyer', Swiss 'Mowag', Finnish 'Patria Vehicles Oy'. 

On November 15-16, 2001, a delegation from the Finnish Company 'Patria Vehicle Oy' 
paid a visit to "Wojskowe Zaklady Mechaniczne" ['Military Mechanical Plant'] (WZM) in 
Siemianowice Slajskie. The visit took place at the incentive of WZM, who were interested in 
cooperation with the Finnish side in implementation and production of the Wheeled APC 
(WAPC). The purpose of the meeting consisted of consultations about special equipment, the 
production of which the Polish side tried to win by entering the announced tender. In the course 
of the visit, the cooperation terms between Patria Vehicles Oy and WZM in Siemianowice 
Sla^skie were agreed. 

Since January 2002, the representatives of Patria have intensified their lobbying activities 
with respect to the management of WZM in Siemianowice SI. [town Siemianowice in Silesia] 
inter alia by frequent contacts in Poland, including in the WZM's headquarters. 

Furthermore, in the last quarter of 2002, increased activity of the official and economic 
Finnish circles towards the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Helsinki was observed with 


regard to Patria's bid for the WAPC. The Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Helsinki, in a 
dispatch sent to Poland, expressed its positive opinion about the Finnish offer. In the Embassy's 
assessment, such a large contract would strengthen the improving tendency in bilateral trade 
turnover and would become an important stimulus for the increase of Finnish investments in the 
Republic of Poland. 

As early as at the beginning of the 90-ties, the WSI, through their representatives in 
Finland, started talks with SISU [Finish military service]. Later, during the visit of Deputy 
Minister Janusz Zemke in Finland on March 2-4, 2003, talks were held both in the Patria's seat 
and in the Finnish MOD, during which Patria management promised that by the end of 2003, the 
first vehicle "meeting the criteria set for it by the Polish side" would be ready. The analysis of the 
materials concerning WAPC Patria shows that this promise had not been kept. The data contained 
in the case "S" run by the WSI show that the economic side of this tender was treated by the 
MOD Tender Commission as secondary, even though the financial matters and the offset should 
be the most important factors having impact on the results of the tender. 

According to the Ministry of Economy, the Finnish offer was too weak. This was why the 
Ministry of Economy suggested the MOD to give up on Patria's bid by excluding that company 
from further stages of the tender procedure. In a document addressed to Minister Jerzy 
Szmajdzinski, the Ministry of Economy warned that Patria understands its share in the offset only 
as compensation for the delivered sub-assemblies and does not want to assume the offset-related 
liability for delivery of other sub-assemblies that were parts of the vehicle (e.g. engine, gearbox), 
which the Polish manufacturer would have to import for the APC supplied to the MOD. This 
situation, in the opinion of the Ministry of Economy, was unfavorable from the point of view of 
the Polish economy's interest. The threat was even greater due to the fact that the Tender 
Commission, which handled the selection of the APC, did not take the offset into account in the 
purchase attractiveness criterion. According to the Ministry of Economy, it was advisable to give 
the foreign supplier a condition in the Terms of Reference (TOR) to assume the obligation to 
fulfil the role of offset co-ordinator and to conclude a comprehensive offset contract. In the 
opinion of the Ministry of Economy, the lack of such declaration should constitute grounds for 
exclusion of the Polish company (WZM) from the tender if its strategic partner will be its foreign 
supplier who did not accept that condition. Despite that, the Minister of National Defense did not 
see his role in this matter, shifting the responsibility to the Ministry of Economy. 


Soon after that, the First Deputy Minister of National Defense, Janusz Zemke, conveyed to the 
Commander of the Army, Gen. Edward Pietrzyk, a memo written by the Chairman of MOD 
Tender Commission, Col. Pawel Nowak, which demonstrated the Chairman's very positive 
opinion about Patria. A similar opinion was presented by J. Zemke in his letter to Minister 
Szmajdzinski. In the correspondence sent to gen. Pietrzyk and Minister Szmajdzinski, J. Zemke 
stated that the WAPC Patria was the only carrier, which met the requirements, and it should be 
included in the equipment of the Polish Army. 

Considerable doubts as to the profitability of purchase of Patria WAPC were caused by 
the minor defects, which prevent the fulfillment of the technical and tactical conditions. During 
the vehicle's tests conducted on March 1-15, 2003, it sank and its engine was completely 
destroyed. The companies' representatives who participated in that event obligated (probably 
under the pressure of the persons who lobbied for Patria WAPC) not to reveal the occurrence to 
the mass media. The letter of the Chief of Counter-intelligence Unit of the Army to the Chief of 
'Unit 36', 3 rd Directorate WSI, devoted to that fact, was dated as late as July 2003, which could 
mean that the WSI learnt about such an important event, which took place in March, only several 
months later. 

When the tender was still in progress, the defense attache at the Embassy of the Republic 
if Poland in Vienna sent information wherefrom it resulted that Patria' s WAPC did not meet the 
technical requirements contained in the tender documents. That carrier corresponded neither to 
the tactical and technical premises of the announced tender nor the Polish standard. For this 
reasons, charges were to be raised against the MOD that the WAPC tender was conducted for the 
benefit of 'Patria'. In March 2003, gen. Dukaczewski conveyed those data to the Minister of 
National Defense and his First Deputy. 

Furthermore, in March 2003, the ABW Chief informed the WSI Chief that the ABW 
obtained a number of pieces of information indicating that there could have been some 
irregularities in the process of selection of the WAPC from the Finnish company Patria, resulting 
from imprecise TOR provisions and the decisions made by the MOD Tender Commission. One 
of the comments related to the structural dimensions of the carrier. The ABW stressed that they 
do not meet the requirement for air transport as well as the requirement of forward buoyancy at 
10 km/h. Due to the fact that the WAPC delivery contract could be signed soon and also due to 
the need for the ABW to present the opinion on offset, the agency asked the WSI Chief to 


consider this matter a priority and take a stand with regard to the doubts raised. Gen. 
Dukaczewski informed the Ministers Szmajdzinski and Zemke about that letter, suggesting at the 
same time that MOD did not provide the ABW with detailed information, because that was an 
internal matter of the Ministry. Meanwhile, in a reply to the ABW Chief, gen. Dukaczewski 
wrote that the WSI "did not notice" any irregularities in the tender procedure. At the same time, 
he assured the ABW that he had kept MOD chiefs informed about all minor defects. 

In spite of such unfavorable information, the tender procedure was completed in April 
2003 and the contract for delivery of WAPC for the Polish Army was signed with Patria. 

The decisive factors were: price (60%), 'polonisation' [meant as a possibility of 
producing parts in Poland's factories] (25%) and warranty period (15%). Patria's bid was the 
least expensive (its value was in Polish zloty: PLN 4.925.248.449 [almost 5 billions PLN, well 
over 1,5 billion US dollars]), but it contained the smallest participation of Polish plants in the 
production. The director of WZM in Siemianowice SI. signed the contract with Patria for delivery 
of WAPC. 

On behalf of the MOD, the contract of purchase of the WAPC for the Polish Army with the 
director of WZM was signed by the Head of Procurement Department of MOD, Col. Pawel 
Nowak. The decisive impact on the selection of Patria rested with the Tender Commission (TC 
MOD), appointed yet in August 2001 by the decision of Minister B. Komorowski. The chairman 
of the Commission was Col. Pawel Nowak, the deputy chairman - Gen. Krzysztof Karbowski 
(appointed by Minister Szmajdzinski after Gen. Waldemar Skrzypek resigned), the secretary - 
co-ordinator - Col. Wladyslaw A. Grebowski. Among the Commission members there were also: 
Col. Tadeusz Pyrcak, Maj. Robert Jamka, Lt. Col. Wlodzimierz Koscik, Lt. Col. Zbigniew 
Tomasik (WSI), Col. Janusz Groskrejc, Lt. Col. Zbigniew Kowalczyk and Cpt. Mariusz 
Soczynski. The Commission was advised by a group of experts headed by Col. Krzysztof 
Szymaniak and his deputy Col. Jerzy Zatonski. The experts' group included also Lt. Col. pplk 
Andrzej Durka, Lt. Col. Grzegorz Nowak, Col. Jerzy Cymbaluk, Col. Wieslaw Korczyc, Mr. 
Leszek Orlowski, Mr. Tadeusz Kusnierz and Col. Jan Rene (appointed on October 5, 2001, at the 
request of Gen. E. Pietrzyk). The observers were Bronislaw Komorowski and Zbigniew 
Zaborowski (from the Sejm's Committee of National Defense) and the representatives of the 
Ministry of Economy. Selecting the carrier, before it was tested in detail, caused the members of 
testing teams and the commission to work under pressure in order to complete the tests 


positively. In many cases, the MOD representatives who took part in the tests together with the 
Finnish manufacturer were able to provide a way to remove the minor defects stated during the 
tests, even though their role should have been limited only to the statement of the existence of 
those defects. The final record of the delivery and acceptance tests for WAPC 'Rosomak' 
(Wolverine - Polish name of Patria) was changed many times before the ultimate version was 
ready: taking an unambiguous stand with regard to the actual fulfillment of the requirements 
contained in the tactical and technical requirements was rather avoided. This could have been 
caused by the wish to meet the expectations of the decision-makers, responsible for the selection 
of the carrier from Finland, and by the awareness of possible consequences if the carrier would 
not be accepted as equipment for the Polish Army. On the basis of the aforementioned final 
record (approved by gen. E. Pietrzyk), the Statement on the delivery and acceptance tests of the 
first specimens of WAPC 'Rosomak' was prepared and then signed by the Head of Public 
Procurement Department MOD, Gen. Roman Iwaszkiewicz. The statement showed that the 
tactical and technical requirements were adjusted to the carrier only after it came into possession 
of the Polish Army (December 31, 2004). Since the desire to meet those parameters cannot be 
held against the Polish MOD, the price should have been re-negotiated. Failing to make such a 
request, with a simultaneous waiver of the obligation that the technical and tactical parameters 
are met, was an incomprehensible action and exposed Poland to financial losses. 

The Trade Union of Engineers and Technicians (Executive Board of the National Section 
of Military Industry Enterprises) informed the President of the Republic of Poland that the 
WAPC (AMV) Patria was pronounced the winner of the tender against its failure to meet a 
number of conditions contained in the tender specification, among them those regarding the full 
load weight, operation range, speed in water and dimensions. The experts found the price offer to 
be unreliable. Entrusting such an important product to WZM, in turn, was regarded as a several 
billion PLN risk, as WZM has neither the required technological condition nor the R&D support 
section. (In order to meet the delivery dates, the Finnish company would produce also those 
elements of the WAPC that initially fell to WZM). 

All this information reached gen. Dukaczewski, and the irregularities concerning the 
WAPC were formulated in the final report of the Delivery and Acceptance Commission and were 
known to the MOD chiefs (the data reached the Chief of the 3 rd Directorate WSI, Chief of 'Unit 
36', 3 rd Directorate WSI, and through them, the WSI Chief). In October 2004, Gen. 


Dukaczewski, in his letter to Minister Zemke, stated that the data in possession of the WSI show 
that the charges against ROSOMAK carrier were groundless. Earlier, gen. Dukaczewski 
presented a similar opinion to Minister Szmajdzinski. Gen. Dukaczewski has also warned the 
Minister of National Defense that there will be more information in the media that would be 
unambiguously critical to the selection of WAPC Patria as the equipment of the Polish Army and 
would present the negative role of the Ministry chiefs in this matter. This proves that the WSI had 
HUMINT sources in the mass media and used those sources to protect the interest of the MOD 
chiefs with regard to the WAPC Rosomak. 

In another letter to Minister Zemke, gen. Dukaczewski stated inter alia that: 

- the AMV (WAPC) from Patria Vehicles Oy, due to the highest price and the test results, has 
little chances of winning the tender in Portugal and no chances at all in the Czech Republic, 

- issuing a statement for Polish Press Agency (PAP) that MOD made the optimal selection of the 
carrier is premature, 

- an important element in the possible process of implementation of WAPC Rosomak in the 
Polish Army is, among others, the inability to equip the carrier in accordance with the signed 
contract with some systems and devices of Polish production. 

In a letter dated March 18, 2005, gen. Dukaczewski informed Minister Szmajdzinski that 
it was possible that the WAPC Rosomak was accepted as the equipment of the Polish Army with 
violation of the Polish law. Only Minister Zemke acquainted himself with the text of that 
document and took a critical stand to the comments contained therein. 

Additional examples proving the unsuitability of WAPC Rosomak for the Polish Army 

- participation of malfunctioning carrier in the shows in Czech Republic on June 16-19, 2005,; 
short circuits in two WAPCs; during the repair two employees of WZM in Siemianowice Sla^skie 
suffered burns in April 2005. 

The information provided to the WSI was not used in any manner as they were contained 
neither in case "S" nor "B". This could mean that the Counter-intelligence Unit of the Army did 
not send this data to the 3 Directorate WSI at all, deciding that there were not of great relevance 
in such an important undertaking. Meanwhile, the information obtained by the WSI additionally 
confirmed the data, which showed that the WAPC Patria did not meet the basic tactical and 
technical parameters. Still, the carrier was the winner of the tender procedure. 


By 2006, the Polish Army had several dozens of WAPC, practically useless in battle as 
they were not equipped. The carriers were not delivered on the agreed dates and in agreed 
quantities, and the Malfunction Report, signed in October 2006 by the commander of 17 th 
Wielkopolska MdBde ['Mechanized Brigade'], Brig. Gen. Miroslaw Rozanski, showed that those 
carriers had many structural defects, that could not be repaired at all. 

The WSI, as the authority obligated to provide count-intelligence guard for the Polish 
Army, were responsible for the WAPC tender procedure, however, the WSI officers practically 
acquired information only by "official means".. They did not confirm the data obtained by 
HUMINT sources and other operational means, nor did they assess or analyze the gathered 
materials (also those from the ABW). They were satisfied with the information coming from the 
meetings of MOD Tender Commission and from the conversations they held, mostly with the 
Commission members. The superiors of those officers did not require them to do anything else. It 
cannot be ruled out that this was an intentional action. 

To recapitulate, the officers, from the chiefs of the WSI Units in the Army to the Chief of 
the 3 Directorate WSI, to the chief of Unit 36, to the WSI Chief, did not take any actions which 
would aim at the neutralization of dangers occurring in the case of WAPC Patria already in the 
initial stages of this undertaking, i.e. mostly 2002-2003. They were aware of the importance of 
the existing dangers, yet they did not want to fall into disfavor with the Ministry chiefs who 
almost at the start of their term of office made the decision to accept WAPC Patria as the 
equipment of units of the Polish Armed Forces. 

The investigation of the Military Police regarding the WAPC tender was supervised by Col. 
Edward Jaroszuk (chief of the Investigation and Inquiry Section in the Investigation and Inquiry 
Directorate of the Main Headquarters of the Military Police), who from August 1988 to June 
1989 was trained in the KGB school in Moscow (another participant of that KGB training was 
Col. Eugeniusz Lendzion). 

After receiving yet other information from the ABW (including information about the 
intention to notify the state top officials about the selection of WAPC being incompliant with the 
tactical and technical requirements and not suitable for the purposes of the Polish Army), gen. 
Dukaczewski as the WSI Chief started showing concern that he could be held liable for the lack 
of reaction to the irregularities in the WAPC tender procedure. Therefore, at his order, the ABW 
was sent a document that was supposed to show, among others, that the WSI started obtaining 


negative data as well. Despite being provided with the information that the WAPC Patria did not 
meet the basic technical and tactical parameters, the MOD chiefs were supposedly determined to 
include the Finnish carrier in the Polish Army's equipment, and the selection of WAPC Patria 
could not have been made without the knowledge and consent of the Ministry chiefs. In the report 
for the Minister of National Defense, gen. Dukaczewski reminded Minister Szmajdzinski that he 
regularly provided the Minister with the opinions which contained doubts and objections 
regarding the WAPC selection. Nonetheless, the Ministry chiefs disregarded the objections 
concerning the Finnish WAPC. 

Minister Szmajdzinski maintained that the implementation of Rosomak would be one of 
the main successes of the Ministry under his management. At the knowledge and consent of the 
MOD chiefs, the aforesaid undertaking was carried out by the Minister's subordinated officers, 
led by the Directors of Weaponry Policy Department, the Procurement Department and the 
commander of the Army. They performed the tasks they were given (with respect to WAPC 
'ROSOMAK') through their own subordinates. 

In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition 
contained in Article 70a. 1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military 
Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the 
officers of Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 
2006: Brig. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski. 
The WSI Chief in the described period was Brig. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski. 

Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 
14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated 
directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of 
National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National 
Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information 
Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the 
Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those 
services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI 
Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of 
Defense directly. The Ministers of the National Defense in the described period were: Bronislaw 


Komorowski, Jerzy Szmajdzinski. 

From the information in the Verification Commission's possession it can be seen that so 
far no penal proceedings have been commenced in this case with respect to the WSI soldiers who 
failed their duty; also the MOD chiefs have not been held liable as appropriate. Thus, the 
Verification Commission sent a notification of suspicion of a crime to the Supreme Military 
Prosecutor's Office, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure. 
Furthermore, the materials obtained by the Verification Commission can be useful in the penal 
proceedings already in progress. 

9. Interference of the WSI on the Fuel and Energy Market 

In the scope of their business activities, the WSI carried out operational and investigation 
activities in the area of fuel management in the units of all types of armed forces. 

Till the end of 1990, the provisions of fuel to the military units were carried out centrally. 
Since 1991, in order to adjust the logistics management to new market conditions, works were 
started on the "Concept of Restructuring of the Institutions in the Main Logistics Department of 
the Polish Armed Forces", which assumed, among others, the complete switch to direct purchases 
from private producers of fuels and lubricants (F&L), as well as, from the representatives of 
Western companies (omitting the intermediation of foreign trade companies, e.g. CIECH) in 
order to reduce the expenses on purchase of F&L, by eliminating the trade intermediation, 
including CPN [Polish down-stream oil company]. This argument requires the contrast of the 
situation on the USSR fuel market, which was the main source of fuels during communist times 
and so it remained until now. The changes made by the General Staff did not lead to the 
independence of the Polish Armed Forces from the Russian suppliers, but created a new structure 
of intermediation and profit-sharing in the fuel trade. Until 1990, the profits went to the state 
enterprise CIECH; after the change, the benefits began to flow to those businessmen who had 
contacts with the commanders of military districts and garrisons, where the fuel bases, used as the 
mixing plants, were located. The greatest profits, however, were made by the Russian go- 
betweens (e.g. the company J&S) and those senior military people who supervised that trade (e.g. 
Romuald Waga, long time chief of the Navy's logistics and later a shareholder in one of the fuel 
companies, brother of Jan Waga who was the president of the Kulczyk Holding and later the 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board in "Orlen"). 

An example of such activities was the monitoring of the situation related to the contracts 
made in 1992-2001 by the Military Port Authority in Gdynia with civil entities operating in trans- 
shipment and lease of fuel infrastructure (PHU "Arion", PUM "Ship Service", "SOG Energy 
Polska Ltd", "Oktan Energy V/L Service S.C.", "BMG Petrotrade Poland"). 

Those contracts concerned the manner and terms of trans-shipment of fuels from the oil 
tankers, which delivered to the companies leasing the fuel warehouses. As can be seen from the 
counter-intelligence reports: Trans-shipments were made using the Navy's pipeline, which 
belonged to the 35 Fuel and Lubricant Storehouse in the place called Debogorze. Furthermore, 


the fuels were mixed with other products in that storehouse in order to improve their chemical 
properties. The tankers delivered furnace oil, while airplane fuel was added to the leased tanks, 
which after mixing with furnace oil, achieved the parameters close to those of the diesel oil. It 
was probably the representatives of 'Rafineria [Oil Rafinery] Czechowice' who gave that product 
the "class" (in accordance with applicable standards), approved the lab tests and gave consent for 
the distribution. The fuel was then transferred to railway tank cars and distributed to the 
contractors (distributors) of the refinery. During one of the last trans-shipments carried out on the 
grounds protected by military units, a coloring agent was probably added to the furnace oil, to 
make it more difficult to distinguish between furnace oil and diesel oil by sight. This raw material 
was distributed all over Poland." 

Thus, the WSI were fully aware of the participation of the officers of Polish Armed 
Forces in those practices and the fact that the military infrastructure was used for that purpose. It 
could not have been different considering that one of the main figures in those activities was 
Admiral Romuald Waga. These facts were, however, concealed from the state authorities, 
including the Sejm's Committee for Orlen Affair, which was not provided, inter alia, with the 
materials proving that Col. Kruczkowski had been investigated since 1991 under the suspicion of 
contacts with criminal circles. The documents of that investigation are missing. The only trace of 
those actions is the operational report addressed to the WSI Chief B. Izydorczyk dated August 

In his letter dated March 18, 2005, the WSI Chief Gen. Marek Dukaczewski assured the 
Prime Minister Marek Belka that the WSI did not use any assistance of people employed in the 
fuel industry. That statement was clearly untrue because - if nothing else - the Vice-president of 
Orlen from October 2992 to 2005 was Andrzej Macenowicz, a WSI collaborator aka "PARYS" 
[cryptic name for secret collaborator]. Dukaczewski was perfectly aware of that and "PARYS" 
himself referred to the acquaintance with the WSI Chief in his conversations with the case 

In the course of cooperation, "PARYS" declared full loyalty and willingness to 
collaborate with military intelligence, stressing that he had full access to "all information 
discussed at the meeting of Management Board and Supervisory Board". He also made an 
extensive account of the ongoing negotiations regarding the prepared contract with Russia: "Soon 
the decision will be made regarding the diversification of Orlen's supply sources; instead of one 


go-between - the company DGC - there will be several, probably five suppliers. This is 
compliant with the guidelines of the Government of the Republic of Poland as well as with 
Russia's expectations, where Russia pointed out the possible candidates, including 'Lukoil' and 
'Yukos'. Decisions in this matter will be made in the next few days, so if we want to have any 
impact on how the situation develops, it would be necessary to take appropriate actions as soon as 
possible. This is even more important considering that it is planned to sign contracts for the next 
five years. The collaborator asked what were our preferences in that respect...", noted Waldemar 
Zak of former 'Unit Y' in regards to Macenowicz's statement. 

Obviously, "PARYS" not only provided information, but was also ready to take actions 
specified by the WSI with respect to Orlen, regardless of his duties to the shareholders and the 
Government of the Republic of Poland that he represented in the Management Board. "PARYS" 
also declared that he was ready to "put someone in the company's structures, if needed". He 
criticized other collaborators of the military intelligence and informed that UOP had a great 
number of "their people" in place: "there are WSI people in Orlen, who forgot what should 
motivate them" (among them, he named a certain man by the name Praksmajer). During the 
meeting, Parys revealed his acquaintance with gen. Dukaczewski. In the summary of the meeting, 
Col. Zak stressed the value of "PARYS". "It can soon be expected that the Russians' interest in 
Orlen will increase tremendously, and after a failed attempt to take over Refinery Gdansk they 
will strive to enter the Polish fuel market by participation in PKN Orlen". 

The "Parys" case was also handled by Col. Roman Karas ('Unit Y') and Col. Krzysztof Lada 
(also 'Unit Y'). The latter, when he already was the Chief of Operations in the 3 Directorate, 
decided that "in the further contacts, the following should be done: 

- determine the current intelligence capabilities of Parys and use them efficiently, 

- stimulate the collaborator, 

- establish the cooperation base and successively investigate the collaborator". 

On December 2, 2003, during a meeting known from the work file, held by Maj. Krzysztof 
Rengel from the 2 nd Directorate and approved by Krzysztof Surdyk, Chief of the 2 nd Directorate, 
the focus was on the profile of Krzysztof Kluzek, another vice-president of Orlen. This was 
probably related to the meeting that Kluzek had earlier with gen. Dukaczewski, during which he 
offered to collaborate. Rengel stressed that both the Kluzek case and the assessment of the 
ABW's role in Orlen are the matters of great importance to the intelligence. "PARYS" gave a 


very thorough and positive profile of Krzysztof Kluzek, describing him as an honest man who 
diligently fought all malfeasances in Orlen. He also referred to the positive opinion that Gen. 
Petelicki held about Kluzek, and indicated also that Kluzek refused an offered bribe in the 
amount of 1,2 million zlotys. Macenowicz also revealed that between Orlen and ABW "there is 
an agreement under which 23 designated people were employed in the company. (...) They 
occupy positions which allow access to the information needed by their parent institution".. The 
memo from the meeting was read by Col. Marek Szlenk and Col. Roman Karas from the 2 nd 
Directorate, and the latter wrote: "Suggested monitoring of the situation in the discussed case - 
the Chief's decision dated December 10, 2003." (Among the officers of the 2 nd Directorate of 
General Staff was the president of the 'Ciech' [chemical] Company, Zdzislaw Monkiewicz, who 
advocated for the participation of subsidiaries in the oil trade with Russia. Dukaczewski must 
have known about his ties with military services). 

The WSI and the Russian Expansion 

At least since October 2003, the WSI counter-intelligence was perfectly aware of the 
Russia's endeavors to take control over the Polish energy sector. Such information was received 
from the Cracow-based unit of the WSI in the course of operational and investigation actions. It 
was determined then that the company X from Poznan, owned by an Ukraine citizen A.W., in 
May 2002 made an economic analysis of Rafineria Gdansk before privatization for the Russian 
company 'Q' from Moscow, owned by the former KGB Chief, Gen. F. J. Bondarenko, 
nicknamed "Little Kremlin", which took into account various aspects of its take-over by fuel 
consortia from former USSR countries. 

The acquired documents presented the Russians' plans to cause the bankruptcy of the 
Polish energy sector in order to take it over. The analysis contained long-term and strategic plans 
of operation in the territory of Poland after it joined the UE. In projects of the hostile take-over of 
the energy sector, A.W. referred to "'action' opportunities, i.e. direct access to the Minister of 
Economy, Mr. Jacek Piechota, Minister of State Treasury, Mr. W. Kaczmarek, Minister of 
Infrastructure and Deputy Prime Minister, Marek Pol, and, naturally, the Prime Minister himself 
(in accordance with the preliminary agreement with Mr. A. Zukowy, Paris, the Merril Lynch and 
Glave International Inc. group, talks have been conducted with the aforementioned officials 
regarding the postponement of the decision to who to sell the controlling block of shares of the 


Refinery: W. Alikpier or A. Chodorkowski; we wait for your [F. J. Bondarenko - Verification 
Commission's note] instructions)". 

The full documentation of that case was sent to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Col. Jerzy 
Skwarc, and next to the Chief of the 3 Directorate WSI, K. Klosinski. It took over a year before 
the information, acquired and sent in October 2003, was noticed in Warsaw, in December 2004. 
Col. Klosinski did not present a written report to the WSI Chief, Gen. Dukaczewski, he only 
made it orally and together they were to decide about notifying the whole matter to the Special 
Service Committee and the Prime Minister. We do not know why the Committee was informed 
not in the framework of the report of the WSI Chief, but two weeks later by a separate letter, 
which no one in the Committee read anyway. The WSI have also failed to provide that 
information to the Sejm's Committee for the Orlen Affair, and the letter to the Prime Minister did 
not have the main informative enclosures. Efforts have been made to precisely block any further 
flow of information. The Chief of General Staff of the Army, at the initiative of Col.. Klosinski, 
ordered the unit in Cracow to drop the operational case in the scope of which the information 
about intentions to make the Polish energy sector go bankrupt were acquired. This was because 
the WSI chiefs decided that the informer was inspired by the Russian services. The order was 
also to stop the collaboration, cease any contacts and start investigation of the former collaborator 
as a figurehead. 

Gen. Dukaczewski, in turn, decided in January 2005 that the possessed information 
relative to the threat to the State's economic interest was not in his competence and informed 
Prime Minister Belka that "all materials" have been conveyed to the ABW. From the existing 
documentation we only know for certain that those materials were conveyed to the ABW's 
branch office in Cracow. Simultaneously, the same materials were sent to the attention of the 
Chairman of Special Service Committee, Andrzej Grzesik, MP. The analyses made by A. W. for 
the former KGB Chief have, however, never been presented to the Investigation Committee for 
PKN Orlen Affair; it has never received them in spite of numerous demands for full information. 
It remains to be explained how the classification of that information was organized. We know 
that Col. Klosinski, when preparing the thesis for Gen. Dukaczewski for his statement during the 
briefing in MOD, included the information about the Russian materials. He wrote that those files 
were sent to Gruszka, MP from the Orlen Committee, however, the MP never received those 
materials. It is shocking that being in possession of information so critical to the security of the 


Polish State, the WSI did not make any attempt to verify that information, acquire additional 
sources and control the existing ones, confront those news with other information.. To the 
contrary, all efforts were directed at blocking that information and protecting Russian interest. 
The WSI did not check or verify the acquired information, which posed a danger to the State 
security, while the person who provided important information was treated as an enemy. 

Russian activities did not end on developing and implementing the plan to take over 
'Rafineria Gdansk'. In 2006, Russia started collecting information about the Polish brown and 
bituminous coal mining, in order to implement the plan of taking over 12 strategic mines. 

In turn, the important information about the German plans to eliminate Poland from the 
world brown and bituminous coal market is contained in the work files of a collaborator of 'Unit 
22', aka "W" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], (run by Maj. Grzegorz Sobecki). That 
information shows that concealing important information from the state authorities was a widely 
accepted practice in the WSI. In 2002, the above-mentioned collaborator, employed by one of the 
Polish banks, delivered to his case officer a document concerning the forecast of the absorption 
capacities of the bituminous coal market till 2010. That report presented on several hundred 
pages the experts' forecasts of demand for bituminous coal, based on the research on cola 
consumption in previous years and on the anticipated consumption, defined on the basis of 
macroeconomic scenarios of economic growth. It also presented alternative sources of energy and 
the perspectives for their use in the national industry. It also discussed the benefits and threats for 
the natural environment, caused by the possible switch of the national economy to other energy 
sources. The second part of the report presented also, inter alia, the perspectives for the coke 
industry development and the situation of several major power consumers (heat production plans 
as well as heavy industry, sugar industry and concrete industry plants). 

The study treated of the strategic branch of the Polish economy and the German plans to 
eliminate Poland from that market, so "W" was right in pointing that it would be purposeful for 
the top officials in the Ministry of Economy to read those materials. However, those materials 
were never conveyed to the appropriate state authorities. In 2002, at the request of Lt. Col. 
Tomasz Korpak, they were sent to 3 Directorate WSI and in 2006 the same officer sent them 
back to the 2 nd Directorate without taking any action. It was only in 2006 that the first memo in 
this case was made. 

The work file of collaborator "W" also shows that the discussed document was prepared 


by a team of experts appointed by a foreign consulting company at the order from one of the 
banks. That team included the employees of Polish ministries who stole confidential information 
to sell it later to the consulting companies. Such actions constitute the crime of disclosure of 
confidential corporate information or information acquired in the course of work duties, the 
disclosure of which may expose a legally protected interest to danger, to unauthorized parties. 
The WSI did not provide that information to the law enforcement authorities, thus allowing the 
practices that were detrimental to the security of Poland to continue. In the collaborator's files 
there is no information that any attempt was made to identify the members of the "team of 

Similar to the Russian attempt to take over the Polish fuel sector, also in the discussed 
situation, there is a risk that the report was the first step for similar actions of the German side 
with respect to the Polish bituminous coal market. A lack of Polish activities in this case have not 
only exposed Poland's energy security to danger, but also allowed foreign entities to analyze the 
strategic sectors of our economy (heat production plans as well as heavy industry, sugar industry 
and concrete industry plants). Due to the fact that those plants base their production on the 
consumption of bituminous coal, those data allow to predict, with rather high probability, their 
financial condition in the next few years. The foreign investors in possession of such analyses 
have an opportunity to steer individual branches of Polish economy. 

The fuel Mafia case is one of the most grave charges against the WSI. Not only did the 
services know about illegal activities and tolerate them, but its soldiers were the main chain links 
in the Mafia and, as the fate of the 'Little Kremlin' report shows, the WSI protected the criminal 
activities of Russian services and Mafia, aimed at the destruction and take-over of the Polish 
energy sector. 

The materials showing the WSFs activities in the framework of control over the fuel 
market till 2000 are often incomplete, because they were destroyed to a great extent or concealed. 
The materials concerning the fuel cases kept being "sanitized" as late as on June 30, 2006, when 
it was already known that the WSI were going to be dissolved. 

In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained 
in Article 70a. 1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter- 
intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of 
Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Brig. 


Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Col. Waldemar Zak, Col. Roman Karas, Col. Krzysztof Lada, Col. 
Krzysztof Surdyk, Col. Marek Szlenk, Col. Krzysztof Klosinski, Lt. Col. Tomasz Korpak, Maj. 
Krzysztof Rengel, Maj. Grzegorz Sobecki. 

The activities of Andrzej Macenowicz, Krzysztof Kluzek and Andrzej Grzesik meet the 
disposition of Article 70a.2.1 of the aforecited Act. 

The WSI Chief in the described period was Brig Gen. Marek Dukaczewski. 

Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 
14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated 
directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of 
National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National 
Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information 
Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the 
Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those 
services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI 
Chief.. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of 
Defense directly. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Bronislaw 
Komorowski and Jerzy Szmajdzinski. 


10. Activities of the WSI Officers in the Military Technical Academy 

The activities of the WSI officers often took on the properties of economic crime at a 
large scale as a result of which the State Treasury lost millions of zlotys. Very often the funds 
belonging to the economic entities or institutions connected to the military were transferred out or 
embezzled via companies, foundations or other institutions established at the initiative of the WSI 
officers or closely linked to them. 

An example of this type of activities of the WSI offers were their business activities 
focused around the Military Technical Academy (WAT) in 1996 - 2000. The trace of these 
criminal activities of the WSI officers was found in mid-1999, during a financial audit conducted 
in WAT by the Fiscal Control Office. The audit concerned the performance of the academy's 
budget assumptions. Fabricated financial documents were revealed then, evidencing criminal 
practices in WAT. Following the findings of the Fiscal Control Office, in July 1999, the District 
Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw, with the participation of the Economic Interest Guard Directorate 
of UOP, instigated the investigation in the course of which the existence of crime mechanism in 
WAT was confirmed; the amount of PLN 381,962,568 was illegally transferred out of the 
academy through a number of business entities. According to the findings, that money was taken 
out the WAT's budget by "Centrum Uslugowo-Produkcyjne WAT" (CUP WAT), established in 
1996, which was to handle the commercial and marketing service of WAT. 

The practice consisted of CUP WAT signing long-term contracts for the delivery of goods 
or provisions of services to WAT with various companies. A large number of those companies 
had close ties to Fundacja "Pro Civili". The mechanism of those contracts consisted of fictional 
appointment of WAT as the recipient of goods or the party ordering the services, for which WAT 
was obligated to pay considerable amounts of money to the contractors. 

An important role in this practice was played by Fundacja "Pro Civili", but also related 
companies "Olbart", "Kiumar", "Glicor", "Sicura" and others. Fundacja "Pro Civili" was 
established on July 5, 1994, with the capital of 300 thousand old Polish zlotys. It was supposed to 
protect the employees and officers of government and local government services as well as public 
and trade union activists, but also assist people who suffered a loss or health impairment when 
defending security and legal order of the Republic of Poland. The main founders were Anton 


Wolfgang Kasco and Patryk Manfred Holletschek (creator of the first financial pyramid in 
Poland: "Global System"). The President of the Foundation Board was Krzysztof Werlich, and 
the Director General - Elzbieta Polaszczyk. The Foundation Council composed of: chairman 
Piotr Polaszczyk (a WSI officer till August 1995), Beata Werlich, Krzysztof Kostrzewski, gen. 
Stanislaw Switalski and Marek Olifierczuk (collaborator run by Piotr Polaszczyk). One of the 
employees of the Foundation was an officer of the 3rd Directorate WSI, Marek Wolny. In 1994, 
the Foundation Council also included Janusz Maksymiuk and Tomasz Lis. 

At least several dozens of various service and trade undertakings were revealed between 
CUP WAT and Fundacja "Pro Civili" and the above-mentioned companies. A large number of 
transactions with the participation of WAT and Fundacja "Pro Civili" consisted of business 
operations of sham nature. Their only purpose was to con millions of zlotys in VAT refunds, 
obtain bank loans and sell the banks the debt claims under leasing contracts. On the part of WAT, 
the signatory in those transactions was CUP WAT. An example of actions undertaken by "Pro 
Civili" was the purchase of a document security system "Axis" for WAT (that system was to be 
used to protect documents against forging and to enable quick, faultless verification of reliability 
of a document, but the findings made during the investigation questioned the existence of that 

It was also determined that Fundacja "Pro Civili", closely tied to CUP WAT, and the 
companies associated with the Foundation were also a "money laundry" for funds which might 
have also derived from illegal operations of crime groups. Such thesis is confirmed by contracts, 
revealed by the prosecution, which CUP WAT made with Fundacja "Pro Civili" and other 
companies in 1996 - 2000 on behalf of WAT. One of them was a contract for leasing of a motor 
yacht by Korporacja Adaer S.A. for WAT. The first contract was made for the amount of app. 36 
million PLN, the second - 20 million PLN. The yacht all the time remained the property of a 
Cyprus-based company Parsley Co. Ltd. Leasing fees were paid to the account of the Bank of 
Cyprus. The purpose of those contracts was to transfer the money abroad. 

The purpose of another contract made between WAT and Korporacja Adar was to consist 
in joint financing of purchase and sale of real property at 4 Konduktorska Street in Warsaw. The 
value of the object of transaction was defined as 4.5 million PLN and WAT's share was 2.5 
million PLN. Valuation of the real property was 1.2 million PLN. WAT's share greatly exceeded 
the value of real property. These activities were aimed at "cheap and quick" loan to the Adar 


Company, extended by WAT representatives. The President of Management Board of Korporacja 
ADAR was a foreign citizen who used three different sets of personal data (citizen of Lithuania 
Valerijus Baskowas, Igor Kapylov from Belarus and Konstantinos Pelivanidis, representative of 
Parsley Company Limited from Cyprus). 

Many undertakings with WAT's participation were doomed to generate losses from the 
start and yet the academy participated in the costs. For example: in 1997, WAT signed a contract 
with "Pol-Bot" concerning the exploitation of sand and gravel deposits, a transaction, which 
brought WAT a 750 thousand PLN loss. Losses were also generated by the establishment of 
"Zaklad Uslug Reklamowych WAT" and its location in Lodz (in 1999, Col. Janusz Lada, without 
due authorizations, signed a lease contract for real property at 89 Piotrkowska Street in Lodz on 
behalf of ZUR WAT; the contract was made with the company 'Secesja 89 Piotrkowska Centrum 
Biurowo-Apartamentowe", owned by Krzysztof A.). 

Cooperation between WAT and Szkola Wyzsza Warszawska (SzWW), formally 
organized by the Foundation for Development of Education and Technology, created at the 
WAT's incentive and financed - theoretically - from public funds, made it possible for WAT to 
create an Office for Cooperation with Non-Public University in 2000. The costs of that Office 
were financed from the subsidy the WAT received from MOD for educational purposes. In 2003, 
SzWW owed WAT a debt for the lease of premises to the amount of nearly 1 .5 million PLN. 
Another source of WAT's financial problems was the signing, at the consent of the then 
Commander of WAT, Gen. A. Ameljanczyk, another lease contract of a "Hunting House" with 
Mariusz Krawczyk, even though the academy authorities knew that Krawczyk failed to perform 
the previous contract with WAT. The conclusion of another contract with Krawczyk was 
influenced by the personal recommendation from Col. Romuald Miernik (WSI officer, Deputy 
Commander of WAT for Economic and Organizational Affairs). The result of the contract with 
Krawczyk was that the "Hunting House" was completely devastated in 18 months and the 
construction alterations made to it caused as a consequence that the construction supervision 
authorities could not accept the building. Krawczyk's debts in the lease rent (at least 100 
thousand zlotys) and the costs related to the re-adaptation of the building owned by WAT added 
up to a considerable financial loss (at least several hundred thousand zlotys) in a seemingly small 

In spite of a bad financial situation, the WAT command did not take any remedies. It has 


shown no initiative for the WAT to rid itself of the shares in those commercial companies the 
operations of which were unprofitable or generated loss. Not much attention was paid to the fact 
that the object of business of those companies was often completely divergent from the tasks of a 
military university (insurance services, oil trade, hotel industry...). The people in the WAT 
command often grossly exceeded their authorizations when signing contracts. Usually, the 
contracts signed by them brought the academy financial loss of a great extent. 
The disastrous financial situation of the WAT became even worse when the function of the WAT 
Commander was held by Maj. Gen. Andrzej Ameljanczyk. It was gen. Ameljanczyk who 
assented to signing loan contract with private investors on behalf of WAT or giving loans to 
private investors, invest in business undertakings which were to bring loss from the start. The 
financial policy of WAT pursued during his term of office was grossly violating the provisions, 
which govern the financial management of budget entities. WAT transactions did not take any 
account the partners' reliability. Neither the WAT command nor CUP WAT, which represented 
the academy, checked the credibility of their contractors or the past of the people who 
represented them in contacts with WAT. It was not infrequent that the people who were CUP 
WAT shareholders simultaneously represented the interest of other companies with which the 
academy made contracts. For example, contracts were made and transactions conducted with: 

- Roman Puderecki - owner of "Budimex" (co-shareholder of CUP WAT) against who court 
proceedings were pending for financial embezzlement, 

- Karol Gilski - former Security Police (SB) officer and shareholder of "Sicura" (co-shareholder 
of CUP WAT), 

- Leszek Grot, 

- Krzysztof Osuch and Francesco Belloni - representatives of "Korporacja Bemowo", 

- Andrzej Goralczyk - plenipotentiary of "Pol-Bot", sentenced in the past for participation in 
criminal association, theft, fraud, conning and forgery of documents. 

Leading roles in the described practices were played by WSI officers. They were usually 
the spiritus movens of those transactions. Some of them, when they were still active WSI officers, 
were responsible in the past for the so-called counter-intelligence guard of WAT, just to become 
employees of that academy later - quite often in prominent positions. If they did not work in 
WAT, then they usually represented business entities, which were the academy's partners in 
commercial transactions. 


One of such people was Cpt. (Reserve) Piotr Polaszczyk, who was a WSI officer till 1995, in 
charge of the WAT target guard and for this reason he had extensive knowledge about the way 
the WAT functioned, he also knew people from WAT who used to be his HUMINT sources in 
the past. Since 1996, he has been the Chairman of Council in Fundacja "Pro Civili" and then the 
originator of many transactions with WAT participation (through CUP WAT). Col. 
(Reserve)Marek Wolny, former officer of the 3rd Directorate WSI, became an employee of "Pro 
Civili'. Very important role was played by Janusz Lada, Deputy Commander of WAT for 
Economic and Organizational Affairs, who personally approved many undertakings with WAT's 
participation and Col. Roman Miernik - a WSI officer, later also a Deputy Commander of WAT 
for Economic and Organizational Affairs. 

Those officers did not act alone. They had knew each other for years, they trusted each 
other, they jointly planned or initiated criminal undertakings where the WAT budget was the 
base. And even the fact that they represented the opposite parties in those undertakings and were 
obligated to act to the benefit of those parties, did not hinder them in carrying out the planned 
undertakings. Such WSI officers as Deputy Commander of WAT Col. J. Lada and Deputy 
Commander of WAT Col. R. Miernik. It was them who took up various ideas to do "business 
together" with Fundacja "Pro Civili" where the brain was Cpt. (Reserve) P. Polaszczyk. It was a 
specific type of collusion of the WSI officers for criminal business based on WAT. And it was 
not only an interim collusion, but as the practices developed, an organized criminal group, steered 
by WSI officers. The fact that the WSI name was accepted in those circles is evidenced also by 
this minor thing that P. Werlich from Fundacja "Pro Civili" claimed to be a WSI officer, though 
he never was, but the WSI name was to make him more credible to the Foundation's contractors. 

When in mid- 1999 the WAT financial policy came into the focus of the Fiscal Control 
Office, the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw and the Warsaw Unit of the WSI Counter- 
intelligence as well as the WAT command made a number of organizational and personal 
changes in the academy with the primary aim to attempt to cover the traces that could lead law 
enforcement to pick up the trail of criminal practices with the participation of WAT command. 
The initiator of those changes was Deputy Commander Col. Lada. CUP WAT was dissolved and 
CUP WAT S.A. was established in its place with the formal founders in persons of: Col. J. Lada, 
K. Gilski and R. Puderski, while the plenipotentiary was Col. Krzysztof Bernat. It was probably 
at that time that many documents related to the transactions conducted with WAT's participation 


were destroyed. 

At the end of 2000, the Military Regional Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw brought charges inter 
alia against: Deputy Commander of WAT for General Affairs Brig Gen. Aleksander 
Boronowski, Deputy Commander of WAT for Economic and Organizational Affairs Col. 
(Reserve) Janusz Lada, the Head of Fire Training Department of WAT Col. Tomasz Kwiecien, 
legal counselors of WAT: Marek Gniewaszewski and Janusz Wojciechowski, director of the 
Publishing House of WAT Wojciech Pogonowski, Bursar of WAT Col. (Reserve) Tadeusz 
Kudlaczek and Col. (Reserve) Andrzej Spychala. 

The separate investigations conducted by the civil and military prosecution included also the 
people associated with Fundacja "Pro Civili" - Cpt. P. Polaszczyk and Col. (Reserve) M. Wolny. 
As a result of criminal practices, exemplified by the discussed cases, WAT lost at least 
381,962,568 zlotys. Most sums lost by WAT were transferred outside the Polish banking system. 
The existence of criminal practices in WAT was confirmed within three independent procedures: 

- the audit by the Fiscal Control Office, 

- the proceedings conducted by the District Prosecutor's Office and Military Regional 
Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw, 

- problem case run by WSI, code-named "K", and operational clearance work case, code-named 

In all control and investigation bases, the participation of the WSI officers or people who 
used to be WSI officers was confirmed. Those people either used to provide counter-intelligence 
guard for WAT or as former soldiers occupied various functions in WAT command. The 
participation of the WSI soldiers in the criminal practices was not even. It cannot be ruled out 
that the activities of some of them were directed by the WSI chiefs. Such situation could have 
existed in spite of the fact that the WSI conducted problem case "K" and operational clearance 
work case "K", the purpose of which was to investigate and then investigate the criminal 
practices in WAT. We know that the Deputy Commander of WAT pplk R. Miernik was sent to 
WAT in 2002 to set the situation in order and he was in regular contact with the Chief of the 3rd 
Directorate Col. Kazimierz Mochol as well as the chiefs of Special Operations Office in that 
Directorate: Col. Eugeniusz Lendzion and Col. Jozef Langowski. This fact could point to the 
direct supervision of the WSI over the activities of many of its former soldiers who developed 
business activities with WAT's participation. It cannot be ruled out that the huge budget of WAT, 


resulting from the needs to conduct research work, could have been an interesting target for the 
WSI and WSI, with the engagement of various business entities, could have wanted to transfer it 
out of WAT and deposit safely outside the Polish fiscal area. 

From the counter-intelligence's point of view, special attention should be paid to the 
disclosed fact that many foreigners, in particular citizens of former USSR countries, participated 
in the criminal practices, which posed a great threat to the complete transparency of WAT as a 
military university. The situation was inasmuch alarming as the contracts concluded with WAT 
often gave the contractors a possible access to the information which was a state and business 
secret. This applied in particular to the information related to the financing of the WAT's 
research and implementation works for the Polish Armed Forces. Some transactions with WAT's 
participation were investigated by the public prosecution in Warsaw, as a result of which charges 
were brought against several dozen people. 

In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained 
in Article 70a. 1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter- 
intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of 
Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Col. 
Marek Wolny, Col. Roman Miernik, Col. Janusz Lada, Col. Kazimierz Mochol, Col. Eugeniusz 
Lendzion, Cpt Piotr Polaszczyk. 

The activities of: Brig Gen. Aleksander Bortonowski, Maj. Gen. Andrzej Ameljanczyk, Anton 
Wolfgang Kasco, Patryk Manfred Holletschek, Krzysztof Werlich, Beata Werelich, Krzysztof 
Kostrzewski, Gen. Stanislaw Switalski, Col. Tomasz Kwiecien, Col. Jozef Langowski, Col. 
Krzysztof Bernat, Marek Olifierczuk and Mariusz Krawczyk meets the disposition of Article 
70a.2.1 of the aforecited Act. 

The WSI Chiefs in the described period were: Brig. Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk and Comm Adm. 
Kazimierz Glowacki. 

Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 
14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated 
directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of 
National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National 
Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information 


Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the 
Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those 
services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI 
Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of 
Defense directly. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Stanislaw 
Dobrzanski, Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Bronislaw Komorowski. 


11. Other Irregularities in the WSI Operations 

There were many other irregularities in the WSI. They related both to basic requirements 
in appointments for duty and, for example, the performance of tender procedures concerning the 
purchase of specialized equipment. There were also gross irregularities regarding the counter- 
intelligence guard for institutions and military units. 

Because the WSI structures were based on the graduates of Soviet courses, barriers were 
created for candidates from outside those circles. As a consequence, the staff policy aimed at 
preserving the old grid. 

Staff-related Irregularities 

The selection of new candidates for duty was not conducted on the basis of correct 
criteria. The negative premises acquired about the candidates for duty and WSI soldiers did not 
have any impact on staff- related decisions. 

The documentation of procedures related to the selection of candidates for duty indicates 
that in many cases, in spite of negative opinions about the candidate (e.g. negative psychological 
profile, alcohol abuse, information about lack of guarantee that secrets will be observed, 
important counter-indications for operational work), positive decisions were made regarding the 
acceptance for service in the WSI. There were also situations where the officers tried to influence 
their subordinates to hide unfavorable facts in their CV. 

The negative information collected by the Internal Security Office (BBW) (e.g. about 
alcohol abuse and detox treatment, crimes and offences) did not have any major impact on the 
further career of a given soldier, his promotions, place in the service, access to state secrets or 
delegation to foreign posts. 

There were scandalous situations where soldiers were sent abroad in spite of negative 

In many cases, the obtained information indicated lack of warranty that secrets would be 
observed, but in almost every such case those people received security clearance for access to 
information with top-secret clause. There were even case when someone occupied a commanding 
position in spite of lack of access to classified information. 


Due to the use of feigned recruitment and vetting procedures, the abuse of alcohol by 
many WSI officers became a serious problem. This practice was common and widely accepted. It 
became a norm to drink at work. 

The described practices did not only constitute a violation of internal regulations or 
negligence of duties. They also caused many instances of misappropriation, e.g. in connection 
with fund "O" management. From the information obtained by the Verification Commission It 
can be seen that the WSI operational funds were often treated as an additional source of income, 
some kind of additional pay. At the slightest excuse money was paid out to private pockets of the 
soldiers and their HUMINT sources. 

In 1999-2001, the WSI soldiers from Counter-intelligence Section in Cracow committed 
forgery of settlement documents related to the costs of their operational undertakings. 

From the documents collected by BBW WSI it can be seen that the Safehouse (SH) in the 
Counter-intelligence Section in Cracow was uncovered; there were also the instances where the 
benefits of sexual nature were obtained. In February 2004, BBW WSI received information about 
improper behavior of the Deputy Chief of the WSI Unit in Cracow, Lt. Col. W. Wojcik. This 
information was confirmed by the officer covering the WSI Cracow Unit (it is interesting that his 
memo - dated January 30, 2004 - was probably antedated. 

As a result of the conducted verification, that information found confirmation in the 
accounts of three secret collaborators of BBW (RA "W", RA "BI", RA "B"), obtained in June 
2004. From the collected materials it resulted that pplk Wojcik led to uncovering of the SHs he 
was responsible for ("L", which he used as his second flat, "M" - used for sexual contacts as well 
as "R" in Zakopane and "G" in Krynica), letting unauthorized people in there; he also used the 
operational car and the driver for his private needs (the driver was, among others, doing the 
shopping for his superior's needs and at the superior's consent used the SH "R" in Zakopane 
during his holiday with the family) and abused his position to obtain benefits of sexual nature (by 
employing M. M. in the WSI financial division on the terms "job in exchange for sex" and 
finding a job for D. M. in military hospital on the same terms (both persons were let in the SH for 
sexual purposes)). Aside from that, pplk W. let a former WSI officer enter the premises of the 
unit under W.'s command, for that officer to prepare the Unit's financial statements in W.'s 
place. There was also information that pplk Lt. Col. Wojcik took psychotropic drugs. 

On similar terms the operational premises were used illegally as accommodation for 


people who held commanding posts in the units to which the premises belonged. This was the 
case, among others, with the Safehouse "T", built in 1997-1998. It was to be used for training 
agents and officers under cover in the eastern direction. This undertaking was doomed to be 
unsuccessful from the start since among the people familiar with the case were at least several 
officers trained in the USSR and the Safehouse itself was used by the WSI officers for holiday 
purposes, often together with their families. An example of this practice is the memo dated July 
22, 2003, where pplk Bogdan Swiatek writes to his superior: "In order to ensure the natural 
concealment of [Safety House] "TARAS", I apply for the consent for my stay there with my 
family from August 1 to August 15, 2003. The stay in the premises will be shown as a summer 
holiday in the framework of my holiday leave".. The costs of stay were paid from the operational 
fund. The construction of SH "T" cost 220 thousand zlotys, and the maintenance costs in 1998- 
2001 amounted to over 30 thousand zlotys. All expenses were covered from the WSI budget. The 
liability for those irregularities rests with the chiefs of units 24 and 34, chiefs of counter- 
intelligence and intelligence and finally the WSI Chiefs: gen. Dukaczewski and Gen. Zukowski. 

Irregularities in the Organization of Purchases 

An important field for misappropriations in the WSI were the purchases of specialized 
equipment for the divisions handling the technical side of operational actions. 

It has become an unwritten rule that the entities dealing in the distribution and service of 
special technique equipment employed former soldiers of the WSI and the Polish Armed Forces. 
This situation caused that those companies run a market surveillance through their employees 
coming from the WSI who had contacts with their former colleagues in the WSI and thus 
obtained from them in advance the information about planned purchases of necessary equipment. 
In many cases, only one company, which had information about the purchases planned by the 
WSI, entered the tender. The information about tenders for equipment for WSI often did not 
reach at all any other interested companies, operating on the market. This situation could indicate 
the existence of a collusion between the parties, where both sides derived unlawful benefits. 

Company SILTEC was established in 1982, probably as a cover company for the 2 nd 
Directorate of General Staff of the People's Polish Armed Forces. In agreement with the 
company DGT-System, they informally divided the market of IT and telecommunications 
supplies for the Polish Armed Forces between themselves, winning all major tenders (some worth 


a dozen million zlotys each). Such action allowed them to considerably (by app. 30-40%) 
overprice in relation to the market conditions. 

In 2000, in the tender for TEMPEST-class computers, SIEMENS made a bid next to 
SILTEC, offering the workstations about 20,000 zlotys/pc cheaper than the competition. The 
tender was, however, won by SILTEC. This was possible primarily owning to the support of Gen. 
Wojciech Wojciechowski from the General Directorate of Command and Communications, 
General Staff, Polish Armed Forces, a college friend of Andrzej Pokrzewnicki - one of the co- 
owners of SILTEC. It was not the first time that gen. Wojciechowski actively supported and 
favored SILTEC, indicating it as the sole supplier of IT equipment to the Polish Armed Forces. 

When analyzing the actions aimed at the purchase of specialized equipment from 
predetermined companies, it is worth citing the behavior aimed not only at evading the law, but 
in particular the possible attempts to influence the text of statutory provisions. 

The first efforts aimed at purchasing SILTEC's cryptographic equipment were taken as 
early as in 2001. The legal regulations in force then did not allow for purchase and admission to 
use of any equipment which did not pass the appropriate certification process. In 2005, the 
provisions of the Act on Access to Restricted Information were amended. There was a deep 
change in the text of Article 60 and subsequent articles. From the possessed information It can be 
seen that the WSI counted on the enactment of the regulation in such a form that would allow the 
Chief of relevant service to give consent for use of cryptographic equipment for a "confidential" 
clause, without conducting the appropriate certification tests. However, such editing of the 
provision met the firm protest of the Sejm's experts. They pointed inter alia to corruptive nature 
of the aforesaid provision. In the end, a provision was adopted that allowed for admission of the 
discussed equipment to use conditionally, for the period of 2 years. The services' representatives 
assured that such solution could be used only in exceptional situations, e.g. lack of proper 
equipment, in field conditions, during foreign missions. The above-mentioned assurances, in the 
light of efforts taken since 2001 with the aim to purchase cryptographic equipment from a 
specific company, which was known from the start not to have met and never to meet the 
statutory requirements, may rise serious doubts. The author of the memo on interpretation of the 
Article 60.7 of the discussed Act, gen. Dukaczewski must have been fully aware of the violation 
of the law which followed the enactment of the Act amendment. The sad end of the described, 
not fully effective, efforts, was the signing of the "Annex to the Concept of Cryptographic 


Protection System Development in the Ministry of National Defense" by Minister Jerzy 
Szmajdzinski, WSI Chief Gen. Marek Dukaczewski and the Chief General of Command and 
Communications Directorate Gen. Stanislaw Krysinski in May 2005. In that document, they de 
facto approved the plan to disregard the existing regulations in the accreditation procedure related 
to the cryptographic equipment offered by SILTEC. This is an example of completely 
instrumental use of the law to secure someone's particularistic interest with obvious harm to the 
level of state secret security, which by the law should be been protected exactly by the WSI. 

The descried unexceptional actions caused measurable losses for the State budget. They 
also constituted a great danger to the State security by accrediting cryptographic equipment 
without required tests. The equipment admitted to use that way is or was used by the people who 
hold the highest state offices, including the President of the Republic of Poland, BBN Chief, 
Minister of National Defense, Chief of MOD Secretarial Office, Secretary of the State - First 
Deputy Minister of National Defense, Chief of General Staff of Polish Armed Forces, WSI Chief 
or Chief Commander of the Military Police. It is also worth noting that if it was decided to 
develop services' own solutions instead of spending many years making efforts to purchase third 
party equipment, it would have been probably implemented in the same timeframe. 

The lack of control and arbitrary use of state money were nearly an every-day occurrence 
in the WSI. There were situations where no tender principles were applied whatsoever and 
specialized equipment was purchased without any procedures. In one of the revealed cases, a 
Polish diplomatic post took part in it. 

In this context, the information provided to the Verification Commission that there was an 
informal group within the WSI, associated with Gen. Dukaczewski, is crucial. That group, owing 
to the staff appointed according to its own principles and used as a some type of a lobbying group 
or pressure group when needed, supposedly had opportunities to carry out any task, not 
necessarily legal and related to the services operation. A "circle" of people who supported and 
covered their actions for each other was created and remained beyond any control. 

The irregularities in tender procedures, which occurred in the WSI, were also recorded in 
the case "P", run since 2005. When conducting that case, the WSI officers determined that the 
tender procedures were usually badly organized. The "sole source contract" procedure was used 
too frequently, with the detriment to the WSI; similarly, the tenders were divided into smaller 
procedures in order to go around the law. Usually, there was no announcement published in the 


"Public Procurement Bulletin" and invitations to bid were only sent to several friendly 
companies, without confronting their offers on a broader market. In 2004, for example, a 
company INSAM was selected that was entered into the National Court Register 8 days after 
having won the tender. The culmination of case "P" was the notification of the military 
prosecution about suspected crime. It is also interesting in this case that the entire proceedings 
were limited to relatively low-ranking officers. The most senior officer among them held the rank 
of "major". 

Irregularities Related to Counter-intelligence Guard 

It was interesting how the proper counter-intelligence guard of institutions and military 
units on the part of the WSI, which were obligated to run surveillance on those entities, was 
missing. The WSI should have controlled, among others, whether the civil business entities that 
co-operate with military institutions do not conduct any criminal activities - in this respect, 
however, lack of proper reaction of the WSI was observed. There were obvious instances of 
informal ties between senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces and the representatives of 
business and state machine. The WSI operatives acquired information about irregularities and 
provided that information to their superiors, however the latter did not draw proper conclusions 
from those reports. 

The lack of proper counter-intelligence guard took place for example in relation to the activities 
of Fundacja Pilotow i Spadochroniarzy "Gloria Victis Aeronauticus", headed by Maj. pilot. 
Andrzej Wydrych. By the order of the Minister of National Defense, Wydrych was delegated to 
work in the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. Since the early 90-ties, his foundation has been 
renting six buildings of the Modlin Garrison Command, located in the area of the airport of 45 
Air TES. After several years, it turned out that the Foundation's premises were used to store 
smuggled spirit. 

The Verification Commission has also took notice of a pathological grid related to the 
construction investments and services carried out by the Polish Armed Forces. The information 
acquired by the WSI unit in Bydgoszcz pointed that there were regular meeting held in that area, 
with the participation of senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces, politicians, representatives of 
local business and authorities. Those meetings were referred to as "ROLOWISKO" (with the 
year of occurrence added). The meetings have their own internal rules and anthem. The name 


derives from the surname of one of the previous Chiefs of Accommodation and Construction 
Service of Pomorze Military District, Anatol Rola. During those meetings, agreements were 
made and specific investments or performance services were opted for, on preference terms. The 
purchase orders went to the companies associated with "ROLOWISKO", while the completion 
costs significantly exceeded the cost estimate value. In the next year, carefully selected 
companies, belonging to "ROLOWISKO", were invited to bid. 

The potential profits were to be shared among all those who opted. Some of those 
investments were carried out for military purposes with active participation of senior officers of 
the Polish Armed Forces. All was supposedly taking place with seeming observance of tender 
regulations. This practice applies to the projects carried out by the Rejonowe Zaklady 
Infrastruktury (Regional Infrastructural Plants - RZI) and Zaklad Inwestycji i Organizacji 
Traktatu Polnocnoatlantyckiego (NATO Investment and Organization Plant - ZIOTP). That goal 
was achieved by carrying out the tenders under special procedure, referring to the State security 
interest. ZIOTP applied to the minister competent for military infrastructure matters for the 
consent to this procedure and then selected companies were invited to bid. 

The main architect of this informal structure was Gen. (Reserve) Tadeusz Glowacki who held 
various positions in the Accommodation and Construction Service divisions of the Ministry of 
National Defense. Through his contacts inter alia with the former ZIOTP Director, Jan Antoniuk, 
and the Director of Military Office of Construction Projects in Poznan (Pikulik), he influenced 
the authorities' decisions. 

Glowacki was associated with the owner of Przedsiebiorstwo Wielobranzowe "LECH". 
That limited liability company gained the greatest benefits from "ROLOWISKO". Glowacki also 
had close contacts with Tomasz Wozniak, owner of the company "MEGA" (and a former SLD 
councilman in Bydgoszcz). "MEGA" was a sub-contractor of "LECH". On behalf of the MOD 
Infrastructure Department, the investment was supervised by Col. Andrzej Erdman, former 
subordinate of Col. Glowacki from RZI in Bydgoszcz. 

An important role in this undertaking was played by the former Director of MOD 
Infrastructure Department, Maj Henryk Grobelny. MOD considered him the "right hand" of 
Deputy Minister Janusz Zemke. From the obtained information It can be seen that H. Grobelny 
was the initiator of the MOD's takeover of a palace and park complex in Samostrzele, on the 
pretext of placing the JFTC headquarters there. That complex was later brought by the Military 


Property Agency (AMW) into company GROMADA AMW as a contribution in kind; H. 
Grobelny, who in his capacity of a ministry official decided to award the contract for construction 
of the Bydgoszcz JFTC hotel to Gromada AMW, became a member of Supervisory Board of that 

The Verification Commission was informed that H. Grobelny "had internal information in 
advance".. Together with another former officer of the Security Service, he set up a company 
GROMADA sp. z o.o. which planned to build, together with AMW, a hotel in Bydgoszcz, at the 
NATO Joint Force Training Center. In accordance with the information provided to the VC, "the 
AMW brought as a contribution in kind the real property located in the Centro of Bydgoszcz at 2 
Szubinska Street. However, the company went bankrupt, because no bank agreed to credit that 

The decision of the transfer of the palace in Samostrzele was made by the Deputy 
Minister of National Defense, J. Zemke. Also T. Glowacki, the initiator of "ROLOWISKO", and 
J. Antoniuk, former Director of ZIOTP, were associated with Deputy Minister J. Zemke. The 
Deputy Minister J. Zemke maintained contacts also with the owner of the company "M". 

The WSI received information about those irregularities and strange HR rules in the 
institutions responsible for investments, among others, in ZIOTP, but they did not use it. The 
Verification Commission learnt that the operatives acquired "information indicating the 
commitment of crime and tort". Such information was conveyed to the superiors, but no 
proceedings were ever instigated. According to the information obtained by the Verification 
Commission, all memos made about that investment "were not used" by the superior, pplk 
Waldemar Siatkowski. The irregularities around the constructions in Bydgoszcz were notified to 
the WSI chiefs in the Army. 

In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained 
in Article 70a. 1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter- 
intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of 
Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Brig. 
Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Brig. Gen. Jan Zukowski, Col. Glonek, Col. Dobroslaw Majca, Col. 
Jerzy Cichosz, Col. Andrzej Danczak, Col. Krzysztof Polkowski, Lt. Col. Bogdan Grenich, Lt. 
Col. Wojciech Wojcik, Lt. Col. Janusz Adamkiewicz, Lt. Col. Bogdan Swiatek, Maj. Werchner, 
Maj. Pawel Grabon, Maj. Krawiec, Maj. Pawula, Maj. Andrzej Wydrych, Cpt. Wierzbicki, Cpt. 



The activities of Gen. Wojciech Wojciechowski, Gen. Henryk Tacik, Gen. Stanislaw Krysinski, 

Gen. Henryk Szumski, Maj. Gen. Wojciech Kubiak and Col. Marek Sobczek meet the disposition 

of Article 70a.2.1 of the aforecited Act. 

The WSI Chief in the described period was Brig Gen. Marek Dukaczewski. 

Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 
14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated 
directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of 
National Defense dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National 
Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information 
Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the 
Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those 
services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI 
Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of 
Defense directly. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Stanislaw 
Dobrzanski, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Bronislaw Komorowski, Jerzy Szmajdzinski. 

The facts cited in this chapter bring doubts as to the legality of conduct of the WSI 
soldiers; thus, the Verification Commission sent to the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office a 
notification of suspected crime, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal 


12. Operation ZEN 

In late December 2001, in one of the special services' safehouses in Warsaw, there was a 
meeting of Minister of National Defense Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Acting Chief Of UOP Zbigniew 
Siemiajkowski, WSI Chief [then] Col. [later General] Marek Dukaczewski and Vice-president of 
the 'Konsalnet Company' [Konsalnet = one of the private security company in nowadays Poland] 
(and former Head of Section 9, Department 1, Security Service MSW) Aleksander Makowski. 
The subject of the meeting was the mission in "Z", and in particular the role that Aleksander 
Makowski was to play in that mission. 

As Zbigniew Siemiajkowski during the hearing before the Verification Commission, the 
Minister of National Defense Jerzy Szmajdzinski "tried to verify Makowski's abilities in (...), it 
was about his operational abilities." I did not believe in his abilities, that was vetted. (...) Some 
wanted very much for Makowski to stay (...). He was walking on slippery ground between 
business and services. We were convinced back then that Makowski's sources of information 
should be treated very carefully. The whole matter stared with operational testing by one of the 
allied services that raised lot of doubts. (...) As the UOP Chief, I had an inner belief that we 
should proceed very carefully because we were dealing with the most important case from the 
point of view of the security of our State and our allies (...). I relayed my doubts regarding 
Makowski to Minister Szmajdzinski and the WSI Chief. (...) Also Rudolf Skowronski had 
business in (...). Our vetting for Makowski, his information and operational abilities was not too 
good for him. This is why he went with his ideas to the WSI. We assumed that Makowski could 
be a confabulator and his sources could be inspired." 

The fact that the meeting was held and the general content of the conversation are 
confirmed also by Minister Szmajdzinski and WSI Chief Dukaczewski, though they present the 
stand of Minister Siemiajkowski differently. According to their accounts, he supposedly agreed 
that Makowski passes under the military intelligence's wing and did not warn about the allies' 
doubts and unreliability of Makowski's information. This is why Minister Szmajdzinski made the 
decision to use Aleksander Makowski and ordered Gen. Dukaczewski to take appropriate action. 
Dukaczewski ordered the case to be run by Col. Oziembala who allegedly knew Makowski from 
the time they both served at the post in Rome in the 80-ties. Oziembala ran Makowski as the 


source called "HAMID" and at the beginning of 2004 transferred the case to Col. Surdyk, with 
partly unregistered documentation. 

The WSI Chief Col. Dukaczewski gave Surdyk the instruction to handle the case, stressing that it 
was done at the personal order of Minister Jerzy Szmajdzinski. 

Individual reports are initialed by Dukaczewski, sometimes they are addressed to 
Szmajdzinski. The latter, during the hearing before the Commission, did not question his 
participation in the decision to use Makowski. He only stressed the uniqueness of the situation in 
which the military intelligence was, not having any sources on the eve of dispatch of the military 
units to "Z". Wanting to acquire information, he supposedly did not go into details of the 
applicable legal procedure. The former Minister of National Defense refused answering the 
question whether he was familiar with the content of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 
1996, whereby special liability was imposed on the Minister of National Defense for operational 
and investigation work of the WSI. 

Makowski' s case was run by the WSI in the scope of two investigations, one of which, the initial 
investigation in 2001-2004 code-named "HAMID", turned up after the Verification Commission 
has been analyzing the case for a month. The case file was not found, there is only the source 
case, started on May 14, 2002. 

A second case - code-named "ZEN" - was started as a problem case only in December 2003 and 
the first document in the file is dated around that time (it has no signature or any information as 
to its producer).. The first report signed by the case officer, describing the case, is dated on 
September 15, 2004. Similar to the "HAMID" file, "ZEN" is incomplete as well: there is no case 
start sheet, the page numbers have been changed and some documents which come from the 
initial period of the case were put into the file at the end. The file also has the traces of attempted 
destruction of documents by covering some information (attempt was made to prevent the 
identification of Makowski' s personal data as well as the information about his past, including 
the work for the 1 st Department of MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of People's Republic of 
Poland and his work in 'Konsalnet'). Along with those efforts goes the fact that some WSI 
soldiers and politicians who made the decision that Makowski should be used by the intelligence 
denied knowing about his place of employment and his ties to Konsalnet). 

The records in "HAMID" file give no doubts: Makowski is described as the WSI 
intelligence source and remunerated for the same. Also the file "Z" contains documentation 


which shows the fact that Makowski was a source who was to provide information (also from 
three other sources placed in "Z"). For his services, Makowski collected - starting from 2002, in 
17 installments - 31.44 thousand zlotys and 108.616 thousand US Dollars. He delivered at least 
75 memos and reports, held 15 registered operational meetings and several trips to "Z" at WSI's 
cost. The intelligence soldiers met several times one of the sources indicated by Makowski, once 
in Poland and twice in "Z". Every time Makowski was also present at the meetings and the 
soldiers who carried out intelligence tasks stressed before the Commission that he never agreed 
for independent meetings between the sources and the intelligence. A meeting with the other two 
sources never had place and it is not clear if they existed at all. Ending this stage of collaboration, 
Makowski caused the conclusion of an informal agreement with the intelligence, according to 
which he demanded 40 thousand USD a month to secure his needs and the needs of the sources 
he run. This was probably connected with the talks he held with the intelligence since autumn 
2005, the purpose of which was to organize a "zone of influence", "build the in-place post 
(residential)" and develop "a business network as a cover institution". 

From the materials contained in available written sources and from the hearings of the 
soldiers who took part in operation "ZEN" as well as from the hearings of politicians responsible 
for the security of the Polish State, It can be seen that the concept of such cover or zone was to 
consist in establishment of a commercial company (or a network of companies) which would 
deliver supplies to the military units in "ZEN".. Those companies were on one hand supposed to 
form the base for surveillance and intelligence work, on the other hand, to satisfy the financial 
needs of the circles co-operating with Polish forces in "ZEN" country. Aleksander Makowski 
was supposed to have share in these activities, and it cannot be ruled out that some share would 
fall to other Konsalnet owners or even the whole company. Whichever the case, another co- 
owner and founder of Konsalnet, Wieslaw Bednarz, traveled to "ZEN" with Makowski and 
Minister Szmajdzinski as early as in February 2002, i.e. at the very beginning of the operation. 

After the elections in 2005, the case of Makowski and his operation of misinformation of 
the authorities of the Republic of Poland was kept secret from the highest authorities: the 
President and the Prime Minister. After Radoslaw Sikorski took the office of the Minister of 
National Defense, he was informed about the general framework of the operation and at the 
beginning of 2006, Minister Sikorski was given the details. As Col. Surdyk explained, Radoslaw 
Sikorski arrived then to the intelligence's seat and was acquainted with the whole "ZEN" 


documentation. The case officer Col. Surdyk, Gen. Dukaczewski and the documentation keeper 
were present during the reading in order to provide further clarifications. They both confirmed in 
their explanations before the Commission that Minister Sikorski read the documentation. 

Later, the President and the Prime Minister were informed, however, they were presented 
only the version complaint with the point of view of the "ZEN" source. 

In the note dated September 11, 2006, a day before the Polish delegation was to leave for 
the US, the WSI Chief informed in turn that the Minister Sikorski proposed the President L. 
Kaczynski to notify the whole case to the allies and take joint actions. Minister Sikorski was said 
to have supported the whole initiative during his talks in the US. Surdyk stated: I informed 
Minister Sikorski about the role played by Aleksander Makowski in this case at the beginning of 
2006, when an article was published in the press about Mr. Skowronski, where his ties to 
Makowski in Inter Commerce were mentioned". 

The cases "ZEN" and "HAMID" cause a few basic questions to arise. Firstly, what was it 
all really about? Secondly, how it could have happened that the authorities of the Republic of 
Poland, in a matter of key importance for the State security, were deceived by a former, 
negatively vetted officer of the 1 st Department of the MSW of the People's Republic of Poland, a 
businessman suspected of swindle, an informer who was negatively assessed by the most 
important special services of the world for nearly 4 years? 

In accordance with the first preserved report concerning the "ZEN" case, dated September 
15, 2004, the case's objective was: "to counteract the threat posed to Poland and her citizens as 
well as to other entities of international law by the terrorist organizations as well as to attempt to 
lead to the capture of the main organizers and leaders "X" and "Y". An operation's objective so 
outlined surely must have required the highest bona fides of people involved, absolutely certain 
information and particular efforts aimed at verification of the sources. Meanwhile, in the 
operation "ZEN" - in the "HAMID" operation too, for that matter - the situation is exactly the 
opposite. Although Makowski is described in the documentation as a source, he signs the receipts 
for money and the special instruction as the source or HUMINT source - in fact, as the officers 
maintain, he was never treated as a source. He was supposed to be, as Minister Szmajdzinski put 
it and M. Dukaczewski and other case officers, such as Col. Surdyk, Col. W. and Col. Z. 
confirmed, "a bridge agent", a "contact with the source", "a contact". The operational instruction 
does not contain such categories of collaboration. Disregarding the operational instruction means 


violating the law, exposing human life and success of the entire operation to an extreme danger. 
And, as a consequence, brings the risk of misinformation of the State authorities, including the 

The assessment of the bona fides of Makowski and his sources is thus of key importance 
to the whole matter. This is because the military intelligence entrusted him with the task of 
creation of the intelligence guard for the Polish presence in "ZEN" and, with the lapse of time, it 
was Makowski who, to a gradually greater extent, decided on the undertakings of the Polish 
intelligence and State in the matters related to "ZEN". 

Meanwhile, Makowski has never been vetted as a source. His bona fides has not been 
screened, he has not been controlled, even his place of employment and his surroundings have 
not been checked. Even more, his sources in "ZEN" have never been vetted and Makowski 
himself did not agree to disclose their personal data to the intelligence. The intelligence officers 
also did not have a change to meet these sources personally, without Makowski' s company. 
When asked for this unusual procedure, contradictory to the legal norms applicable in operational 
actions, the people responsible for this excused themselves with various circumstances. Minister 
Szmajdzinski pointed primarily to the need for immediate action due to the approaching date of 
action in "ZEN". The WSI Chief emphasized the merits and efficiency that Makowski had in the 
time of his work for the Security Service. Officers Surdyk, W. and Z. pointed to the orders 
received from their superiors, including the Ministers of National Defense, who pointed 
Makowski to them as a source. 

These explanations are not credible. It seems even that the operation "Z" was some type 
of cover for completely different actions, aimed at deriving personal benefits for Makowski and 
people related to him. This is indicated by the fact that the warnings about Makowski being an 
unreliable person, a confabulator, a person who conceals his true intentions and aims, were 
systematically ignored. Special emphasis should be put here on the fact that this opinion about 
Makowski was known to the Minister of National Defense and the WSI Chief as they had been 
warned by the UOP Chief, Zbigniew Siemiatffowski. The fact that the UOP Chief pointed both to 
UOP findings and to the information coming from the allies is of great importance. In this 
perspective, it becomes of special significance that there were the attempts to repro the 
operational documentation, both by covering Makowski' s personal data and by describing him as 
a source which he in fact was not, as a person not subjected to normal operational procedures and 


thus not delivering the information reliable for the intelligence. It must be also stressed that this 
fact has been pointed out at least twice by the intelligence officers: Col. Hermel and Col. Szlenk. 
The former, in his analysis of October 2004, pointed that Makowski's information is of general 
nature, they do not find confirmation and, first of all, are consequent, not beforehand. 

"In the assessment of the sources' work we see that the provided information is 
superficial, which gives the grounds for assumptions that: 

- the source makes up the story for a hearsay information, but has no direct access to it, or 

- it is delivered through a chain of people, losing this way many important details and ending 
contorted or incomplete". 

Even a more far-reaching diagnosis was contained by Col. Szlenk and Col. Hermel in the 
conclusion of the current analysis, put at the end of Case "Z" (vol. IV, pp. 256, 257): They write 
there that: 
"(•••) Lack of details and vagueness of the information causes it to be of little value. 

2. The source confuses the data of people associated with X, Y, group Z, W, etc. 

3. A great majority of information is superficial and pertains to matters, which had already taken 

4. The presented data are imprecise, impossible to verify or even untrue. The current verifiability 
rate of the delivered information is drastically low. 

In the conclusion it is stated point-blank: 

"1. The provided information did not meet the operational results declared by the contact, 

2. Our contact has limited abilities to obtain reliable, and thus verifiable information from his 
alleged human sources, 

3. It cannot be ruled out that the contact purposefully plays a game with the WSI in order to gain 
personal (e.g. financial) benefits." 

In spite of such a crushing diagnosis, not only was the case continued, but also huge 
amounts were spent on keeping the alleged "source" or "contact". First of all, however, there was 
a conscious misinformation of the State authorities, primarily the President of the Republic of 
Poland, and the relevant allied institutions. The case files preserved at least three reports 
addressed to the highest State authorities, where it was stated that the WSI is in possession of 
information pointing to an opportunity to capture the terrorist leaders from group X. An 
arrangement with the allies was suggested in order to undertake a joint operation aimed at 


liquidation of the terrorists, the highest authorities were persuaded to start appropriate 
international talks, false reports were delivered to other competent domestic services, the Deputy 
Minister of National Defense in charge of the WSI and to the Prime Minister and the President of 
the Republic of Poland. On the basis, among others, of the alleged reports of Makowski and his 
sources, in winter 2005, M. Dukaczewski suggested the State authorities to implement 
extraordinary measures in the whole country in protection against a terrorist attack. If his had 
been followed, it would have meant exposing the social peace to considerable threat. 

Undoubtedly, however, the most grave consequences derived from the attempt to 
misinform the President of the Republic of Poland, the highest authorities of the State and the 
Poland's allies when, as a result of misinformation, the intelligence started an operation that was 
aimed at conning the allies out of multi-million award under the pretences of elimination of the 
terrorists. At the same time, the allies were accused by the intelligence officers of ill will, or even 
a politically inspired unwillingness to capture the terrorists, because they pointed out the 
fictionality of the information. We should particularly stress the suggestion contained here, 
among others, in the report of July 24, 2006, which indicated that the policy of power, pursued by 
the US, was the reason for unwillingness to capture the terrorists and for the rejection of 
proposals coming from the Intelligence Directorate of the WSI. All those arguments were a 
camouflage for the true objectives, which motivated Aleksander Makowski, the true author of the 
entire operation and actual instigator of the activities of the WSI intelligence. 

We do not know all the circumstances and reasons for collaboration of the military 
intelligence with Aleksander Makowski. Certainly not without importance are the issues raised 
by the soldiers and politicians in their statements made before the Verification Commission, 
where they pointed to the confidence the intelligence had in Makowski due to his long-term work 
in the Security Service. Also the acquaintance of Makowski with Marek Oziembala, who he 
supposedly met during his stay at the post in Rome in the 80-ties, dated at that time. Oziembala 
was also Makowski' s first case officer. Also the business experience Makowski had could have 
some impact on the decisions on Minister Jerzy Szmajdzinski. Szmajdzinski denies knowing 
what that experience was, but it is hard to believe; a detailed account of financial relations 
between Makowski and the inhabitants of "Z" was given to the Commission by the testifying 
soldiers of the WSI. The financial conflict between Makowski and the UOP intelligence was 
mentioned by Minister Siemiajkowski, while the settlements made in precious stones were 


reported by the soldiers heard out in this case by the Commission. These accounts create a picture 
of large-scale, sometimes illegal operations conducted by Waldemar [supposed to be: 
Aleksander] Makowski, Skowronski and their domestic and foreign partners with the use of the 
Polish State machine. The third factor which was probably taken into account were Makowski' s 
relations and acquaintance with some of the "ZEN" commanders. These close ties are confirmed 
in his explanations by Minister Szmajdzinski who supposedly observed them on site during the 
visit in "ZEN" in 2002, but also by other soldiers who stayed there in the framework of activities 
of the WSI intelligence. 

This is why, aside from financial matters, we should also take political conditions into 
account. Such a suggestion is contained in the reports which stressed that the Western allies, due 
to their "great power" political game were not interested in the liquidation of terrorists and that 
this was the exact reason - not the lack of Aleksander Makowski' s bona fides - for the lack of 
confidence in the information from Polish sources. But such premises result also from the stand 
taken by some soldiers during the hearings, when they stated that they do not see anything wrong 
in co-operating with groups infiltrated by the US enemies and they did not see it as a threat to the 
Polish mission. 

The cases "ZEN" and "HAMID" thus appear as a specific summary of the negative 
consequences arising from the fact that the Polish military special services were based on human 
teams, concepts and patterns of actions inherited from People's Republic of Poland. Here met 
almost all pathologies described in this report: services' reliance on the teams trained in the 
USSR, use of former Security Service people (organized in the so-called business intelligence 
agencies, which in fact were teams aspiring to steer Polish services), building in-place posts and 
conducting intelligence activities based on the network of business enterprises and finally 
complete disregard of the State authorities and their control over special services as well as 
readiness to cheat on those people's own State. The alleged professionalism, effectiveness and 
indispensability of those services proved to be just the opposite. In the case "ZEN", the services, 
acting at the orders of a swindler, robbed the Polish state and were ready to expose Polish 
soldiers and commanders of armed forces to the highest danger and international embarrassment. 
We need to ask here what was the inspiration for such activities, remembering that it all happened 
so because for many years the services which grew up on Soviet background were given 
complete impunity and except for a few months of rules by Jan Olszewski's cabinet no one has 


ever tried to force those services to serve the interest of the Polish State and Nation. Looking 
from this perspective, the liquidation of the WSI and creation of new military special services 
appears as the only possible solution. 

In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained 
in Article 70a. 1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter- 
intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of 
Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Col. 
Jerzy Surdyk, Col. Dariusz Sobala and Col. Waldemar Zak. 

The activities of Andrzej Makowski meet the disposition of Article 70a.2.1 of the 
aforecited Act. 

The WSI Chiefs in the described period were: Brig. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski and Brig. 
Gen. Jan Zukowski. 

Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 
14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated 
directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of 
National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National 
Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information 
Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations.. Pursuant to the 
Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those 
services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI 
Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of 
Defense directly. The Minister of the National Defense in the described period was Jerzy 

The facts cited in this chapter bring doubts as to the legality of conduct of the WSI 
soldiers; thus, the Verification Commission sent to the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office a 
notification of suspected crime, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal 


The Military Information Services was headed by the Chief, to whom all chiefs of 
individual directorates, offices, units, sections etc. were subordinated. It was the WSI Chief, 
holding the highest office in the WSI organizational structure, who was responsible for actions of 
all soldiers, officers and employees of the WSI. 

Until 1995, the responsibility for actions of the Military Information Services was not 
regulated expressis verbis by any Act or even an Ordinance. This could cause a mistaken belief 
that there was not anyone who, as the supervisor of the service's actions, together with that 
service's Chief, would be jointly and severally responsible with the officers who committed acts 
incompliant with the legal order in force. By virtue of Article 35.1 of the so-called "Minor 
Constitution" of 1992, it was the President who was the supreme commander of the Polish Army. 
The next section provides that it is the President who, in agreement with the Minister of National 
Defense, appoints and dismissed the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army, and at the request 
of the Minister of National Defense appoints and dismisses Deputy Chiefs of General Staff, 
commanders of individual types of Armed Forces and commanders of military districts. Those 
provisions mean that at the time of peace the responsibility for activities of the Polish Army rests 
both with the President and the Minister of National Defense. This signifies their special 
responsibility for the actions of the WSI. 

A similar solution was implemented in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 
2, 1997. Article 134 of the Constitution states that at the time of peace it is the President of the 
Republic of Poland who exercises the command over the Armed Forces, through the Minister of 
National Defense. 

In both legal situations, a greater burden of responsibility rests with the President of the 
Republic of Poland who exercises his prerogatives through the Minister of National Defense. 

Only Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated 
December 14, 1995, contained the regulation stating precisely that the Military Information 
Services are subordinated directly to that Minister. Naturally, this does not exclude in any manner 
the responsibility of subsequent Ministers of National Defense for the WSI actions before the 
entry of that Act into force, because every Minister is liable for his or her ministry on general 


The key regulation is § 1.16 of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed 
Scope of Competencies of the Minister of National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. It imposed on 
the Minister of National Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the 
Military Information Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. 

A uniformed provision was included later in the Military Information Services Act of July 
9, 2003, whereby the supervision over the activities of those services rested with the Minister of 
National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI Chief. Pursuant to Article 9.1 of this 
Act, the WSI Chief, until the Act of June 9, 2006, was subordinated to the Minister of Defense 

This legal situation indicates that the special responsibility for irregularities and omissions 
pointed out in the report rests with: 

• the President of the Republic of Poland Lech Walesa 

• the President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander Kwasniewski 

• the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army, Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki (in the period of 
subordination of the WSI to the General Staff of the Polish Army) 

• the Minister of National Defense Piotr Kolodziejczyk 

• the Minister of National Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz 

• the Minister of National Defense Zbigniew Okonski 

• the Minister of National Defense Stanislaw Dobrzanski 

• the Minister of National Defense Bronislaw Komorowski 

• the Minister of National Defense Jerzy Szmajdzinski 
and the following Chiefs of the WSI: 

• Counter-Adm. Czeslaw Wawrzyniak 

• Gen. Boleslaw Izydorczyk 

• Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk 

• Gen. Kazimierz Glowacki 

• Gen. Marek Dukaczewski 

Antoni Macierewicz 
Chairman of the Verification Commission